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‘I’ve always been proud to say I’m doing microfinance. In the early days, nobody knew what it 
was, and I was happy to explain what we were trying to do. Now when people ask, I feel 
embarrassed. And I feel like hiding somewhere. I often say, I must admit it, I’m just retired. So 
this is the sorry state of the sector today. So far we’ve fallen.’  
  (Gibbons, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Here, my feeling is, one of the reasons why consumer protection in microfinance has not been 
a priority, […] there is an inherent contradiction, or a conflict of interest. A MFI can not grow, 
if they want to pay attention to the clients.’ 
 (C.S. Reddy, p.c.)  
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PREFACE 
Microfinance and Financial Inclusion have been under discussion as a means of 
empowerment and development aid for at least forty years. Since Muhammad Yunus and the 
Grameen Bank won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, interest in the matter has risen further.  
The Nobel Committee described Microcredit as ‘an important liberating force in societies 
where women in particular have to struggle against repressive social and economic 
conditions’ (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2006). Microfinance seemed to present a 
silver bullet in development. It allegedly helps women out of poverty and empowers them to 
become entrepreneurs by providing access to financial products, thus providing opportunities 
to the poor to overcome poverty. At the same time it would achieve a stronger position of 
women, a stronger community, access to education for children, and with economic uprise, 
health parameters would improve. 
The idea of a social business, which meets a double bottom line by being not only financially 
sustainable but also achieving social goals, was given a lot of attention, not only in the media, 
but also by equity investors. In India, more and more such institutions started operating. As 
they often considerably overlap in their focus, they have begun to compete for investors, staff 
and clients. In this competition for faster growth and attraction of equity investors, several 
organisations have overstressed economic success and lost track of their second mission: to 
help empower the poor. Against this background, three major delinquency crises occurred in 
the Indian microfinance market in the last years. 
In these crises, Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) were accused of freely giving multiple loans 
and later harassing clients who were struggling to pay back (The New York Times, 2010). 
Quite suddenly, MFIs were hindered in continuing their operations by state or religious 
authorities and clients refused to pay their instalments. Soon, stories of farmers committing 
suicide because of over-indebtedness and coercive recovery practices by MFIs were reported 
(The Economist, 2010a). Many observers (e.g. The Wall Street Journal, 2009), compared the 
situation to the US subprime crisis: They described a bubble in microfinance, created by 
giving too much credit to people who were not creditworthy. It was argued that the situation 
of MF clients not only does not improve, but that they are actually worse off because of their 
loan. Others argued that attacking microfinance was merely a political coup in order to retain 
political power by gaining the votes of the poor (The Economic Times, 2010a). These issues 
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have dominated global news and public opinion on Indian microfinance in 2010 and 2011. 
Now, there is a climate of scepticism and disbelief against the ‘miracles of microfinance’.  
The need for consumer protection in this field was not addressed for the longest time. 
Microfinance was solely perceived as an opportunity for clients, without taking eventual risks 
into account. That socially oriented institutions lead to over-indebted clients came as a 
surprise to many. This perception of the microfinance sector explains the lack of regulation of 
the sector.  
Over the last years the issue of consumer protection has been discussed amongst all 
stakeholders – politicians, donors, investors, MFIs and their associations. Still, the adoption 
and implementation of consumer protection proves difficult. There is a consensus on the need 
to improve and strengthen consumer protection. What client protection in microfinance 
should entail seems to be undisputed, as various institutional codes converge on the same core 
principles. These codes usually prescribe transparent pricing, appropriate collection practices 
and ethical staff behaviour, avoidance of over-indebtedness and mechanisms for redress of 
grievances (see e.g. The Smart Campaign, 2010).  
In 2010 and 2011 the Indian State of Andhra Pradesh (AP) and the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) adopted regulations for the microfinance sector. The central state issued a new draft for 
a central microfinance law in July 2011. Still, there is no unified regulation in India and it is 
likely that the introduction of these regulations will ensue lengthy constitutional conflicts over 
the competences of different government bodies. Besides, it is also unclear how regulations 
can be implemented and safeguarded in practice. The regulator can try to implement strict 
regulation, however, what happens in actuality can only be controlled to a limited extent. At 
the moment industry associations have good intentions, but not sufficient power to act against 
the interests of their members. If they do get strengthened, they could become very important 
watchdogs for the regulator. Lenders enjoyed growth without scrutinising the promises of 
MFIs, or were only interested in the financial aspects of lending from the start. MFIs have 
been infected by the race for maximum growth and focussed on financial data. This is partly 
due to the difficulty encountered with measuring social performance. At present, they are 
struggling to regain their credibility and funding, as banks and investors have stopped lending 
to them.  
  3 
FOCUS AND OUTLINE 
The main focus of this paper is the position of clients in Indian microfinance. 
In all credit transactions there exists a difference in information between borrower and lender. 
The group lending methodology of microfinance was designed for lenders to overcome the 
lack of information about the risk-taking and creditworthiness of borrowers.   
In my thesis I wanted to find out, if, at the same time, an informational asymmetry to the 
other side exists. This asymmetry, namely the lack of information of clients, which seems to 
occur in microfinance, lies at the heart of consumer protection issues in all fields. In the 
context of microfinance, it was so far largely ignored. This is probably due to seeing 
commercial microfinance as a development programme and not as a for-profit business. 
Secondly, I was interested to find out how much importance is given to consumer protection 
in commercial microfinance and how microfinance insiders assess the chances of success for 
the various actions taken. 
In order to find out how central the consumer is to the actions of industry stakeholders, I 
conducted interviews and followed discussions at conferences, blogs and in newspapers. My 
interview partners were regulators, investors, banks, industry associations, microfinance 
institutions and advisors. I spent seven months in India, from the outburst of the last crisis in 
October 2010 to the RBI passing a regulation in May 2011, during which I was doing an 
internship at GIZ in Delhi in the project ‘consumer protection and sustainable consumption’. I 
was working on a service that will enable microfinance clients to get independent advice on 
microfinance products and help them to seek redress if necessary. This project was conducted 
in partnership with the Indian ministry of consumer affairs.  
My thesis is split in five parts.  
First, I give an introduction to microfinance and a short description of the microcredit model. 
I explain the market imperfections and information deficits, which microfinance academics 
and practitioners wanted to overcome using the group lending mechanism.  
I will analyse if consumers actually have enough information about products and should trust 
MFIs, a question that was not yet considered. An information asymmetry on the clients’ side 
was ignored for a long time, as were eventual negative effects of microfinance and the need 
for consumer protection in this field. Additionally, I give in introduction to other 
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microfinance products like savings or insurance and the role that consumer protection will 
need to have there.  
In the second part I describe the highly competitive Indian microfinance market. I briefly 
explain how it developed, and the two main channels through which it is provided. I will 
explain how it is organized and regulated, and what situation the sector is currently in. I also 
address the issue of the crises of delinquency and bad reputation, which occurred in Indian 
Microfinance in the last years. This led to speculations about a microfinance bubble, which 
were covered in the media around the globe. Heavy competition in Indian microfinance did 
not lead to an improvement of the position of clients, but lead to a failure of the joint-liability-
group model. The current state of Indian Microfinance shows the serious consequences that 
stem from the information asymmetry on the clients’ side. 
In the third part I summarize the outcome of the first two chapters and ask about the 
consequences that should follow. Knowing about the informational deficits of clients and the 
risks these deficits cause, may either lead to reconsidering the microfinance model and 
looking for alternatives or it might lead to a change in the perception of microfinance.   
As alternatives to commercial microfinance I briefly present the SHG-BLP model and co-
operative banks.   
Most likely, commercial microfinance will remain the preferred model. I argue that the 
knowledge about the deficiencies of the microfinance model should result in a new perception 
of microfinance: Microfinance as just another – useful – financial service, irrespective of an 
eventual positive developmental effect. As such, it needs to meet regulatory standards just 
like other financial providers. A lack of information on the side of consumers is not a 
singularity of the microfinance market. It is equally problematic in mainstream financial 
markets. In order to address this deficiency, consumer protection needs to be regulated.   
 I give an overview of the general situation of consumer protection in India, the rationale 
behind regulating consumer protection and the difficulties that come with it.  
In this chapter, I also compare consumer protection in Indian microfinance to the situation of 
low-income clients in the UK and the US financial markets. Despite very different livelihoods 
and loan sizes, they are surprisingly comparable. Lack of financial literacy, the lack of 
knowledge about the risks and costs associated with doorstep-lending and especially the need 
for an organisation representing the interests of poor consumers also occur in financial 
markets for poor clients in other countries. Consumer protection should not be mistaken for a 
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social programme, but needs to become a regulatory requirement that businesses have to take 
into account.    
The fourth chapter of my thesis covers the level of consumer protection in microfinance in 
India. In order to create a functioning regulatory framework, the roles of all stakeholders - 
from the state to the individual borrower - have to be kept in mind. Additionally, I discuss the 
motivation of these actors to engage in consumer protection (or to refrain from it) and how 
they can be scrutinized.  
I begin with the macro-level, describing the role of the Indian state, the federal union, the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the federal states. I give a short summary of the current legal 
framework of these entities, including the regulations in the federal state of Andhra Pradesh 
(AP). Here, I will also discuss microfinance as a political tool.  
Not only individual institutions, but also funders, donors, banks and investors need to be 
governed by a set of regulations, be it by the Indian government, their home governments or 
self-regulating efforts.   
Self-regulation plays a crucial role. First of all, regulation will not work if MFIs do not feel 
committed toward it. Industry associations can help to strengthen awareness, provide skills 
and change organizational culture. Within a regulatory framework, they should play a role in 
monitoring practices in the field. They can serve as a link between MFIs and the state that will 
be unable to monitor actual practices. However, these associations are industry bodies. They 
represent their members’ interests, but at the same time aim to regulate and monitor them. As 
of now they lack credibility as they struggle with taking action against their members. 
The section on the role of donors, investors, and banks focuses on how well they are 
scrutinised by their owners and how they scrutinise the MFIs they are funding. Donors, for 
instance, had to explain their involvement in the Indian microfinance crisis in parliaments in 
their home countries.   
The self-regulating efforts of industry associations and individual institutions have been 
important in creating awareness and are discussed in detail. While some institutions are very 
active in publicly promoting responsible finance, others remain unnoticed as they continue to 
use unethical lending practices, seeking profits as long as the sector gets shut down totally. 
The institutional structure of MFIs can be an additional obstacle in meeting its social mission. 
Staff incentives are designed to promote growth, not poverty reduction or adherence to client 
protection codes.  
Ultimately, I cover the level of clients. As a prerequisite for consumer protection, consumers 
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need to understand the contracts they are signing. As in the European and the US financial 
market, there is a lack of comprehension of the terms of financial contracts. Additionally, 
microfinance clients often lack access to information because they live in remote areas. Some 
are even illiterate. Financial literacy trainings are a crucial instrument in addressing this need. 
This also needs to include information about consumer rights and legal assistance in disputes.    
 
I end with a summary of my findings. The imperfections of the microfinance model 
necessitate a regulatory framework, if the microfinance model is not modified or replaced 
altogether. The process of commercialization of microfinance made it obvious that 
microfinance should at least meet the standards in consumer protection that mainstream 
financial products have to fulfil. The details of microfinance make it necessary that such a 
regulatory framework addresses all stakeholders in the process.  
Indian microfinance is in a state of transformation. How the RBIs regulation will be 
implemented is still to be seen. Also the latest draft of the central MF Bill will be changed. 
There is still fear that neighbouring states of Andhra Pradesh, where the crisis happened in 
2010, will follow issuing strict legislation (see e.g. The Hindu, 2011). Some expect that many 
MFIs will not survive the current financial year, ending in March 2012. It will be interesting 
to look at the situation in another year, and see how it evolves and if Indian Microfinance will 
consolidate.  
That there is a conflict between financial success, and meeting developmental goals equally 
applies to other microfinance markets. Above all, governments have to take responsibility and 
control their financial sectors. Consumer Protection must not be optional and depend on the 
benevolence of the industry, but needs to be a precondition for operating in this business. 
  7 
1. AN INTRODUCTION TO MICROFINANCE:                
WHAT IT IS, WHY IT IS NEEDED AND HOW IT WORKS 
 
1.1. Why microfinance developed: The imperfection of credit 
markets1  
The need to have a specific term describing financial products for low-income clients 
suggests that financial products for these differ from mainstream financial products. Catering 
low-income clients goes beyond lower amounts being handled. Microfinance clients usually 
live in remote areas, which are not reachable using the existing distribution channels. Often, 
they are illiterate and unfamiliar with the concept of various financial products and have no 
collateral to offer. It is necessary to replace the securities that financial institutions ask for by 
other mechanisms. Because formal financial institutions have limited information about their 
clients and their actions, they have no way of screening trustworthy from unreliable clients. 
As banks lack information, they cannot charge riskier clients, which are more likely to 
default, more than safe customers. To have an average interest rate, however, means that safe 
clients are subsidising risky ones and will eventually drive the safe clients out of the market, 
so that the lender is left with only risky clients (Armendariz et.al., 2010, p. 58). This 
phenomenon is called the problem of adverse selection. It gets even more problematic as there 
is limited liability: in case of default there is no way of recovering the outstanding amount, 
especially as there is no collateral available. Through this, the riskier clients have an incentive 
to use their loans for even riskier projects. If their project fails, they will not have to pay back 
the principal; if it succeeds, they will enjoy higher returns. The lending institution, on the 
other hand, has neither information on how risky the client will be when using the credit he is 
given, nor has it control over the client to deter him from taking excessive risk (ibid). This is 
called the problem of moral hazard2.  
It is mainly these two informational asymmetries that explain why there is reluctance to offer 
mainstream financial products to the poor.  
                                                 
1 As microcredit was developed first, the problems were addressed there. They also exist in 
the market for other financial products. See also FN 4. 
2 Moral hazard does not only exist for credit. The lack of information about clients is 
problematic with all microfinance products, e.g. in microinsurance, when ‘insurees don’t take 
those precautions against bad outcomes that may have been agreed upon’ (Dasgupta, P., 2007, 
p. 70). 
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1.2. The shift to microfinance 
The term ‘microfinance’ has displaced the term ‘microcredit’ in the general discussion, as 
there has been a shift from offering only credit to providing all kinds of financial services. 
Initially ‘microcredit’ described institutions where ‘the focus was explicitly on poverty 
reduction and social change, and the key players were NGOs’ (Armendariz et.al., 2010, p. 
15). As these services have broadened, the terminology has shifted from poverty reduction to 
financial inclusion.  
‘The push to “microfinance” came with recognition that households can benefit from access to 
financial services more broadly defined (at first the focus was mainly on savings) and not just 
credit for microenterprises. With the change in language has come a change in orientation, 
toward “less poor” households and toward the establishment of commercially oriented, fully 
regulated financial entities.’ (Armendariz et.al., 2010, p. 15) 
 
The definition of microfinance now includes all financial services: 
‘The term Microfinance covers various financial products for low-income clients, who would 
otherwise not have access to formal financial services. This includes credit, insurance, savings, 
pensions, remittances, or any other financial product. Usually, this happens without the clients 
having any collateral to offer.’ (Smart Campaign).  
 
This introduction gives an overview of the most commonly used microfinance products. The 
best known and most widely spread microfinance product is microcredit. The main focus of 
this paper lies on this product. In the literature on microcredit, the joint liability model and 
other mechanisms are described as a way of overcoming the market imperfections that I 
described before.  
‘From the standpoint of economic theory, the group-lending contract addresses [...] information 
imperfections that cause moral hazard and adverse selection. In principle, the group-lending 
contract provides a way to achieve efficient outcomes even when the lender remains ignorant or 
unable to effectively enforce contracts. Moreover, in principle, the group lending methodology 
can potentially promote social capital, and thus further enhance efficiency.’ (Armendariz et.al., 
2010, p. 128),  
 
After describing the joint liability model, I describe the status of other microfinance 
variations. The lack of consumer protection was debated for microcredit in the last years, as 
problems arose there, but is even more relevant for other products. With credit, the risk of 
default lies with the lender. Clients of microinsurance, savings, pensions and remittances as 
opposed to loan products have to trust the institution and have to carry the risk of default on 
the institutions side. 
‘Providing insurance poses challenges absent in providing credit. Most important, the insurance 
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company must earn the trust of customers, while for credit the reverse is true: it is customers 
who must earn the trust of bankers.’ (Collins et.al., 2009, p. 91f) 
 
1.3. The Joint Liability Groups in Microcredit 
Joint Liability groups, sometimes also called Grameen groups, are a way of overcoming the 
imperfect information the lender has. In this model, members avail credit either as a group or 
individually, but are liable for their peers. In case one member fails to repay the loan, the rest 
of the group will have to. This leads to low loan default rates. The risk caused by lack of 
information of the lending party is avoided, as members of the group are likely to choose 
members they trust. At the same time, a member is unlikely to default in such a constellation, 
as she will have a strong interest in being seen as a trustworthy member of her social 
surroundings. Next to this internal motivation, the group will also pressure the individual not 
to default, as they will have to cover for their peer. With this mechanism, the problem of 
adverse selection is effectively countered, as cautious entrepreneurs will group with other 
cautious ones and risky ones will be left with other risky ones (See Murdoch, 1999, p. 1580f). 
The trust of others electing someone as a group member is referred to and valued as ‘social 
collateral’, indicating that it replaces traditional securities. At the same time, the problem of 
moral hazard is addressed, as fellow group members have information about the use of the 
loan, and will make sure that peers are able to pay back the loan. Group members are likely to 
help each other out in times of struggle, which increases the chance of success of their 
business. 
Additionally, a second incentive is used. The first loan granted is usually small. When the 
first loan circle is completed without default, a higher loan will be granted to the group. As a 
result of this mechanism, groups are less likely to default as a whole. As foreseen by Murdoch 
(Murdoch, 1999, p. 1583) this incentive is likely to fail in a competitive surrounding where 
institutions do not share client data, as groups can easily default and approach another MFI 
for a new loan. The instalment of credit bureaus, which share information on clients and their 
repayment behaviour, is one way of addressing this problem. 
Even though the group model is most widely used, variations exist: There are individual loans 
for clients who have a need for a bigger loan, where a more detailed loan assessment is done. 
There, the repayment capacity and willingness has to be scrutinized. There is also urban 
microfinance, given to small businesses in slum areas or the like. The challenge here is to 
assess the stability of clients, as they are more likely to disappear and move to another city or 
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back to their village. Also their housing conditions are often less stable. Loans are not solely 
given to women. Sometimes loan conditions are more flexible, for instance in special loans 
for agricultural businesses, where there is no steady income throughout the year. The 
repayment schedule allows repayment in times of harvest. It is the group model as I described 
it, which is responsible for the enormous growth and profitability of microfinance. As the 
model is applied equally everywhere it becomes profitable by reaching scale.  
1.4. Microsaving 
Some argue that the most adequate and needed product for the poor is not credit but savings 
(see Collins et. al., 2009, p. 179). They argue that loans are used as ‘accelerators’ in building 
lump sums, as a way of reverse saving. 
‘Loans are “accelerators” in the lump-sum-building process in more than one way. Obviously, 
they give households access to cash immediately rather than after a slow process of saving. But 
loans often have features that speed up the process even further. Price is one of them. [...] 
Khadeja, who took a loan at 36 percent a year and spent much of it on gold jewelry that she saw 
as a vital store of value for her future, used the pressure that the weekly discipline of her 
microcredit provider exerted on her. [...] Khadeja saw the truth of an oddsounding 
paradox: if you’re poor, borrowing can be the quickest way to save. Khadeja knew that without 
some external force to help her, her chances of saving enough money to buy the gold necklace 
were small. [...]  
If Khadeja and Surjo had savings tools that were safe, and as disciplined as the microfinance 
loans, they would have been better off, since they would not have had to pay interest. But given 
the options available to them, their “borrowing to save” strategy makes sense. 
[...] though they also saved in informal clubs and other devices, [...] borrowing proved the most 
manageable way to turn their capacity to set money aside into useful sums.’   
(Collins et. al., 2009, p. 110 ff) 
 
If real saving products were offered, it would save clients the interest rates they have to pay for 
credit, when they actually need savings. Additionally, it would lower the interest rates for those 
who still take a loan, as MFIs would avoid paying for the wholesale loan they avail from banks. 
‘[…] That is one very huge thing that can bring down the cost of funds. If you look at regular 
banks, even rural banks, the biggest difference is that they can accept savings or different kinds 
of deposits, and even if you give up to 7% or even 9% return on those deposits, even then that’s 
4% to 5% cheaper than with banks.’ (Practitioner 3, p.c.) 
 
If MFIs could offer savings, institutions might also be less driven by other investors, but focus 
on clients’ needs, as ‘MFIs that depend on external sources of donated funding often 
concentrate on the demands of donors rather than on the demands of potential clients, 
especially potential savings clients’ (Ledgerwood, 1999, p. 155).  
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One of the reasons why this service is not as widely offered as microcredit is that in many 
cases, institutions are not permitted to accept savings (Armendariz et. al., 2010, p. 169). 
Others argue that the real reason is that the costs for administering the savings accounts are 
too high (APPG, 2011a, p. 50f). The reluctance of regulators to allow institutions to accept 
savings shows that they acknowledge the risk of institutions disappearing with ‘peoples’ 
money’. But even without these institutions, people save in various ways: 
‘Poor households seek to keep money in places that they can access freely and frequently, both 
to maximize the amount they save and to ensure that they can retrieve the savings at short 
notice. Security is important, but so is convenience. Reward (in the form of interest receivable) 
is of less importance: Thus they may hide savings at home or entrust cash to their next-door 
neighbour. When households try to build savings into large sums, the mix of characteristics 
shifts. Now security is very important, since the money may have to be stored for some time as 
it builds, and reward is valued more highly. But a new characteristic enters the mix - structure. 
The poor, like all of us, tend to want to have their savings cake and eat it, but when you’re more 
hungry than average, the temptation to eat it is all the stronger. Structure - in the form of curbs 
on the liquidity of the savings, and rules defining the term, timing, and value of deposits - helps 
self-discipline, as the poor often know.’ (Collins et. al., 2009, p. 20) 
 
Others argue that the existence of informal ways to safe suggests that the need for saving 
products is actually being met by informal saving institutions, so there is no real need for 
formal savings products. 
‘How do microsavings-oriented organizations define, much less assess, their competition? How 
are savings-oriented institutions going to beat the many informal options people have become 
comfortable with? The key battleground ought to be the value to poor people of formal versus 
informal savings options, not poor people themselves (Make them save more! Give them 
financial education!). […] If people don’t manage income surpluses through bank accounts, it 
is because their informal options are not all that bad. Let me rephrase that, as it’s all relative. 
Banks have not been able to deliver a level of convenience and service that induces poor people 
to get out of informal options.’ (Mas, 2011) 
 
Considerations like the importance of safety, accessibility and need for structure shape the 
design of microsaving products. The challenge to earn the trust of customers and handle the 
high transaction costs will pose a challenge to the development of microsaving instruments. 
The provision of microcredit seems to be simpler and more profitable. ‘It’s more profitable to 
keep people in debt than it is to help them save’, as Malcolm Harper put it (Harper, CGAP 
MF Blog, 2010a). 
‘Paraphrasing from a conversation with Jonathan Morduch yesterday, all it takes to offer credit 
is to assemble a group of people who are willing to pay for the privilege of using your cash. To 
offer savings, you have to get regulations right, you have to figure out what you are going to do 
with deposits, you have to build trust with clients, you have to maintain sufficient liquidity, you 
have to find ways of cutting costs of serving clients dramatically which often means heavy 
capital investments in technology.  
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The fact is that savings cannot expand at anything like the pace that credit did. And therefore, 
the discussion about savings needs to be circumspect in terms of how many people can 
reasonably be reached--and that the number will be a fraction of the people reached by credit.’ 
(Ogden, 2011, FAI Blog) 
 
Besides the regulatory framework, slower growth rates of microsaving products are one 
possible reason for the reluctant provision of these services.   
1.5. Microinsurance 
‘You have to become a responsible lender means you have to address the risk which your 
money is going through, not because of the usage of money, but the consumer himself is 
vulnerable. So the day you’re able to address a vulnerable component of the consumer that is 
the day your completeness of your developmental impact is there.’ (Ramana, p.c.) 
 
The poor are exposed to various risks like injuries, illnesses, loss of crop or livestock, or loss 
of a job. Being poor leads to worse nutrition and worse working conditions, which further 
increase these risks (Allianz et. al., 2006, p. 4). Such problems rapidly become financial 
problems, as there is a loss of income and additional money is needed to cope with the 
situation. People often have to use their savings, sell some of their belongings and borrow 
from various sources (see Armendariz et. al., 2010, p. 86f.). Loans are often used to overcome 
these emergencies, as insurance is not available.  
‘But in the end, loans are not the best solution to such medical emergencies. These are 
problems of risk – problems for which insurance is designed. Not having insurance poses a 
double burden on families. First, major health-related emergencies create an urgent need for 
cash. Second, emergencies simultaneously diminish the ability to repay loans. […] Only 
insurance arrangements (or tax-funded public safety nets) can aggregate these kinds of risks, 
provide urgently needed resources at the right time, and do so without creating additional 
obligations.’ (Armendariz et. al., 2010, p. 8)  
 
In India, nearly 80% of the population is without life, health and non-life insurance (National 
Insurance Academy, 2010). There are high costs to build an infrastructure to reach rural areas 
and there is a lack of information about clients. As clients with higher risks are more likely to 
take out insurance there is a problem of adverse selection. Moral hazard may occur, as the 
insured might change their behaviour and be reckless, which will increase the probability that 
they need insurance. They might take less care than they would if they had to carry the risk 
themselves. Additionally, for example in health insurance, having an insurance might lead to 
clients seeing a doctor and asking for treatments, even when they would not perceive them as 
necessary if they were not insured (see Armendariz et. al., 2010, p. 198f).  
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Micro-insurers mitigate these risks according to the insurance offered. Many microcredit 
products are offered in combination with loans, like the so-called ‘credit-life’ product (ibid, 
p.195). In case of death of the microfinance client or a close family member of the client, the 
insurance pays for the outstanding amount of the loan, and adds a fixed payout to the family 
to cover funeral costs or the like. Insurance is automatically linked to the credit product, in 
order to avoid adverse selection and is offered by the MFI on behalf of an insurance 
organization.  
A way of avoiding the risk of moral hazard is found in crop insurance where, instead of 
insuring against bad crop, the insurance pays in specific cases of bad weather, which are 
likely to lead to a bad harvest.  
Health insurance is less prevalent, but there seems to be demand for it. In a recent study, 
access to better healthcare was seen as the main reason to join insurance in rural India (Dror, 
2007, p. 23). 
Even when formal insurance products are available, as in India, payments are hard to manage, 
as they do not take into account the cash flow of clients. Also, as usually only specific risks 
are insured, clients might prefer to use general-purpose tools like savings or loans (Collins et. 
al., 2009, p. 91). Just as loans are said to be used as reverse saving, they can also be used as 
reversed insurance. Some MFIs offer emergency loans to meet this demand: 
‘They tend to be very standardized: a fixed amount and a relatively short term of, say, three 
months, and intended to be taken for any purpose rather than crafted for a specific risk. They 
may not provide just the right sum over just the right period of time, but they help, partly 
because, as we have seen in this chapter, poor households are used to patching together 
resources from a number of providers, and a loan from a nearby source that is disbursed quickly 
with little fuss can be enormously valuable.’ (Collins et.al., 2009, p. 94) 
 
1.6. Micropension 
Microfinance clients also worry about how they will finance their lives when they retire. As 
microfinance addresses the self-employed in the informal sector, they are likely to have no 
income when they are no longer able to work. The life expectancy in India is 64 years 
(UNICEF, 2010), but is expected to rise to the age of 80 years.  
‘India’s old age population is set to double to 200 million in the next two decades. About 85 
percent of India’s workforce is in the informal sector and a third of them earn under Rs. 3,000 
per month.  
Most will become destitute when they stop working. The nuclearisation of families at all 
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income levels means the old will have to fend for themselves. Better life expectancy will mean 
more old people who will need financial support as they age.’ (Forbes India, 2010) 
 
Strong family ties are part of the Indian identity. India is ‘a textbook case of the working of a 
‘joint family system’’ (Uberoi, 2010, p. 276). The provision of welfare is traditionally seen as 
a function of the family (ibid, p. 291). Due to increasing mobility and labour migration, but 
also due to a change in values the joint family model becomes less prevalent. Many elderly 
cannot live with their children any more who would traditionally provide for them in their 
retirement (OASIS Foundation, 2000, p. 14). 
Even though there is demand for pension products, institutions are reluctant to offer pension 
schemes. The particular challenge when offering pension products is ‘selling this pension 
product and keeping it active for a long term’ (Forbes India, 2010), as money might be 
withdrawn for emergencies. One way to counter this is to link pension products with the 
provision of microcredit, so that borrowers can access their funds by availing a loan against 
their pension savings (OASIS Foundation, 2000, p. 30).  Another challenge is allowing 
flexibility regarding payments while having to keep transaction costs low and to scale up.  
‘You need to be extremely flexible about payments, the amount and have a grassroots reach so 
that when the maid has Rs. 100 that she can put away, there is somebody to immediately put it 
away for her.’ (Forbes India, 2010) 
 
A way to keep transaction costs low is to include a third party, for instance a NGO or MFI, to 
easily reach a lot of clients in order to scale up. Also, these third parties are already known 
and trusted by clients (Arunachalam R. , CUVMF Blog, 2011a).  
One reason why there is less focus on social security might be that – just as savings and 
insurance - it will not generate quick successes. Additionally, engagement in a pension 
scheme might lead to an ideological debate. 
‘The one concern which continues to bother me is that the policy is hard to sell to an aid-weary 
public. The appeal of microfinance was that it claimed to help people to help themselves; for a 
small initial outlay, the project could become self-financing. […] People want an aid story that 
has a clear end in sight. 
Social protection seems to be about setting up embryonic welfare states that are likely to need 
some aid support indefinitely, and, given the crisis over welfare dependency in many western 
countries such as the UK, this one is a particularly hard sell and could get entangled in 
domestic debates.’ (Bunting, The Guardian Poverty Matters Blog, 2011b) 
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1.7. The imperfections of the microfinance model: Informational 
asymmetries on the clients side  
 
Information asymmetries on the lender’s side like moral hazard and adverse selection have 
been studied at length. The mechanisms I described above were developed to overcome these 
problems. Strangely, however, they were merely studied from the perspective of the lender, as 
‘the borrowers have better information on their creditworthiness and risk-taking than does the 
bank’ (Armendariz et.al., 2010, p. 58). It is hardly discussed that there equally is an 
information asymmetry towards the other side that affects the equilibrium: Borrowers do not 
share the same knowledge about the product that lenders have. And even if information is 
available, clients might lack the capacity to understand complex loan products (see 
Arunachalam R., CUVMF Blog, 2011b). This asymmetry between consumers and producers 
always exists, as Adam Levin explains: 
‘Now, it should hardly be controversial that there is an unequal playing field between 
businesses and consumers. Generally, businesses know more about their products than 
consumers and have more bargaining power than consumers. (Yes, there are information 
asymmetries running the opposite way, which is a particularly salient problem for credit and 
insurance products.) For many businesses, it is important to maintain this asymmetry of 
information and bargaining power, as there's profit in it. 
In theory, and I emphasize in theory, competition should eliminate many of the problems these 
asymmetries create for consumers, but there's no such thing as a perfect, complete market, just 
varying degrees of market imperfection, so competition alone cannot be relied upon to solve 
everything.’ (Levitin, Credit Slips Blog, 2011) 
 
Consumers buying physical products can usually3 rely on them being safe, as they have been 
tested before they are allowed to enter the market. Product safety for financial products is not 
as self-evident for some reason. 
‘Consumers can enter the market to buy physical products confident that they won’t be tricked 
into buying exploding toasters and other unreasonably dangerous products. They can 
concentrate their shopping efforts in other directions, helping to drive a competitive market that 
keeps costs low and encourages innovation in convenience, durability, and style. Consumers 
entering the market to buy financial products should enjoy the same protection.’  
(Warren, 2007, p. 9) 
 
In the US, the recently created US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should fill this gap. 
Elizabeth Warren, who advised President Obama on its development, sees the reason for this 
                                                 
3 In India, there are also large deficits in product safety for physical products. (The Hindu, 
1999).  
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discrepancy in the lack of regulation: ‘The difference between the two markets is regulation.’ 
(Warren, 2007, p. 8).  
In order to overcome the information asymmetry in the financial market there is a need to 
regulate consumer protection (Cartwright, 1999, p. 10). I discuss consumer protection in 
detail in chapter 3.2.  
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2.  MICROFINANCE IN INDIA  
2.1.1. Channels of Microfinance in India: 
The SHG and the JLG Model 
In order to improve access to the formal banking system for India’s poor, the National Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) has been using the Self Help Group 
Banking Linkage Programme (SHG - BLP) since the beginning of the 1990ies4. The SHG 
model was considered to be the ’Indian Microfinance Model’, as Malcolm Harper explains: 
‘When I had some involvement in starting the Self-Help Group movement in Andhra Pradesh, 
in the early 1990s, we used to say that we’ve got the Self-Help Group system, and Bangladesh 
has the microfinance system; and we think that ours is rather better. It’s linked to banks, which 
are secure institutions; it’s cheaper, it’s built on local communities, and so on. This looked like 
a better approach because of India’s enormous numbers of rural bank branches, which 
Bangladesh does and did not have. So the general feeling was that this was the “Indian” 
approach, whereas Grameen Bank and it’s replicators were the “Bangladesh” approach, and it 
was interesting to see which would do the best job. But then, the microfinance institutions came 
into India around ten years ago in a big way’ (Harper, Interview by Governance Across 
Borders, 2010) 
 
In the SHG model, groups with up to twenty members are formed. NGOs, government 
agencies or banks may act as Self Help Promoting Institutions (SHPI) and initiate the 
formation of the group. Who decides to form a group, however, should be a matter of the 
group itself. As a group, members are encouraged to save within the group and start by giving 
small loans to each other. After having saved for 6 months and thus having established a 
certain savings discipline, they can participate in the SHG – Bank Linkage Programme, where 
the group will be linked to a local bank branch and will be able to attain credit from that bank 
(Ghate, 2007, p. 24f). Loans are given to the group as a whole, who then agrees on the use of 
the money within the group without interference from outside. An individual member can 
have a loan from the group according to the terms agreed on within the group. The SHG 
functions as an intermediary between the bank and the individual (The Hindu Businessline, 
2010). The quality of a SHG and thus its success depends on the effort the SHPI invests in the 
formation and training of the group (Karmakar, 2008, p. 41). The lack of organisations 
offering these services limits the spreading of the SHG – BLP. Another reason is increasing 
                                                 
4 The model was earlier established by a NGO called MYRADA, for details see Rao, K. M. 
(2008), 58f.  
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competition by MFIs, who are using the second channel of microfinance, the Joint Liability 
Group (JLG) model. 
In the JLG model5, loans are given to members of the group individually by the MFI, which 
acts as the intermediary between the lender6 and the individual. In case of default, the other 
group-members are liable for each other. Most commercially oriented microfinance 
institutions use this model (NABARD, 2007). Compared to SHG loans, MFI loans are easier 
to obtain and available faster. There is no need for proving a savings discipline and group 
trainings were less time consuming. In the JLG model, loans were immediately available 
without eventually having to wait for another member to repay their loan first (Sa-Dhan 
Microfinance Resource Center, 2006, p. 2).  
The SHG model, on the other hand, is also used as an entry point for other developmental 
activities: 
‘Seeing is believing’. The SHG members have adopted family planning measures more easily 
when the fellow lady adopts the same with comfort and this has a demonstrative effect, when 
somebody in their neighbourhood is comfortable with it. SHG is an entry point for many 
activities of development, not just the provision of microfinance.’ (Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
It is also said to be more participatory than the MFI model and to have a greater effect on 
empowerment of the group members (Ghate, 2007, p. 25). 
‘The biggest disadvantage of the MFI model, however, is that it is less participatory and 
empowering, since the ‘banking’ functions and procedures are taken care of entirely by the 
field staff of the MFI, who disburse and collect loans. In the SHG model, millions of poor 
women deal with the banks and do their own accounting and cash handling.’  
(Ghate, 2007, p. 27) 
 
The SHG-BLP also has its downsides. With the need for participation come high hidden costs 
for the client. Building up and maintaining a SHG takes time. For instance, SHG members 
have to go to banks to pay back their loan, whereas in the JLG model, instalments are 
collected at the doorstep (The Hindu Businessline, 2010). The default rate in the SHG-BLP is 
rising and was at approximately 12 percent in 2008-09 (ibid). As mentioned earlier, not all 
SHGs are of the same quality, depending on the SHPI. Some SHGs lack the skills in 
bookkeeping and accounting necessary to manage the group finances (Singh, 2008, p. 122). 
The success of SHGs depends on the effort and quality of the NGOs promoting them, and 
                                                 
5 For a detailed description see earlier chapter 1.3. 
6 This might be a bank, an investor or a donor 
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some groups are very weak. Also, in some cases women still face problems opening bank 
accounts and availing a loan (Reddy C. S., 2010).  
2.2.  The Indian Microfinance Market before the AP Crisis  
‘According to Intellecap, the size of the microfinance market is $50 billion considering India's 
150 million poor households. Market penetration is still believed to be just 10% of what is 
required. In fact, 40% of India's population is unbanked, while MFIs have been able to reach 
only 114 million people with a loan portfolio of over $1 billion, leaving it immense scope to 
grow. Which means India is the largest market for microfinance globally. It is simply an 
irresistible pie and everyone wants a slice.’ (Forbes India, 2009) 
 
‘Indian MFIs doubled in numbers from 10 to 20 in this year’s top 100, as their growth trends 
continued well into 2008, an exception to the slower growth in other markets. Even as top 
performers halved their annual growth rates from 200 percent to 100 percent, Indian institutions 
in the top 100 managed to increase their client base by an additional 75 percent over the prior 
year. Expanding access outside of the southern states, the hub of Indian microfinance over the 
last decade, has provided ample market for continued growth. Perennially low operating costs, 
which did not move from prior year results, kept Indian MFIs achieving high marks in 
efficiency, as well. On average, these institutions ranked six percentage points above their peers 
in this pillar.’ (MIX, 2009, p. 4)7, marked as in original) 
 
‘The good news is: MFIs are growing, they need capital. And investors want microfinance 
exposure. They're buying MFIs like they bought IT 10 years ago’ (Reille, quoted in Reuters, 
2010) 
 
Microfinance in India is a matter of superlatives: the huge population and the tremendous 
poverty make it an almost endless market for microfinance. In 2007, Intellecap estimated a 
credit demand of about 50 billion USD by 245,7 million people (Intellecap, 2007, p. 26). 
Considering the pace of population growth in India8 the market seems to grow9 with it.  
In addition, the Indian government encourages the growth of microfinance. To offer financial 
inclusion10 to the poor is a key objective of Indian financial politics as part of the strategy of 
                                                 
7 The MIX, Microfinance Exchange Network, is the main source for global microfinance data, 
available at www.mixmarket.org. 
8 Given the census data from 2001 with a population of 1,1 billion. In the new census from 
2011, 1,21 billion were counted. (Government of India. (2011). Ministry of Home Affairs. 
www.censusindia.gov.in ). 
9 I use this argument in order to show how microfinance was pushed as an investment 
opportunity. To calculate a demand by using the amount of poor people in India as done by 
Intellecap in general seems questionable, considering that most microfinance clients are less 
poor and moderately wealthy (see Bateman, 2010, p. 44). It is debatable whether 
microfinance is demand driven at all considering the lack of alternatives (Bateman 2010, p. 37 
ff.).  
10 Defined as ‘the process of ensuring access to financial services and timely and adequate 
credit where needed by vulnerable groups such as weaker sections and low income groups at 
an affordable cost” (see NABARD, 2008, p.1) 
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inclusive growth (Rangarajan in NABARD, 2008, Preface). In order to encourage banks to 
engage in microfinance, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) made microfinance a category 
which banks can lend to while fulfilling their Priority Sector Lending (PSL) obligation. Banks 
in India are required to lend about 40% of their total lending to certain sectors like agriculture, 
micro and small enterprises, educational loans and housing loans. As microfinance is one of 
these sectors, banks can fulfil their obligation to ‘aim at raising the proportion of their 
advances to priority sector to 40 per cent’ (RBI, 2010). Besides offering the service 
themselves, they can fulfil their quota either by participating in the Banking Linkage 
Programme or by providing wholesale lending to MFIs. At the moment, there are debates that 
commercial MFIs might lose priority-lending status, which would make accessing funds more 
difficult for them (Economic Times, 2010). The Malegam Report11, which proposed a 
regulation for microfinance non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) was granting the 
newly established NBFC-MFIs PSL status. Those MFI NBFCs would have to fulfil stricter 
requirements.12 
In addition to promoting microfinance by such regulation, the state is also the biggest actor in 
microfinance in India, with NABARDs SHG – BLP (GTZ et. al., 2008, p. 22).  
The BLP had 48.5 million loans to SHGs outstanding by March 2010 (NABARD, 2010, p. i). 
Given that an SHG on average has 15 members (NCAER, 2008, p. 1), this would mean that 
approximately 727.5 million people were covered. In the financial year of 2009/10,  
144.53 billion rupees13 of loans were disbursed (NABARD, 2010, p.i.). According to the RBI, 
58% of the outstanding loan portfolio is accounted for by the SHG-BLP, 34% by NBFCs and 
8% by others like NGOs. This does not include co-operatives or thrift (RBI, 2011a, para 2.5). 
Although MFIs still have smaller numbers compared to the SHG BLP, their size and growth 
is still spectacular in the global perspective of microfinance. In the financial year of 2009/10, 
the 150 MFIs reporting to MIX had 26.6 million active borrowers. The gross loan portfolio by 
all of them was 4.4 billion USD (MIX, 2011a). By March 2010, out of the ten biggest MFIs 
(by borrowers), four were Indian.  
                                                 
11  Report of the  Sub-Committee of the Central Board of Directors  of Reserve Bank of India  
to Study Issues and Concerns in the MFI Sector, see 2.3.2. and Appendix.   
12 This will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.1.2. 
13 3.2 billion USD,  using the rate of March 31st, 2010, 1 INR = 0.02221 USD 
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With this background, in July 2010, SKS, the biggest Indian MFI with around 5.8 million 
clients at that time (MIX, 2011b) entered the stock market to pave the way for a new 
superlative in Indian microfinance. It was the second IPO of a MFI after the Mexican MFI 
Compartamos in 2007 (The Economist, 2010b). By the end of 2010, SKS had 7,7 million 
clients14 and the amount disbursed was 4.792 million USD (SKS Microfinance, 2011). 
‘By market standards, the SKS IPO is a great success. Institutional investors have over-
subscribed their allocations by 13 times, and the company’s valuation of USD 1.5 billion came 
in at the top end of the offer band price.  
This sky-high valuation represents 6.7 times the company’s post issue book value, and about 40 
times the company’s fiscal year 2010 earnings. 
Such multiples are not in line with market peers. In emerging markets, banks are valued at 3 
times the book value, while finance institutions serving low-income customers are trading at 
2.6 times the book value. The SKS valuation is even higher – by a margin – than 
Compartamos’s valuation in its landmark 2007 IPO. At listing, Compartamos was valued at 27 
times the company’s historical earnings although its 2006 return on equity (ROE) at 55% was 
more than double the ROE of SKS today.’ (Reille, CGAP MF Blog, 2010b) 
 
In this scenario of high spirit and high valuations, the biggest crisis the microfinance industry 
has yet seen happened, which changed the environment and perspective of microfinance in 
India. This will be discussed in chapter 2.4.4.  
2.3. Legal Framework of Microfinance Providers 
2.3.1. Constitutional Competence to regulate microfinance 
As India is a federation, government powers are split between the union and the federal states. 
Article 246 of the Indian Constitution15 provides that the legislative power is either with the 
union, the state or both. Who is competent to regulate is fixed on lists, which are attached to 
the constitution. Microfinance is a cross-sectional issue, it can be tackled from the financial 
side (art. 43), the competence to regulate corporations16 or, under the competence for money 
lending and relief of agricultural indebtedness (List II, art. 30 of the 7th schedule).  
This leads to uncertainty in whose competence the regulation of microfinance is in the 
federation, which complicates the regulation of the sector. In the recent Microfinance Crisis in 
Andhra Pradesh, the State Government issued an ordinance on the basis of their competence 
for money lending laws. The ordinance was then challenged under the aspect of the AP 
                                                 
 
15 For a selection of relevant provisions see Appendix.  
16 Which is with the union, if the object of the corporation is not confined to one state (List I, 
Art. 44) or the state, if otherwise (List II, Art. 32) 
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Government not having authority to issue this ordinance as financial corporations are a union 
competence (The Times of India, 2010b). In the Malegam Report, the RBI is arguing that the 
AP government was right regulating NBFCs in that regard, as the RBI had not made use of 
their competence until then.  
This indicates the RBI’s view that the legislation it will pass will supersede over the AP act. 
The RBI’s view on this is that it has the competency to regulate, but the state was right in 
regulating as long as the RBI was inactive.      
‘In the RBI act, there is a part that very clearly says, the RBI can regulate, or can give 
directions regarding lending by NBFCs, it has so far chosen not to do it. Now as long as it 
chose not to do that, it so far only looked at deposits (the asset side), or at the liability side, it 
looked at the management of the liabilities, the mobilization of liabilities by NBFC, not the 
utilization of assets. Now as long as it did that, the moneylender laws of the state apply, the 
moment the RBI acts under the union act to give directions on lending, this becomes 
unfunctional, a state law will not prevail.’ (Rajagopalan, p.c.) 
 
The AP government contested this view and claims that it is nevertheless competent to 
regulate microfinance (The Hindu, 2011a). It still sees a need for regulation, at least as long as 
the RBI does not have explicit and detailed regulation on consumer protection issues.  
‘The government cannot regulate the financial soundness, the methods of operation which is 
the domain of the RBI. The area of concern is the clients; and the ordinance is there to protect 
the clients from the clutches of MFIs.  If this issue is addressed, the state government being a 
sovereign government, having a legislative body, might take a decision on the ordinance.’  
(Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
The newly suggested draft of the (central) microfinance bill, which is scheduled to be 
discussed in Parliament in the winter session 2011 simply declares that ‘micro finance 
services extended by any micro finance institution registered with the Reserve Bank shall not 
be treated as money-lender for the purpose of any State enactments relating to money-lenders 
and usurious loans’ (MFBill 2011, explanation to para 42) and seeks to resolve the 
constitutional conflict in that way. 
2.3.2. Institutional Organization of Microfinance Providers 
As a further complication, microfinance can be provided by differently regulated entities, like 
banks, NBFCs, NGOs, or co-operatives. Banks and NBFCs fall under the regulating authority 
of the RBI, for NGOs there are federal acts. NGOs can be trusts or societies. Trusts are 
regulated by state acts, for societies there is a nationwide act, however, with additional 
varying state acts (USIG Council on Foundations, 2011). Depending on which of these 
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organizations is giving credit, there are different regulatory schemes and different rules. The 
reason for these different rules is the stricter regulation of banks and NBFCs compared to 
NGOs (Rajagopalan, p.c.). 
In the early days of Microfinance, there was a need to register as a bank, like the Self 
Employed Women’s Association in Ahmedabad (SEWA) did. In the 1990ies more and more 
NGOs started entering the market, co-operating with SHGs, as the SHG-Bank Linkage 
programme was mainstreamed (Rao, 2008, p. 58f). Besides the need for capital and 
administrative efforts, the RBI has in general been very reluctant to admit new banks in India 
(Alok, p.c.). This is one of the reasons for the prevalence of the NBFC model in microfinance.  
As mentioned above, NGOs are either registered as trusts, societies, co-operatives or  
section 25 companies17. Legally they are not permitted to engage in commercial operations, 
as they are non-profit organizations. This also restricts them from borrowing funds (Rao, 
2008, p. 60f).  
With scaling up microfinance on a for-profit basis, there was a need to register as a for-profit-
company18. The most common option for MFIs was to turn into Non Banking Financial 
Companies (NBFCs). NBFCs need certification from and are regulated by the RBI under the 
Companies Act 1956. Any company engaged in microfinance falls under the RBIs definition 
in Section 45-I of the Act and thus has to register with the RBI. In order to avail a licence, it 
has to fulfil a minimum capital requirement. Most upscale MFIs are organised like this, as 
investors are more confident in institutions regulated in this form. International capital in an 
NBFC cannot exceed 50 per cent (Sa-Dhan, 2006, p. 25ff).  
After the issuing of the ordinance in Andhra Pradesh, a Sub-Committee of the RBI, the 
Malegam Committee, which was appointed to make recommendations on the future role of 
the RBI in Microfinance, suggested to create a new legal form: NBFC – MFIs (RBI, 2011a). 
A lot of further restrictions go along with this new legal entity, like a maximum loan size of 
25 000 Rupees, an interest rate cap at 24% and also a prohibition to provide doorstep service, 
to name a few (RBI, 2011a). In May, the RBI decided to accept the framework of the 
recommendation (RBI, 2011b, p. 18f). Detailed guidelines have not been issued yet, but after 
                                                 
17 For a detailed view see: Sa-Dhan, 2006: Existing Legal and Regulatory Framework for the 
Microfinance Institutions in India; or Rao: MFIs in India, in Karmakar, 2008 p. 54 – 66. 
18 Some NGOs are split in for profit and not for profit entities, RBI regulation does not apply 
to NBFCs licensed under Section 25 of the Companies Act, see Rao, 2008, p 60. 
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stakeholder discussions the maximum loan sizes have been increased to 60 000 Rupees and 
are now regulated more flexible for different loan products. 
What is still missing, however, is a unified regulation that also includes banks, NBFCs and 
NGOs (CRISIL Ratings, 2009, p. 4). The revised microfinance bill is expected to solve this 
issue, but still has to be adopted in parliament.  
As discussed above already, both NGOs and NBFCs are not permitted to collect savings. 
NBFCs claim that is the reason why they need to turn to investors in order to attain capital. 
Alternatively, they get funded by banks at rates of around 15% - being able to collect savings 
would give them a cheaper resource of credit and would allow them to reduce interest rates 
(Practitioner 3, p.c.). 
Banks and co-operatives are permitted to take savings; co-operatives can only accept savings 
by their members though.  
Like with any regulation, it is a challenge to arrive at an adequate level of protection. 
Overregulation might lead to counter effects like high administrative costs that will increase 
the loan fees for consumers, or anti-competitive effects.  
The RBI has recently allowed the use of shop owners and the like as business correspondents 
to increase financial inclusion. It is being discussed to also allow the use of for-profit 
corporations as business correspondents (Srinivasan N. , SSR, 2010, p. 5). 
 
2.4. Recent developments and challenges  
In the 2011 edition of the Banana Skins Report, an annual report on the risks in microfinance, 
based on a survey with stakeholders globally, the ten biggest risks named by Asian 
Stakeholders19 were: political interference, reputation, credit risk, liquidity, inappropriate 
regulation, competition, mission drift, corporate governance, management, and product 
development, in that order (CSFI , 2011, p. 19). 
All these factors played a role in the events happening in the last years. As discussed earlier, 
microfinance in India has undergone a lot of changes, from being funded by donors to 
becoming more commercially oriented, attracting equity investors and even entering the stock 
                                                 
19 82 out of 107 Asian Stakeholders questioned were Indian. (CSFI, 2011, p. 4)  
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market. The growth of microfinance hardly led to spreading microfinance to areas that 
previously had been without access to financial products. It was mainly concentrated on 
certain pockets where a lot of MFIs were already operating. These areas were favoured, as the 
product was well known and functioning, so costs and risks for newly entering MFIs were 
low.  
In the last years, the Indian microfinance market experienced three major crises of massive 
default, where microfinance stakeholders were antagonising other stakeholders in the rural 
political economy. These events explain why political interference, reputation and credit risk 
are seen as the biggest risks by MFIs. I will discuss these crises in the following.  
 
2.4.1. ‘Liquidity makes markets; too much liquidity makes 
bubbles.’20  
‘Should we be over concerned with their grotesque profitability (at least up until recently)? It’s 
really two questions, sustainability is a donor weasel word, it means profitability and I suppose 
on balance it’s a good thing that thanks to the efforts of DFID microfinance is now a profitable 
business. But it has gone too far, become too profitable and therefore burst, like in so many 
places financial institutions do burst when they go too far, when they get too silly.‘(Harper, 
APPG Inquiry, 2011) 
 
The tremendous growth of the Indian microfinance market has been compared with the US 
mortgage market and the crisis that followed (e.g. The Wall Street Journal, 2009, The 
Economic Times, 2010d). Like for the US subprime credit market, it is also true for the Indian 
microfinance market that in ‘a hasty pursuit to acquire clients and maximize profits, a number 
of undesirable, fraudulent or deceptive practices were carried out’, including a lack of due 
diligence in the assessment of the clients’ repayment capacity. Also, the flourishing of the 
market, the availability of capital and the fast growth of the microfinance sector have seemed 
to alarm observers of financial markets, especially with reports on over indebtedness 
(Microfinance Insights, 2010, p. 46).  
 ‘If companies try to sell more soap or fertilizer than the market can absorb, prices fall and 
inventories bulge. If companies try to sell too much credit, demand can seem to keep up with 
supply for years. Oversupply covers its own tracks as people use new loans to repay old loans. 
Put otherwise, microcredit is a prescription drug—useful in moderation, but dangerous and 
even (metaphorically) addictive in large doses. Overborrowing is a particular concern for 
people close to the edge of survival. Yet as the global financial crisis has exposed, when the 
money is easy, investors and their intermediaries have strong incentives not to worry about 
                                                 
20 The Economic Times (2010).  
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whether the money is well lent. The recent microcredit crashes are perhaps the first bubbles in 
history fueled more by generosity than greed’ (Roodman, forthcoming, p. 11 (draft)) 
 
MFIs wanted to grow to attract investments. As I described earlier, the fastest growth was 
possible in certain pockets, which were easily accessible, densely populated and where people 
already knew the product. So, in order to attract investments with the promise to continue this 
growth, institutions focussed on areas where people already had loans. This led to multiple 
borrowing and eventually to clients’ over-indebtedness. In the three cases that are discussed 
below, the bubble burst, as people were unable to continue to repay and formal institutions - 
be it the state or a religious authority - sanctioned MFIs.  
The Indian microfinance crisis also resembles the US subprime crisis in the reaction to the 
crisis. In the US, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau was established, in India, 
regulation by the AP government, the RBI and the central government followed. The need for 
strengthening consumer protection in order to avoid such situations will be discussed in detail 
in chapter 3.2.  
 
2.4.2. The Krishna Crisis in 2006 
Already in 2005, borrowers in Andhra Pradesh complained to politicians about bad practices 
of MFIs. MFIs on their part were worried that the AP government might include them in ‘a 
proposed amendment to the State Moneylender’s Act providing for interest rate ceilings’ 
(Ghate, 2007, p. 87). This did not happen back then, but in the following year, the district 
officer ‘of the Krishna district seized the records and closed about 57 branches of Spandana 
and SHARE in the district, the two largest MFIs in the country, as well those of a few smaller 
MFIs’ (ibid, p. 86). Borrowers were given the impression that there was no need to repay, so 
repayments went down to 10 to 20 %. The field staff was reluctant to enter these areas, as 
there was such a hostile atmosphere against them (ibid). The reasons for this so-called 
Krishna-Crisis were soon established:  
‘One of the longer-term causes was clearly the ‘quest for numbers’ relating to outreach and 
profitability that is the main motivation of many MFIs. […] The crisis serves as a useful 
reminder that there are other just as important client-centred consumer protection objectives 
[…]. We are all responsible for building up a climate of expectations […] that celebrates the 
[…] rate of growth of outreach, efficiency, field worker productivity, and so forth, without 
always remembering that they can: (i) lead to short-cuts in client selection and training, field 
worker training  […] and loan size determination; (ii) be used as the only criterion for incentive 
payments to field workers; and (iii) put a degree on pressure on them that leaves no time for 
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issues affecting client satisfaction […]. The set of accusations that received the most 
prominence, however, related to coercive collection practices, leading to borrowers having to 
‘abscond’, or migrate out of the village, and even in some cases, allegedly, commit suicide. 
[…] The third set of accusations was that MFIs were ‘dumping money on borrowers’, who 
were finding it difficult to repay and having to borrow from moneylenders at a higher cost […] 
A final underlying cause was that the MFIs […] under-estimated the degree to which they were 
antagonizing several powerful players in the local political economy.’ (ibid, pp. 93-100) 
 
The introductory summary of the State of the Sector Report 2006 saw the Krishna-Crisis as an 
opportunity to learn: 
‘[…] Better to be woken up this way than not at all. The consensus is that the sector will 
emerge stronger if it reads the lessons the right way, and conjures up the collective will to 
implement them. The experience has left many observers less sanguine about the sufficiency of 
self-regulation left to itself […].’ (ibid, p.18) 
 
This crisis initiated the first efforts of regulation. In March 2006 Sa-Dhan’s code of conduct 
was issued (ibid, p. 88). Just as well, the RBI published their fair practices code for NBFCs 
(ibid, p. 90). 
 
2.4.3. The Karnataka Crisis in 2009 
Despite the warning after the crisis in Krishna, which was supposed to ‘wake up Indian 
microfinance’, MFIs continued to grow, and another crisis happened in 2009 in the State of 
Karnataka.  
In the financial year of 2008/09 the number of clients in Karnataka grew by 64%, with this 
growth being concentrated on the southern districts which are better developed and have 
denser population (EDA Rural Systems, 2010, p. iv). In Karnataka, with 11.6 million 
households of which 2.77 million were poor, the estimate of the number of microfinance 
accounts in March 2009 was 7.31 million (Srinivasan N., SSR 2009, p. 72).  
‘In Kolar town, the epicentre of this crisis, microfinance clients are likely to have an average of 
three loans each. Client information from seven of the 9 MFIs operating in the town shows that 
at least 33% of them have more than one loan and around 20% have three or more loans. More 
significantly, the opportunity for borrowing from multiple MFIs has resulted in debt from these 
seven MFIs of around 150 clients (out of 12,000) in Kolar town rising to levels of Rs 45,000 
($1,000) and beyond, mostly exceeding the commonly accepted definition of microfinance in 
India’ (EDA Rural Systems, 2010, p. iv f) 
 
In this scenario, next to an increasing indebtedness, the silk and handicraft business, on which 
many livelihoods were depending, deteriorated. This additional problem made it hard to meet 
payments (Srinivasan N., SSR 2009, p. 74). After a suicide happened in January 2009, the 
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local muslim authority called Anjuman Committee was informed which ‘irked by months of 
complaints about women “neglecting” family duties, families led into crippling debt by the 
culture of “easy money” that had developed in the town and oath taking at meetings invoking 
hindu goddesses, intervened in the only way it knew: interaction between MFIs and muslims 
in the town was prohibited by religious edict’ (EDA Rural Systems, 2010, p. v). 
The Anjuman Committee argued that lending and borrowing on interest was ‘haram’ and 
against Islamic law, as was the interaction with men from outside, the neglect of family by the 
women who had to attend several centre meetings as they had taken several loans. Besides 
these issues, which were religiously motivated, there was also criticism of recovery methods 
in case of default, as there was a practice of loan officers to stay in the house until the loan 
was repaid. The interest rates were felt to be very high and repayment was felt to go beyond 
the capacity of women, forcing them to undertake “undesirable jobs and activities”. 
(Srinivasan N., SSR, 2009, p. 72)  
Youth groups came to borrowers houses and spread the fatwa and so a few days later, the 
majority of Muslim clients defaulted (EDA Rural Systems, 2010, p. 7). 
‘This was followed by further vigilante action – such as chasing away of MFI staff – by youths 
armed with sticks [...] The youth took clients’ repayment cards away. MFI staff were also 
attacked and beaten up in some of the colonies. In one colony, some group members paid their 
instalments the following week but were harassed by their neighbours and other group 
members. They stopped repaying thereafter for fear that their neighbours would complain to the 
Anjuman.’ (ibid, p. 7) 
 
As 65-70% of microfinance clients were Muslim (ibid, p. 5). The committee issued a fatwa 
and spread it at prayers, advising not to pay back or take up new loans and threatening with 
social and religious sanctions in case of acting against it. The sanctions included denial of last 
rites, boycott of social functions, and even excommunication (Srinivasan N., SSR 2009, p. 
71).  
In the following, rates of delinquency also increased in neighbouring districts, either with 
reference to the Kolar Crisis or following announcement of local religious authorities that 
there was no obligation to repay (EDA Rural Systems, 2010, p. 5). Again, as in AP three 
years earlier, despite all religious connotations, MFIs were accused of over-lending and 
coercive recovery practices in order to expand their businesses. Again, the crisis was 
discussed in the industry and again, there were warnings stressing the need for responsible 
growth: 
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‘Kolar reminds us of some lessons from AP that the sector has forgotten. Regardless of the 
proximate cause reported, the underlying reason for such a development is seen to be the 
fatigue that has set in among the borrowers arising from excessive debt. A combination of 
borrower wants and expectations and the MFIs’ ambitions on expansion had led to an excessive 
debt level that was not applied for income generation by the borrowers.’ (EDA Rural Systems, 
2010, p. 76)  
2.4.4. The Andhra Pradesh Crisis of 2010 
Despite all warnings another crisis happened in 2010. Shortly after the overly successful IPO 
of SKS, the so far biggest crisis happened, which was also reported in global newspapers. 
There were reports on the ‘deadly spiral of microfinance debt’ (The Guardian, 2011). 
Microlenders were compared with ‘loan sharks’ making ‘hyperprofits off the poor’ (The New 
York Times, 2010, quoting a senior official from AP). In October, the AP Government 
released an Ordinance, arguing that the SHGs they had built up were ‘being exploited by 
private Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) through usurious interest rates and coercive means 
of recovery resulting in their impoverishment and in some cases leading to suicides’. This 
would make it ‘expedient to make provisions for protecting the interests of the SHGs, by 
regulating the money leading transactions by the money lending MFIs’ (AP MFI Ordinance, 
2010).  
The Ordinance made it obligatory for MFIs to register at a State Authority and to provide 
information on the interest rate charged. It ordered - besides other things - that people were 
allowed to be members in one SHG only, that all payments were to be made at the 
Panchayat21, and it ordered MFIs to seek approval from the Registering Authority to grant a 
new loan. Monthly, MFIs were supposed to submit statements with a list of borrowers, loans 
given, interest rate charged and repayments.  
As a penalty for carrying out business without registration it provided for imprisonment for 
up to three years.  
The process of registration lead to a halt in collections in AP. Field workers were arrested 
and, even when collections were permitted again, they were still scared to collect outstanding 
loans out of fear of physical aggression by clients. As time passed, institutions were losing 
more and more money. At this point, these losses pose a serious risk to the future existence of 
MFIs that are mainly active in AP.  
                                                 
21 A village centre 
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The ordinance was later turned into an act. As I mentioned above, it is unclear if it is still 
valid as the RBI has passed legislation and it is unclear if it will stay valid in case the central 
government passes legislation. The ordinance and act led to repayment rates falling from 99% 
to below 10% in AP (Forbes India, 2011). Many MFIs stopped lending to clients, which led to 
even less being willing to pay back their loans. The incentive that they would be able to avail 
another loan after repaying the current one fell away. At the same time, banks, which 
provided 80% of the capital to MFIs, stopped lending to MFIs. Investors have ‘pretty much 
walked away from this sector’ (Mahajan in Forbes India, 2011). 
In July 2011, BASIX, one of the top five Indian Microfinance Institutions, which is also 
known for being an ‘ethical investor’ (livemint, 2011), announced that it would not survive 
without fresh funds as they had accumulated bad loans worth 450 crores Rupees (Rs.) since 
October 2010. The worth of BASIX decreased from 230 crores Rs. to 128 crores Rs. in that 
time. In August BASIX received 800 crores Rs., so its survival is saved for some time 
(Microfinance Focus, 2011). Still, many other institutions face similar struggles.  
SKS in August 2011 halted lending in AP, claiming that the AP government had approved 
less than two per cent of loan applications (ContifyBANKING, 2011). The SKS stock price, 
which was initially rising after the IPO, dramatically fell at the time of the AP crisis. From a 
peak of 1,490 Rs. worth in September 2010 (Reuters, 2011), the stock dropped as low as 268 
Rs. at one point.  
There is speculation that another crisis is brewing in Tamil Nadu, where a Public Interest 
Petition was filed. It seeks a direction to the RBI, ordering it to investigate unfair and illegal 
practices of MFIs. The petitioner’s counsel was quoted arguing that ‘the malady that had 
infected Andhra Pradesh is infiltrating into our State [i.e. Tamil Nadu, author’s note] also. 
While Andhra Pradesh had brought in an ordinance to check the menace, the Tamil Nadu 
Government is yet to do so’ (The Hindu, 2011b).  
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3. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE OF MICROFINANCE 
The commonly used JLG microfinance model suffers from an information asymmetry, which 
MFIs considered insufficiently in their lending practices. Field practices and standards 
intending to educate clients could not bear up against the pressures of competition. This can 
be studied looking at the status of Indian microfinance.  
Especially donors and governments, but also ethical investors should reconsider their position 
on microfinance. They should seek to either find alternatives to the current microfinance 
models, or, if they do wish to continue engaging in microfinance, see it with clear vision: As a 
financial service that does not differ much from financial products for the mainstream market. 
It can be useful to its clients, but just as well entails risks, which have to be mitigated. In the 
mainstream market, the major tool to combat these risks is consumer protection. But both in 
the mainstream and in the microfinance market, consumer protection is not a development 
programme, but a business requirement. Microfinance is a business, so adequate regulation 
should apply. 
In the next chapter I very briefly describe the alternative options of financial services for the 
poor. Some feel that banks should be encouraged to directly engage in microfinance, others 
feel the SHG-BLP should be strengthened, or that that the focus should shift to co-operative 
banks. 
Still, as I described earlier, currently a lot of microfinance is provided by MFIs, using the JLG 
model. While stakeholders might consider changing their tactics, a way to deal with the 
current state needs to be found. Similar to mainstream financial products, microfinance 
requires consumer protection - as a way to correct the information deficit of borrowers. This 
can either be done by educating clients or by prohibiting certain practices from the start. In 
chapter 3.2., I give a theoretical overview of consumer protection, while in chapter 4 I discuss 
the challenges of implementing consumer protection, taking into account the many 
stakeholders involved in Indian microfinance.  
3.1. Alternatives to Commercial Microfinance 
One option to deal with the imperfections of the JLG model is to reject it as such and seek to 
find and strengthen alternatives, which have a stronger focus on developmental effects or are 
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easier to monitor. Some argue that, for those looking for development impact, the SHG-BLP 
should be the preferred model, as the client relationship is more central there.  
‘The reason is, there is better governance, better monitoring and they understand the consumer 
well, because their members, they know each of them. So even if the leader of a self-help group 
can make a better assessment of a customer and customer need and their financial requirement 
than the biggest financial institution which can come and make a credit assessment. All you 
have to do to get them is to what information you require and to make an assessment how much 
to give. And I think, fundamentally the social capital is there, relationship, I’m talking about 
customer relationship. Protection comes out of the relationship. I will only know your 
vulnerability if I know you. Otherwise I can come in a different form, you may fall for me and 
give a loan, but I have nothing. […] I am seeing the SHG groups from a different angle: They 
have social capital, they understand the customer, they understand the vulnerability of each 
member of the group. So they know exactly how much she can take and how much she can 
repay. Even if she wants more, they will not give, because she can’t take it. […] When social 
groups, or SHG groups, if they work with the principles by which it was set up, it will be fine. 
You spreadsheet it, make some 15 members in a computer, the members are there, the 
signatures are there, you’re looking by those parameters which are what you can put in the 
computer, if that is the way you want to judge and give the loans, like some people tried in 
Tamil Nadu or something. Just the names and the signatures and fingerprints, so it matches. But 
with no social bonding, no time spent on group formation, it takes about 15 000 Rs, and about 6 
months to form a tier group which is well functioning. But if you don’t spend that time, I’m 
talking about a good group which is a SHG group, but if you think NGOs are useless, all you 
require is 15 names and 15 signatures and then it’s a group, they will fail.’ (Ramana, p.c.) 
 
While the developmental effect of the SHG-BLP is certainly there, in the past there have been 
issues with the lack of quality of SHGs, as I pointed out in chapter 2.1.. 
Others argue for strengthening co-operative banks: 
‘I think that the focus should be on getting banks into microfinance, not on promoting special 
microfinance institutions which, at least the experience in India shows, make a great deal of 
money, at least for a while, out of getting people into debt and in a way don’t want to take 
savings. […] Donors should […] never give capital for lending, they should be forced to 
borrow from banks, or better, to take it from savers. Again its old hat but the cooperatives, that 
route of credit unions or Mutuelles, that is surely the preferable route for consumer financial 
services. Sadly it is one that is diminishing in importance.’ (Harper, Interview by Governance 
Across Borders, 2010, p. 4) 
 
Co-operatives are seen as favourable as they are institutions, which are owned by people. 
Profits and savings of its members stay with the community, where they will also be invested. 
This leads to further economic growth in the area. Also, the fact that members have a 
financial stake in the co-operative bank leads to a wise choice of management.  
‘Without financial stake, members tended to choose flamboyant persons who were good at 
accessing dole or credit. With high stakes, they opted for strict disciplinarians and financially 
prudent persons as leaders.’ (Rajagopalan in The Economic Times, 2010b) 
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Furthermore, these institutions are transparent, as they present their audited statements (ibid). 
That co-operative banks are hardly discussed is surprising, but might stem from the fact that 
they lack advocates. They are neither of interest to private investors nor owned by 
governments who would see a role in protecting them. Apparently, the regulatory framework 
has even become less favourable towards co-operatives. A circumstance, which might even 
stem from the empowering effect of co-operative banks, as Shashi Rajagopalan speculated: 
‘There are the most appalling laws, for example in Andhra Pradesh, we do have a good co-
operative law, but in the last five, six years, the department refuses to register co-operatives 
under that law. Now as a result, people’s choice of running their own organisation has gotten 
very severely restricted. Then, you have only third party players coming in, and at that, they 
can form a cartel quite easily. In true competition, all forms of organisations must be allowed to 
flourish. No one form should be stifled. Here in India we have stifled the co-operative form of 
organisation. […] That’s because co-operatives consist of large numbers of members from 
contiguous areas, and contiguous areas means vote-banks. And no legislator wants a co-
operative leadership to emerge, which can threaten him or her. And that’s where it comes from, 
where the entire approach to poor, a very paternalistic approach to poor comes from, ‘oh you 
can’t do it by yourself, let the state do it for you’.’ (Rajagopalan, p.c.) 
 
While the RBI, NABARD and some state governments have established a committee to study 
co-operative societies as contributors to financial inclusion (RBI, 2011b, para 91), and the 
RBI is trying to ‘revive the [...] rural co-operative credit structure’ (ibid, para 90),  
co-operatives are hardly part of the discussion within the microfinance community.  
Unfortunately, alternative sources of microfinance have been given little attention in the 
debates following the AP crisis.  
3.2. Consumer Protection 
Besides changing the model in which financial services are provided to one which focuses 
less on profit, another option is to keep the model, but treat it like other commercial financial 
services. Similar to the situation in the US after the subprime crisis, following the crisis in 
India there quickly started a discussion on the need for consumer protection to help avoid 
such problems in the future. Behind this lies the rationale that, if consumers were well 
informed about the contract they are signing and their rights, the situation would not come to 
the point of suicides, massive defaults, political action and bad press.  
‘The roots of the global financial crisis, which started in 2008, lie partly in a failure to regulate. 
Now more than ever, policy makers and regulators face increasing questions over whether and 
how to regulate consumer credit so as to protect borrowers.’ (Porteous, 2009, p.1) 
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Still, the need to protect microfinance clients astonished some, as microfinance, with its 
mission to serve the poor, giving them dignity and empowerment (e.g. Govindarajan, Harvard 
Business Review Blog, 2010), would not give a reason to ask for additional protection. Even 
before it hit the headlines in global newspapers, microfinance practitioners feared that MFIs 
might ‘simply transmute into a ‘feel-good’ version of the sort of ‘doorstep lending’ 
organizations found in the developed countries’ (Bateman, 2010, p. 130).  
For some reason, consumer protection efforts usually focus on the middle class rather than the 
poor.  
‘Consumer protection is also attacked, usually covertly, for being ‘middle class’, the middle 
classes for this purpose being defined as those with the opportunity and education to look after 
themselves. The implication is that the poor are out of reach of this movement since they are 
too ignorant or under too many pressures to resist exploitation.’ (Harvey, 1978, p. 15) 
 
This holds also true for India. Considering the Asian Development Bank’s definition of 
poverty, still three quarters of the population do not reach the middle class as they earn less 
than two Dollars a day (von Braunmühl, 2010, p. 403)22. Poor consumers in India - mostly 
living in rural areas - hardly have any knowledge about consumer rights and where to turn in 
case these get disobeyed (ibid). Poor consumers also face additional challenges, especially in 
credit markets:  
‘For most goods and services the careful poor consumer can avoid those who seek to ‘exploit’ 
the poorer end of the market and purchase in the mainstream markets. […] However, in the 
credit market poor consumers lose being part of a wider consumer collective. […] in credit 
transactions the creditors’ interest only starts once the bargain has been struck and (s)he starts 
to receive payment. […] illness or unemployment may cause them quickly to fall behind with 
payments. […] the credit market appears to be ultimate in individualism, stripping consumers 
of any protection afforded by being part of a crowd and forcing them to seek out the best terms 
their situation permits.’ (Howells, 1999, p. 244f)23 
 
                                                 
22 The Indian government set the poverty line - which entitles the poor for benefits of welfare 
schemes - at 32 Rs. (for urban areas) and 26 Rs. (for rural areas) (0,7 USD/0,57 USD, using 
the rate of March 31st, 2011). This number will be revised eventually. (See Times of India, 
2010c). 
23This quote describes the credit market for low-income clients in the UK. Differing 
livelihoods make a comparison of the credit market a bit far fetched, especially as there is no 
practice of group lending. Still, some aspects are comparable: the issue of doorstep lending 
with the involved pressure and limitation of choice, and the high costs leading to high interest 
rates. Also, the use of credit as reverse saving, to help managing the budget or in an 
emergency and the limited negotiation power and knowledge about consumer rights and the 
credit product can be seen in both credit markets. See Howells, G. (1999). Seeking Social 
Justice for poor consumers in credit markets . In P. Cartwright, Consumer Protection in 
Financial Services (S. 239-263). Kluwer Law International. 
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That microcredit is often offered using the group model does not contradict the argument of 
lack of protection of being part of a crowd. There is a mass of consumers in the market, but 
they are not mixed with better off consumers, as described by Harvey, meaning such who 
‘look after themselves’ and fight for better conditions which would then also improve the 
situation of poor consumers.  
Also, the barriers to contest unsound practices as an individual client are higher for poorer, 
less educated clients. In India, there is no collective organised institution acting and lobbying 
for poor consumers’ rights and interests. Until recently, the lack of attention by the regulator 
facilitated the infringement of consumer rights by microfinance providers: 
‘In microfinance today, growing numbers of practitioners are relying on practices that would be 
considered illegal or unethical in mature financial markets – untrue information, unlawful 
repossession, and usurious interest rates in particular. Lack of adequate customer protection in 
emerging markets thus easily opens the door to exploitation of poor people.’ Alliance for Fair 
Microfinance24, quoted in Bateman, 2010, p. 131) 
 
3.2.1. Why should consumer protection be regulated?  
Broadly, there are two main theoretical approaches to answer why there should be consumer 
protection.  
The first one is a paternalistic model, where it is argued that, as there is such a vast power 
imbalance between the two contracting parties, the state needs to assist the consumer. The 
company has better knowledge of its product and usually more money and legal knowledge to 
fight causes at court. Also, it usually drafts the contract, as it would not make sense to agree 
on a contract with every single client who would lack the legal expertise and interest to do so 
(see Harvey, 1978, p. 13f).  
The second approach sees the importance of consumer protection in the power of consumers 
to shape the market. A strong consumer will pressure companies to develop the best, safest 
and cheapest products, and will make an economy stronger. Just as products get improved and 
safer by regulating product safety, financial products are likely to improve by regulation. 
‘Just as the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) protects buyers of goods and 
supports a competitive market, we need the same for consumers of financial products–a new 
regulatory regime, and even a new regulatory body, to protect consumers who use credit cards, 
                                                 
24 Their website (www.fairmicrofinance.org) is offline, the discussion forum 
(finance.groups.yahoo.com/group/fairmicrofinance) has not been used since 2008.   
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home mortgages, car loans, and a host of other products. The time has come to put 
scaremongering to rest and to recognize that regulation can often support and advance efficient 
and more dynamic markets.’ (Warren, 2007, p. 9f)  
 
Measures go beyond countering the inequality of bargaining and include ‘anti-monopoly 
legislation, control of excessive or misleading advertising, full disclosure requirements, power 
to reopen extortionate bargains, better excess to the legal system for the unrepresented 
consumer, and consumer education programmes’ (Harvey, 1978, p.20). 
Another way of arguing in favour of consumer protection from the business angle is by 
pointing out that it will increase the company value. In microfinance, this translates to not 
lending beyond debt threshold levels of clients (see e.g. Access, 2011, p. 5). 
Protection for microfinance consumers should hold both approaches in mind: 
First, as already noted, microfinance clients, more than middle class consumers, face a strong 
imbalance in the negotiating process.  
There is a ‘[...] huge imbalance of power, information and resources between consumers and 
MFIs, with low-income consumers at a great disadvantage. [...] While MFIs/FIs know their 
products rather well, the individual low income consumer often finds it difficult and/or costly to 
obtain sufficient and transparent information regarding the various financial products that they 
access from MFIs. In addition, many of the low income people find MFI financial products 
naturally complex and/or difficult to assess, even when all relevant information is disclosed.’ 
(Arunachalam R. , CUVMF Blog, 2011b), marked as in original) 
 
Besides, engaging in consumer protection will also make sure that the market becomes fairer 
for suppliers. The late Shashi Rajagopalan, Director of the Central Board of the Reserve Bank 
of India and member of the Malegam Committee even suggested that there might be a cartel.   
‘But even competition – what is seen in the MFI sector, 4,5, MFIs can form a cartel and not 
come into competitive spirit, and that’s what we saw happening, and therefore it’s again very 
important not to assume that just because there are many players, there will be competition. The 
regulator has to make sure that competition is true competition and that it doesn’t fall into a 
cartel instead. And in this instance, cartels have been formed.’  (Rajagopalan, p.c.) 
 
Strengthening consumer rights can also be a step in the fight against corruption. Considering 
that corruption is a major problem in India (The Economist, 2011) this could also be a 
motivation to engage in consumer protection. 
‘I’ve been to a slum in Hyderabad, there the lady has passbooks of 50 clients, she’s the 
coordinator agent. I asked her how she survives and she said, everyone who borrows, they give 
me 100, 200 Rupees. There is corruption, […] the MFIs are also promoting corruption.’       
(C.S. Reddy, p.c.) 
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The widespread practice of the use of agents is a very severe problem, which I also address in 
a section an microfinance and politics in chapter 4.1.3.  
None of these approaches see consumer protection as something derived from developmental 
goals but as ‘an ethical part of financial services’ (Access, 2011, p. 6). This strengthens the 
argument microfinance should be treated as any other financial service.  
3.2.2.  Regulatory risks  
Paternalism vs. Free choice 
There are also arguments against consumer protection. One is the allegation that consumer 
protection is paternalistic and restricts personal freedom and choice, which includes even ‘the 
right to choose imprudently’ (Harvey, 1978, p. 19). Others say the poor are underestimated 
and know better what they need than some drafters of legislation who are far away from their 
reality. 
‘The notion that it’s somehow unethical to enter into a profitable business working with the 
poor is insulting to the poor. They are not children who need our protection. They’re working 
women and men who are thriving under a system that allows them to take their economic lives 
into their own hands. Treating them as anything less is unjust.’ (Akula, 2010, p. 153) 
 
One reason for consumer protection is to safeguard that a consumer has enough information 
to make a choice. It is paternalistic in the sense that some contracts are unenforceable, even if 
the consumer would wish to be bound by them. In order to justify that paternalism, some 
argue using the assumption that consumers consent to the state overruling their wishes 
(Cartwright, 1999, p. 14). The role of consumer protection must be to ‘protect the consumer 
against misrepresentations of a contractual nature and to protect the prudent shopper on the 
basis of information. If all relevant information about a class of goods is available to the 
prudent shopper, together with information about the true cost […] then at least a prudent 
shopping decision can be made with the consumers’ eyes full open’ (Harvey, 1978, p. 19). 
The right to make imprudent decision is not hindered by such measures. Everyone is free to 
take decisions despite knowing better. Considering the asymmetry of the contractors in 
microfinance, and the lack of information on one side, an institution cannot claim to treat their 
clients as equal partners and be non-transparent on terms and conditions of that contract at the 
same time. I would rather argue that consumer protection does not restrict a free informed 
choice here, but enables it in the first place.  
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High administrative costs and anti-competitive effects 
Another argument is that consumer protection will increase costs that will have to be carried 
by the consumer.  
The counter argument sees the need for a balance of the costs occurring for businesses to 
comply with legal provisions and the transactional costs of the consumer who has to check the 
product himself and is at risk to be exploited when there is no consumer protection (See 
Harvey, 1978, p. 22).  
As a CGAP report on consumer protection argues, there is a conflict between consumer 
protection and keeping the costs low for clients reaching scale: 
‚The drive to include poor clients naturally leads banks to cost-effective technologies that make 
transaction costs affordable to customers and banks. Outsourcing noncore tasks is an effective 
way to reduce costs, but having nonbank staff handle banking transactions increases risks. 
When banks or regulators take steps to contain these risks, customer service tends to diminish 
and access to expanded services tends to become restricted by limiting the types of services 
nonbank staff are authorized to handle. There is a tradeoff between customer service and 
customer protection. Customer service tends to diminish in branchless models where there is 
minimal direct interaction between bank staff and the customer. Reduced customer service is 
reflected in a longer time needed to acquire clients because of stringent know your customer 
(KYC) requirements, restricted range of services, limits on transaction size, and additional 
safeguards for establishing customer identity that require customers to provide information 
such as personal identification numbers (PINs), passwords, fingerprint, etc.’  
(CGAP, 2010, p. 2) 
 
This is one reason why it is important to have a regulation applying to all market players 
equally. Otherwise, a single institution will suffer from a competitive disadvantage (at least in 
the short run). As Chuck Waterfield from Microfinance Transparency puts it: ‘The problem of 
keeping your price transparent is obvious – it’s difficult to show a true price that looks higher 
than the competition when, in fact, it is lower than that charged by others’ (Waterfield, CGAP 
MF Blog, 2011, marked as in original). 
As costs increase for the businesses, only the biggest ones might survive. Institutions that 
offer new, individually shaped products, or new market entrants carry a higher risk. They 
have higher costs, which might be harder to carry, as their businesses are still smaller. This is 
a general problem of scale though. As Deepak Alok pointed out to me, these costs and 
regulations are part of the regulatory scheme businesses have to take into account. 
‘Those costs have to be dealt with in the business plan anyways, that cannot be dealt away with, 
so for example, if you’re manufacturing a chemical, then you have to comply with all 
regulations, you have to take approval and all, so this would be kind of a business condition. 
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[…] Deserving candidates who want to enter, they will find ways, they will find investments, 
too, complying with the regulations.’ (Alok, p.c.) 
 
3.3. The general level of consumer protection in India  
‘You are educated, I’m educated, we educated people are being exploited, so how can you 
expect illiterate people not to be exploited.’ (C.S. Reddy , p.c.)  
 
India passed consumer regulation as early as 1986 in a distinct law, as one of the first 
countries in the region. At the time it was passed – and even now -– the Consumer Protection 
Act25 was one of the most progressive acts in this regard. The act defines consumer as any 
person who pays for a good or service, including ‘goods bought and used by him and services 
availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-
employment’ (Para 2 (d) (ii) CPA). This means it also covers micro-entrepreneurs, the typical 
microfinance clients.  
Consumers enjoy the rights, which are stated in para. 6 of the act. These include ‘the right to 
be informed’ (para. 6 (b)), ‘the right to be heard and to be assured that consumer’s interests 
will receive due consideration at appropriate forums’ (para. 6 (c)), ‘the right to seek redressal’ 
(para. 6 (e)), and ‘the right to consumer education’ (para. 6 (f)). 
The administrative structure that was created in India is quite elaborate, there is a ministry 
dedicated to consumer affairs, the Ministry for Consumer Affairs, Food and Public 
Distribution. In all states there are Consumer Protection Councils, which have also been 
established on district level (von Braunmühl, 2010, p. 403). These institutions have the task to 
safeguard consumer rights and should meet regularly. In practice, these meetings are 
unfortunately not conducted as often as provided by the law. This makes the system rather 
inefficient (ibid, p. 404). For consumer complaints, there are consumer disputes redressal 
agencies (para. 9 CPA) on the national, state and district level. These forums consist of judges 
and lay members. They resemble courts as they have judicial power over complaints of 
consumers even though not all of their members are judges. The idea behind the 
establishment of these tribunals is to avoid lengthy court procedures and make jurisdiction 
easily available for consumers. A decision is supposed to be made within three months (para. 
13 (3A) CPA). 
                                                 
25 For a selection of relevant provision of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 see Appendix I.  
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Unfortunately consumer protection in India is not as extensive and efficient in reality as it is 
on paper. In a recent study, none of the tribunals examined was following the rule to decide 
within three months, but instead took a year or more. The study was conducted in 2008 and 
found that there were cases pending which had been filed as early as 1992 (von Braunmühl, 
2010, p. 404). It can be said that the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies do not manage to 
cater to the needs they were created for. Even though consumer protection is a concern in 
India, the existing mechanisms do not seem to be sufficient to safeguard consumer protection 
rights26. These difficulties should be held in mind when designing a consumer protection 
framework for microfinance clients. The little awareness of clients and their limited means 
will further increase the difficulties of enforcement. This is why a regulatory framework for 
microfinance has to include all stakeholders and hold them accountable. In the next section I 
describe the current status of regulation on different levels and difficulties occurring with 
regulation of these stakeholders. 
 
                                                 
26 There are efforts to improve the systems of legal redress for clients, like a GIZ project 
working on mediation procedures. See  
http://www.asemindia.com/Project_cat.aspx?Sectionid=2&Subsectionid=10&rowid=13&cati
d=25, retrieved August, 20th, 2011. 
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4. THE STATUS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION IN MICROFINANCE IN INDIA  
‚It's an imperfect and uncomfortable state of affairs. And every piece in the lending ecosystem 
is to blame.’ (The Economic Times, 2010c) 
 
‚They [i.e. microfinance practitioners, author’s note] knew, and we have told them time and 
again, that you are inviting trouble from the government and politicians by doing what they’re 
doing and they said: to hell with you, and now, they are in a total mess, there was a mess in 
2005…and they never woke up. In 2005, 06 they came up with a code of conduct, and even 
now, the code of conduct is not implemented. I sit on Sa-Dhans Board, and nothing happens, 
neither the associations feel responsible, nor the individual MFIs, […] nor banks, which are 
lending, which RBI calls principle agents, they don’t feel responsible. The RBI, which is 
supposed to be a regulator, does not feel responsible. In fact, in the Malegam Report they 
agreed that they have failed their duty as a regulator. The point is that none of them paid 
attention to client protection or responsible MF because they were basically keen to make 
money.’ (C.S. Reddy, p.c.)  
 
Recent events in Indian microfinance suggest that consumer protection in Indian microfinance 
needs improvement. There is no single culprit for the Indian microfinance crisis; rather, the 
events show a systematic failure. None of the stakeholders involved managed to anticipate 
and prevent the emergence of a bubble. In this section I discuss the present status of consumer 
protection at the levels of various microfinance stakeholders. Additionally, I present 
challenges at their respective levels. Considering the variety of players involved and their 
respective interests, there are many issues that I just touch briefly. To add clarity, I add a little 
paragraph at the end of each sub-chapter, presenting the critical issues in the context of a 
regulatory framework.  
4.1. The State 
‘Regulators perceive high risks from nonbanks offering banking services, given low literacy 
levels and past experience with nonbank financial services provision.’ (CGAP, 2010, p. 2) 
 
As microfinance is a crosscut issue, it is uncertain which entity in the Indian federation is 
competent to regulate consumer protection - as was mentioned earlier. Here, regulation at the 
national level, the RBI and the state level will be discussed. As C.S. Reddy from APMAS 
noted, at one point there was discussion about the creation of a ‘separate entity, called 
Microfinance Development and Regulation Authority, MFDRA, which could then cover all 
different forms’, however, it was never realised due to lack of ‘interest in it in the government 
of India level or the RBI level’ (C.S. Reddy, p.c.). 
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4.1.1. The Indian government 
As mentioned above, even at the national level there are several players that could engage in 
client protection in microfinance. There is – amongst others - the financial ministry, the 
ministry for rural development, or the ministry of consumer affairs and public distribution27. 
The main actors at the national level have been the Ministry of Finance and the RBI. Still, as 
explained earlier, also other national laws like the Consumer Protection Act apply to 
microfinance. 
a. The Micro Finance Bill 2007/2011 
As mentioned above, already in 2007 a central microfinance bill was placed at the Lok Sabha, 
the Indian parliament, but was never passed. In 2010, there were efforts to revise the bill. As 
the RBI had started drafting a regulation covering NBFCs, some voices said it was 
unnecessary to regulate the remaining entities, especially as those were not commercial 
entities (Business Standard, 2011a). The bill was expected in early 2011 (Moneycontrol.com, 
2010). Recent reports already indicated that the state has followed the view that the RBI 
regulation makes a central regulation redundant. An Indian news website quoted a Finance 
Ministry Official: 
‘ “There is a feeling that the ground realities of the sector are now different, especially after the 
announcement of an MFI policy by the Reserve Bank of India early in May,” the official said. 
The Finance Ministry had ‘found' overlaps in the draft Bill and the Malegam panel 
recommendations, which were accepted by the apex bank almost in totality […]. “Some 
grounds on which the Bill has been put on hold are the caps on interest margin and rate of 
interest, and the redundancy of a central law when the RBI is the sole regulator for nearly 92 
per cent of NBFC-MFIs,” he added.’ (The Hindu Businessline, 2011) 
 
Alok Prasad, the CEO of MFIN, the association of Microfinance NBFCs, argued for a central 
regulation, as he expected that the struggle whether or not AP state law prevails over the RBI 
regulation could be solved by a central regulation (The Hindu Businessline, 2011). A new 
draft for a microfinance bill was introduced in July 201128 and will be discussed in the Indian 
Parliament in one of the next sessions.  
The draft suggests to regulate all institutions offering microfinance (except co-operatives), 
and to establish the ‘Micro Finance Development Council’ as an advisor to the central 
government as well as to the state governments (MFI Bill 2011, para 3-9). MFIs will have to 
                                                 
27 These acts have to be passed in parliament, so they undergo scrutiny by politicians from 
various fields. Still, the draft usually originates from one of the ministries. 
28 See Appendix. 
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register with the RBI (MFI Bill 2011, para 10), which has to scrutinize that certain conditions 
are met. Besides a minimum capital of 5 lakhs Rs., these provisions are held rather generally. 
There are clauses like ‘the general character and management of the applicant shall not be 
prejudicial to the interest of the clients availing micro finance services’ (ibid, para 12 (1) a), 
or that ‘the applicant is engaged in the promotion of financial inclusion by providing micro 
finance services’ (ibid, para 12 (1) b, marked as in original).  
It RBI will have the duty to ‘promote and ensure orderly growth of the micro finance Sector 
in accordance with such measures as it deems fit, for the purpose of promoting financial 
inclusion’ (ibid, para 23 (1), marked as in original). In pursuit of this mandate, they are to 
provide i.a. for ‘greater transparency’ (ibid, para. 23 (2) a), to issue sector related benchmarks 
and standard measuring ‘methods of operation, measures of recovery’ (ibid, para. 23 (2) b), to 
collect information for a ‘data base in the public domain relating to micro finance services’ 
(para. 23 (2) f), and are responsible for ‘training and capacity building measures’ (ibid, para. 
23 (2) g) and promotion of customer education for ‘greater awareness and for economic 
empowerment of micro finance clients’ (ibid, para 23 (2) h). In its mandate the RBI may also 
give so called ‘directions’ to MFIs, which are binding for the institutions (ibid, para. 24).  
The draft suggests that institutions offering ‘financial assistance to eligible clients’ have to 
convey an annual interest rate to clients, including all fees and additional charges. Also 
powers of inspection and enforcement (ibid, para 26) are to be transferred to the RBI, which 
might take steps like the removal of officers or the managing committee, or prohibition of 
further provision of micro finance services.  
The RBI is also responsible to appoint Ombudsmen in order to ensure redress of grievances 
by individual clients (ibid, para 31). 
The provisions allowing thrift (ibid, para 44) were strongly welcomed by the microfinance 
industry (M-CRIL, 2011, p. 2). The whole bill is seen positive, as it declares the systematic 
importance of microfinance institutions for financial inclusion and might settle the 
constitutional dispute. The financial market shared this perception, the proposal of the new 
draft led to a rise of 20% of the SKS stock (IndiaRealtime, 2011).  
There was criticism that the draft for the MFI Bill entails too many vague provisions and is 
regulating ‘micro-management’ issues of MFIs, which ‘risks leaving the regulation of the 
microfinance sector open to changing political winds almost in the way that the sudden 
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promulgation of the Andhra Pradesh legislation brought microfinance in the state to a halt’ 
(M-CRIL, 2011, p. 3). Also the provision, which enables the RBI to transfer certain powers to 
NABARD led to uncertainty (ibid). NABARD itself was discussed to take up a regulatory 
role for non NBFC MFIs (SiliconIndia, 2010). Microfinance practitioners were worried that 
NABARD would struggle with objectivity, as they are also engaged in microfinance 
themselves in the SHG-BLP programme (Mehta Mankar, p.c.).  
‘If it is given a proper mandate, a proper capacity building and a proper system to enforce the 
regulation that it has, it may be a good regulator. RBI has an intact system of supervision and 
monitoring. NABARD may not have for an effective supervision. Because regulation also 
means to have an effective system of monitoring and supervision. So NABARD will also have 
to develop a monitoring wing in case it wants to monitor it. But again, NABARD regulation 
will have to be consistent with RBI regulation, because this is an issue, which is part of the 
financial sector.’ (Alok, p.c.) 
 
By having a central bill that transfers powers to RBI and allows the RBI to transfer them 
further to NABARD, there will be a uniform regulation, at least in the union entities.  
4.1.2. The Reserve Bank of India 
‘It makes sense that RBI is the regulator, because they are the regulator for the financial sector, 
so why should MF be left out. But they cannot be regulating from the perspective of systemic 
risk, or the institutional protection, they should be regulating from a perspective of the client 
protection.’ (C.S. Reddy, p.c.) 
 
The majority of the microfinance practitioners I interviewed were of the opinion that the RBI 
was the best-suited regulator for microfinance, as they shared the opinion that it was a ‘highly 
respected, careful and knowledgeable institution’ (M-CRIL, 2011, p. 3). They perceive the 
RBI as an entity that is not influenced by daily politics.  
‘Not that I agree with all their regulations, but it should be a central body like the RBI, a lot of 
MFIs or NBFCs already come under RBI regulation. I definitely think there’s value in it being 
an apex central body versus state level governments, because what we’ve seen happen also is 
that that ends up being simply about the politics and power play between the state governments 
and people who are affected by the microfinance operations.’ (Mehta Mankar, p.c.) 
 
‘RBI is a very, very good regulator in that sense, thinking ahead, forming something. 
Sometimes they lack to take action, but some of the lack is deliberate or sometimes when they 
say ‘Theek hai’29, there might be oversight.’ (Desai, p.c.) 
 
As was explained earlier, the RBI is competent to regulate NBFCs. Someone interested in 
setting up an NBFC will have to apply for registration at the RBI. Its members are nominated 
by the Indian Government, which owns the institution. The RBI is India’s central banking 
                                                 
29 Hindi expression for ‘Alright’ 
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institution with the main mandate to safeguard monetary and financial stability. As such it 
also has the competence and task to regulate and supervise the banking sector, including 
NBFCs. Due to its systematic approach, the RBI was for a long time reluctant to pass a 
regulation on consumer protection.  
Already in 2009, the RBI had already given out a circular on fair practices codes for 
NBFCs30. This circular requires MFIs to adopt a fair practice code themselves and gives an 
outline of what this code is supposed to include. There is a duty to adopt a model for interest 
rates, fees and other charges, which should also be made available to the public in a 
newspaper and online. Interest rates are supposed to be conveyed as annualised interest rates 
in order to make products comparable for customers. To this end, the terms and conditions 
shall be expressed in clear language with the main points included in the loan application 
form to help the client make an informed decision. Terms and conditions should also be 
provided to borrowers in writing. Next to transparency, fair recovery practices were 
addressed. MFIs should resort from practices of harassment and physical violence in the 
recovery process. Furthermore, NBFCs are to put a grievance mechanism into place. (RBI, 
2009). The master circular is binding and NBFCs might face sanctions if they do not act 
accordingly (M2i Consulting, unpublished). However, the points addressed are rather goals 
than real duties, since there are no benchmarks included in the document. This makes the 
regulation soft and easy to circumvent. Maybe it was even seen as a gesture in order to urge 
MFIs to retain discipline and settle the issue themselves. 
As mentioned earlier, in November 2010, after the State Government of Andhra Pradesh had 
passed its regulation, the RBI assigned the Malegam Committee with the task to make a 
recommendation for a regulation on consumer protection in microfinance. In May 2011, the 
RBI announced in its the monetary statement that it had decided to accept the framework of 
these recommendations: 
‘The RBI announced that after ‘the recommendations of the Committee31 were discussed with 
all stakeholders, including the Government of India, select State Governments, major NBFCs 
working as MFIs, industry associations of MFIs working in the country, other smaller MFIs, 
and major banks’, it would ‘accept the broad framework of regulations recommended by the 
Committee’ (RBI, 2011b). 
 
                                                 
30 Available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/15FAPRCO_010709.pdf . 
Retrieved February 20th, 2011. 
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The role that has been assigned to the RBI in the draft of the new microfinance bill has been 
discussed in the previous chapter. As it transfers a lot of regulatory and supervisory functions 
to the RBI the recommendations of the Malegam Committee might remain as they are, when 
the Microfinance Bill will be adopted by parliament.  
 
The Recommendations of the Malegam Committee 32 
‘[...] We are very clear that, for the first time, the RBI is not only looking at regulation for the 
sake of systemic good management, for the first time we are saying, regulation for the sake of 
the consumer, the customer. We have not done it before, so we are suggesting that for the first 
time. And I certainly believe that a very good code will develop as a result.’ (Personal 
communication.’ (Rajagopalan, p.c.)  
 
Detailed guidelines are yet to be published, but as of now, the main suggestions are the 
following33: 
The Malegam Committee suggested introducing a new category of NBFC-MFIs. By the 
preliminary definition, an NBFC-MFI is  
‘A company (other than a company licensed under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956) 
which provides financial services pre-dominantly to low-income borrowers with loans of small 
amounts, for short-terms, on unsecured basis, mainly for income-generating activities, with 
repayment schedules which are more frequent than those normally stipulated by commercial 
banks and which further conforms to the regulations specified in that behalf’ (RBI, 2011a, p. 
para 4.2). 
 
Bank loans to MFIs ‘will be eligible for classification as priority sector loans under respective 
category of indirect finance only if the prescribed percentage of their total assets are in the 
nature of "qualifying assets" and they adhere to the "pricing of interest" guidelines to be 
issued in this regard’ (RBI, 2011b, para 92). ‘Qualifying asset’ means that it has to meet the 
following criteria: 
‚(i)34 loan disbursed by an MFI to a borrower with a rural household annual income not 
exceeding ` 60,000 or urban and semi-urban household income not exceeding ` 1,20,000; (ii)35 
loan amount not to exceed ` 35,000 in the first cycle and ` 50,000 in subsequent cycles; (iii) 
                                                 
32 As already noted, the RBI has announced that it will pass the framework of the 
recommendations, and already announced some revised provisions RBI. (2011, para. 92). I 
will present the revised versions where they exist and indicate it in a footnote. 
33 For a summary and a selection of relevant provisions see appendix 
34 In the Malegam Report, there was a unified maximal household income of 50,000 Rupees. 
After discussions with stakeholders, the different livelihood of urban clients was factored in. 
(RBI, 2011, para. 5.9.) 
35 In the Malegam Report, there was a unified maximum loan size of 25,000 Rupees. (ibid.) 
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total indebtedness of the borrower not to exceed ` 50,000; (iv) tenure of loan not to be less than 
24 months for loan amount in excess of ` 15,000 without prepayment penalty; (iv) loan to be 
extended without collateral; (v) aggregate amount of loan, given for income generation, not to 
be less than 75 per cent of the total loans given by the MFIs; and (vi) loan to be repayable by 
weekly, fortnightly or monthly instalments at the choice of the borrower’ (RBI, 2011b, para. 
92)  
 
The Malegam Committee suggested regulating transparency in loan pricing (RBI, 2011a, para 
8.7), so that MFIs shall only charge a processing fee, an interest charge and an insurance 
premium. Effective interest rates shall be displayed in offices and loan documents (ibid, para 
8). Not more than two MFIs shall lend to an individual borrower (ibid, para 9.7). MFIs may 
lend to individuals outside JLGs or SHGs (RBI, 2011b, para 92)36. 
The Report foresees the creation of one or more credit information bureaus (RBI, 2011a, para 
10.5).  
Additionally, in order to ensure enforcement of the provisions, it proposes to establish a 
proper system of grievance redress by MFIs (ibid, para 11.9). 
In order to ‘widen the base from which MFIs are funded in respect of the Net Owned Funds 
needed for Capital Adequacy’, the committee suggests to create one or more ‘social capital 
funds’ (ibid, para 21). 
Additionally, the RBI introduced a margin cap of 12% and interest rate cap of 26% on 
individual loans in order to be eligible as priority sector loans (RBI, 2011b, p. para 92). 
As the draft for the MF Bill foresees that the RBI will take up a regulatory role - including 
consumer protection issues, it is likely to become the main regulator. Some aspects of this 
new role are still unclear. To name one, there are doubts about the RBIs power to monitor and 
enforce this regulation.  
‚While aspects related to Corporate Governance, Systems and other such aspects for NBFC 
MFIs are non-negotiables and need to be solidly enforced through a regulatory stipulation and 
also supervised diligently, the aspect of artificially restricting client level of borrowing, placing 
emphasis on the household income as an eligibility criterion and such aspects are practically 
untenable. As someone who has worked in over 550 districts in India and several other 
countries over the last 23 years, I can vouch safe that such measures cannot be enforced on the 
ground. And also, as these aspects cannot be supervised with any degree of reliability, they 
should not be regulated at all. And if this still needs to be done, it may be better to influence 
these by incentivising the appropriate behaviors through provision of preferential priority sector 
credit (and/or other incentives) for livelihood loans, loans lesser than Rs 50000 and the 
                                                 
36 In contrast to para 9.7 of the Malegam Report where it says that ‘MFIs should lend to an 
individual borrower only as a member of a JLG’. 
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like.’(Arunachalam R. , CUVMF Blog, 2011c)   
 
4.1.3. The federal States 
After the regulatory action of the AP government37, a claim frequently made was that the act 
was politically motivated. Many fear giving power to state governments in this aspect, as they 
are conceived to be driven by short-term political considerations.   
As this is a general topic and not confined to the states I insert a brief excursus on the topic.  
_____ 
Excursus: Microfinance and politics 
‘What do you think has happened in AP? It’s political business. It’s a huge vote-bank at the end 
of the day.’ (Practitioner 3, p.c.) 
 
One risk that people see in the states being regulators for the microfinance sector is the fear of 
populist action by political parties. The poor are seen as ‘vote-banks’ who will give their 
votes to the party promising them a loan waiver.  
‘There is political risk; the microfinance clientele belongs to the bottom of the socioeconomic 
pyramid. India is a democracy and we elect our leaders, as a result populist policies and 
programs are announced including tinkering with the regulation, loan waivers and subsidies’ 
(Arya, p.c.). 
 
‘The only thing is, they shouldn’t be seen as a political victory. This is the end. If the congress, 
which is leading in AP, if they see that killing of microfinance in AP is a victory for them, then 
the sector is finished. [...] The new chief minister came, and he announced he’s against MFIs. 
[...] If the congress sees it as a victory, and as winning a vote-bank, then that’s the end of the 
sector. Because then everybody else will replicate, and if there’s an opposition, they will do it 
faster than the congress. Without getting into politics, as an economic disaster or issue, if you 
can take it and solve it, I think we’re better off.’ (Ramana, p.c.)  
 
That political parties try to gain popularity by criticising microfinance certainly holds true. As 
an example, after the outbreak of the crisis in Andhra Pradesh, the opposition in Andhra 
Pradesh instantly argued that Rahul Gandhi, member of congress, the political party in power, 
had a ‘proximity’ to MFIs and was to blame (Financial Express, 2010). The microfinance 
crisis offered a stage for politicians to show their commitment for the common man.  
                                                 
37  For the contents of the AP Act see Appendix and Chapter 2.4.4.   
     For the question of constitutional powers of regulation and if the AP act will ‘survive’ see 
chapter 2.3.1.  
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Another argument is that politicians act against microfinance, as they feel threatened by the 
empowering effect of it. It was argued that as empowered borrowers might become 
independent of their political patrons, local politicians try to work against MFIs.   
‘We need a regulatory regime that checks malpractices while encouraging the positive aspects 
of microfinance. But local politicians don’t want to empower people through independent 
access to finance: they prefer patronage networks that can be used as vote banks. Government-
driven SHGs can serve that purpose, but not MFIs.’(The Times of India, 2010a)  
  
Deepak Alok argued that Microfinance products replace dependency on grants given by local 
politicians. These grants were given in anticipation of votes.  
‘Poor people are also a political constituency. And lots of women grants and other grants are 
directed towards the poor. And lots of people expect votes in return for that. So, if something is 
going with them without those sources that may create a competition. Definitely this is a 
political risk. (Alok, p.c.) 
 
The abuse of microfinance for local politics is striking in the widespread use of local 
politicians as agents. In one instance, the agent collected commission for loans, which were 
only disbursed after the local elections (Arunachalam R. , CUVMF Blog, 2011d). 
_____ 
 
Another argument condemning the action of the state explained the act as an unfair means in a 
competitive situation. As a provider of the SHG-BLP, the state was acting to gain a 
competitive advantage. This claim stems from MFIs being attacked as undermining the goal 
of state sponsored programmes like NREGA. MFIs were accused of siphoning up funds, 
which the poor had previously received from the state. 
‘NREGA is a state sponsored employment generation programme, assuring wage labour at a 
specified wage rate. It is intended to be a poverty alleviation programme. Such payments on a 
weekly basis are being used to repay the high cost loans from MFIs, or siphoned off by MFIs. 
This has negated the very purpose of such programmes.’ (Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
While state officials see their projects under attack, MFI officials claim that clients chose MFI 
loans over SHG loans as they are easier and faster to avail and the AP government is using its 
political power to strengthen its position in this competitive situation.  
‘The AP government says it is protecting borrowers from coercive loan recovery by MFIs that 
reportedly has caused 30 suicides. Its not-so-hidden agenda is to give the government’s own 
microfinance scheme — through self help groups (SHGs) — a lending monopoly, eliminating 
MFI rivals. The preamble of the ordinance clearly says that MFIs are a threat to SHGs and must 
be quashed.  
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The government is supposed to be a referee. But in AP, the referee is also a big player and it 
wins by disqualifying rivals. The state alone cannot provide enough inclusive finance, so 
villagers will be driven back to moneylenders. Money lending thugs posing as MFIs have 
apparently caused some suicides.’ (The Times of India, 2010a)  
 
‘Behind the scenes, the AP Act was written and championed by SERP, the agency responsible 
for running the AP government-backed microfinance SHG program. Evidence shows that 
SERP has been losing the struggle to compete with private sector MFIs. 
The effect of the AP Act is not to protect the poor, but to protect the uncompetitive 
government-backed SHG program run by SERP. 
The AP government-backed SHG program competes directly with the private sector MFIs. The 
SHG program however is failing to keep up and has lost significant market share to the MFIs. 
Why? According to the October 2010 Intellecap White Paper, the government programs have 
“…neither the discipline needed for long-term sustainability, nor a business model that can be 
scaled up effectively”. Additionally, there is a widespread belief that the World Bank is on the 
point of providing an additional $1 billion in funding support to SERP or a successor program. 
The case for this extension is believed to be strengthened if the commercial MFI industry is 
weakened. 
An AP Act that eliminates law-abiding private sector participants in the market and directly 
benefits the government-backed provider is unfair at best and illegal at worst.’  
(Legatum Ventures, 2011, p. 5) 
 
‘I think the AP crisis is nothing but a public-private conflict where the state has its own 
programme and the private initiatives seem to be growing much faster on the back of 
(primarily) foreign commercial capital […]. Nobody can compete with the state when it comes 
to it, your state has several powers and private initiatives can’t do anything about it. I think it is 
specifically that. The fact that the MFI community, in their pursuit of growth, also overlooked 
issues regarding what was happening to their customers, didn’t help the cause.’  
(Shrivastava, p.c.) 
 
MFI stakeholders are uncomfortable to have the state governments involved as its actions are 
conceived as being harder to predict. In Andhra Pradesh, the MFIs seemed to be surprised by 
the action of the AP government (e.g. Practitioner 3, p.c.). Considering the earlier crises of 
microfinance and the coverage in Indian literature and media in the last years this argument is 
a little surprising. SERP claimed that they tried to discuss the matter with stakeholders and 
enacted the ordinance, as discussions did not lead to any change.  
‘The practices of the MFI were not healthy and many of them were aware of the impending 
problems. However, with a view to expand rapidly and to earn more for the purpose, all basic 
tenets of financing have been given a go by driving the poor into debt trap. The ordinance has 
not just come like that and all the concerned have been sounded about the problems before the 
ordinance was brought into effect.’ (Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
That regulation was passed as an ordinance initially, and not as a parliamentary act right 
away, does give the impression that the actual adoption was quite sudden. Regardless of the 
circumstances surrounding the issuing of the ordinance, it is hard to believe that MFIs were 
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surprised by the state taking action - given the previous crises happening in Indian 
microfinance.  
‘I was not following the developments there and most of the developments in AP happened in 
regional media, that almost for eight to nine months before the crisis erupted there were signs in 
the media, some sporadic news coming here and there, so that way MFI had significant time 
and signals to do corrective actions, that they have not done. Managing the bureaucracy, 
managing the political risk and managing the media risks, on these three accounts they have 
failed miserably. Rather, they have antagonized all these three forces, not even kept it neutral.’ 
(Practitioner 2, p.c.) 
 
‘The funny thing in MF in India is, everybody is worried about MFIs, but MFIs are not worried 
about themselves [...]. From 2003 onwards, even if you see the NABARD report of 99, every 
time there has been a mention about the need to be responsible, not having a mission drift, there 
was the example of Compartamos having a public issue. Every workshop, conference, meeting 
said MFIs should not undercut each other, there should not be unhealthy competition, they 
should improve governance, all the rating reports raised these issues.’ (C.S. Reddy, p.c.) 
 
While regulation by a central authority such as the national State or the RBI certainly is 
needed to create an equal playing field, it will be hard for such an entity to supervise the 
implementation on the ground level, especially concerning consumer protection, as Ramesh 
Arunachalam argued: 
‘If we rely on the RBI or a central institution (without local presence) to deliver the goods on 
the above consumer protection aspects, it would be analogous to searching for a needle in a 
haystack. […] Without question, these aspects cannot be monitored and set right by the central 
bank, or any other national institution, or MFI association, as they do not have the local 
presence and resources. It did not happen last time around and it will not happen now. This can 
only be done by the state governments and them alone. And if such issues are brushed aside 
and the proposed microfinance bill is unable to prevent occurrence of these and similar 
problems, the microfinance crisis will reappear again and in much larger vein all over India.’ 
(Arunachalam R. , moneylife, 2011)  
 
Action of the AP government was to be expected, given the events of the years before and 
corresponding announcements, which were ignored by MFIs. That a regulator stepped in was 
certainly needed. This would have been the time for the central regulator to finally adopt a 
unified microfinance bill to regulate the sector coherently and nationwide. Following the draft 
of the MFI bill, the RBI will become the regulator for the sector. This was welcomed by the 
sector, as the RBI is a trusted and knowledgeable institution. As long as the bill is not passed, 
however, there is uncertainty of the regulatory situation. In such an ambiguous environment, 
banks and investors have stopped lending to MFIs. The longer the wait for regulatory action 
continues, the more MFIs will have to close down (see e.g. livemint, 2011) To have 
institutions that provide microfinance services in a regulated environment would certainly be 
the better option.  
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4.2. Funders’ Responsibility  
‘As long as money comes, nobody bothers’ (Ramana, p.c.) 
 
When discussing responsibility for the crisis in microfinance, the role of microfinance funders 
cannot be left out. Funders were blamed for not having scrutinized the MFIs they were 
investing in, and for pushing them to meet unrealistic growth rates. It was argued that ‘MFIs 
are expected to achieve 100 % repayment rate by funders and investors, knowing fully well 
that such recovery rates are achieved only by causing the customers acute distress’ (Access, 
2011). 
As funders are in control of the capital that institutions need they have a strong position and 
would be able to expect consumer protection as a loan conditionality. That way they could 
strengthen the awareness and importance of client protection easily.  
The lending institutions differ in what they expect from their investment. Initially it was 
merely donors and social investors who lent, expecting poverty reduction and other 
developmental benchmarks to improve. Then banks came in, which were happy to fulfil their 
PSL quota in an easy and profitable way. In the last step, equity investors realized that 
microfinance was a profitable business model and invested to get high returns. As it is hard 
for the Indian regulator to govern funders, especially donors and investors, other mechanisms 
are relevant to ensure consumer protection. In this section I will briefly describe these funders 
and current efforts to regulate their behaviour. 
4.2.1. Donors 
 
‘DFID and other donors must play a central part in refocusing the industry. As Mark Napier, 
the incoming Director of Investment Innovation at CDC stated during an oral evidence session 
for this inquiry, donors should act as the ‘conscience of the market.’ (APPG, 2011a, p. 6) 
 
Next to the Indian state and Indian institutions like SIDBI (Small Industries Development 
Bank of India) or NABARD, international donors provide finance to MFIs. These institutions 
are known as ‘patient lenders’, who have lower expectation for returns but see microfinance 
as a means to achieve goals in their development policy. Because of this strong non-financial 
motivation for their involvement they should be expected to be especially diligent concerning 
the situation of consumers.  
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The World Bank and SIDBI have started a ‘responsible microfinance’ project38, in which they 
have developed ‘a framework of ‘good practice’ based policies for the sector. These set of 
policies are handed to the sector through loan conditionalities arising from its loan to SIDBI, 
which in turn would be providing bulk funds to MFIs (Srinivasan N., SSR 2010, p. 84). 
Institutions approaching SIDBI for funding will have to share their data on an information 
platform. The institutions will be monitored on the implementation of their codes of conduct 
and their client relations. As of now, four of these reports are publicly available online39. 
These reports are very valuable as they provide a social rating and try to measure the 
development impact of MFIs. These ratings can be used for donors or other investors to check 
that institutions they are funding have an impact on social parameters.40 
Donors are mainly funding the SHG-BLP, and no commercial microfinance operations. It has 
received contributions by ‘virtually every bilateral, multilateral agency, and private 
foundation in the country, including agencies within the UN system […] multilaterals outside 
it like the world bank, and government agencies’ (Ghate, 2007, p. 190). However, the role 
they played in the development of commercial microfinance should not be forgotten. Many of 
the biggest MFIs started as NGOs, which were being funded by donors and private 
foundations (Ghate, 2007, p. 191). Ghate mentions DFID and SDC here, who enabled the 
transformation of NGOs to for profit entities.  
‘Thus the NGOs would actually give a grant to their individual borrowers – who in turn would 
then invest in the shares of the new for-profit NBFC. The grant to the individual borrowers 
could be justified in law as having provided financial support to the poor, who were loyal 
customers/borrowers of the microfinance operations. 
With the donor community, this could be justified as integrating the poor in the exciting 
investment opportunity in their own financial institution which could operate on market 
principles. Thus even public institutions like SIDBI – possibly in good faith – joined the game 
by providing transformation loans at fairly low rates of interest. These loans would provide the 
NGOs necessary liquidity to actually put the money in the hands of the borrowers, who in turn 
would invest in the NBFC, and the NBFC in turn would buy the portfolio of the NGO for cash 
and this cash would be used to repay the transformation loan.’ (Sriram, 2010, p. 14f) 
 
Besides this, donors have mainly supported financial infrastructure, capacity building, and 
encouraged to set up industry associations like Sa-Dhan (Ghate, 2007, p. 191). 
                                                 
38 For details see http://www.sidbi.in/Micro/WorldBankInitiative.htm, retrieved February 20th, 
2011  
39 http://www.sidbi.in/Micro/codeofconduct.html, retrieved February 20th, 2011.  
40 For further information on social ratings see EDA, M-CRIL et.al, 2006. Social Rating and 
Social Performance Reporting in Microfinance. Retrieved February 20th, 2011 from 
http://www.m-cril.com/pdf/Framework-for-Social-Performance-Rating-and-Reporting.pdf. 
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Funders seem to be in a good position to put pressure on institutions to enact consumer 
protection. But aid agencies can also come under pressure themselves, by their governments 
and parliaments. In Germany, which is the biggest state actor in microfinance and engaged in 
213 microfinance projects in 70 countries (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011), the engagement of 
the German government in India and its involvement in microfinance, especially in Andhra 
Pradesh was subject to a parliamentary inquiry by the green fraction. They scrutinized the 
focus of the German government in ensuring that development goals are met in its 
microfinance operations (ibid, question 9). They asked about the involvement of merely 
commercial investors who are not aiming at a positive effect for development, and about 
transparency for the Indian consumer (ibid, question 24). Other questions were regarding the 
assistance of MFIs, which were listed at the stock market (ibid, question 10), or if clients of 
any MFI which was given assistance by the German government had committed suicides 
(ibid, question 7).   
In the UK, the all-parliamentary group on microfinance undertook ‘an inquiry into the role of 
microfinance in tackling extreme poverty and the way in which donors such as the UK 
Government should seek to contribute to the microfinance field’ (APPG on Microfinance, 
2011b). The results were published and presented at the House of Commons. Before the 
inquiry was made, the topic was discussed at various occasions. One of the questions in 
November 2010 was ‘To ask Her Majesty's Government how they can protect the 
beneficiaries of United Kingdom-supported microfinance projects in south Asia from 
exploitation by banks and investment companies’ (UK Parliament Website, 2010). Also in the 
UK, the eventual funding for institutions having undergone an IPO was examined (ibid).  
The public interest in the effects of government support in microfinance has led to scrutiny 
within the donor countries, which might have an impact on donor behaviour. 
As most funders focus on supporting infrastructure and not institutions directly, they might 
not have the possibility to pressurize MFIs to change their behaviour on the ground. Via their 
engagement in industry associations and the like, however, they can raise awareness and work 
towards more transparency, as GIZ is doing with its engagement in enhancing consumer 
protection for microfinance clients.  
4.2.2. (Indian) commercial Banks 
‘[An, author’s note] Associated factor is the role of banks in providing teeth to industry 
associations and affirmative action on implementing CoCs [Codes of Conduct, author’s note]. 
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Until banks show active interest in assuring compliance through better lending terms, the 
associations will not be able to operate proactively.’(Access, 2011, p. 12) 
 
As already mentioned, Indian banks can fulfil their Priority Sector Lending obligations by 
lending to MFIs. Future regulations might change the interpretation of lending to MFIs as 
PSL.  
So far the banks have not shown particular scrutiny regarding client protection. A lenders’ 
forum was established, which is supposed to ‘promote transparent, responsible and 
commercially sustainable industry practices and codes of conduct so as to better safeguard the 
interests of the poor and the unbanked who form their client base’ (India Microfinance 
Business News, 2010). Members are banks, which account for approximately 80% of 
microfinance lending (ibid). The lenders forum was also involved in the ‘responsible 
microfinance project’ of the World Bank and SIDBI.  
Still, at least in my interviews I had the impression that banks were more focussed on the 
profitable side of microfinance rather than looking at the success in various developmental 
parameters.  
Q: ‘As a bank who allocated their funds to MFIs, how do you decide what MFIs will get 
funding? What do you look at? 
A: Generally we’re giving them a credit facility so we need to evaluate them. Qualitatively and 
quantitatively, when it comes to qualitative factors, the management team, a vision, a mission, 
the products and services they offer, the human resource capabilities, the operations and 
technology and when it comes to the quantitative we look at the financials, the strength of the 
balance sheet, how leveraged are they, what is the operative costs they show, that’s standard. 
Every bank revises their own matrix to evaluate MFIs and filter MFIs and then every bank 
parallelly devices its own portfolio strategy, what kind of MFIs would I like to lend to, so this 
exercise is usually done periodically and this is the programme under which we’ll be lending 
wholesale to MFIs. So a MFI should be x years old, it should have a minimum capital of so and 
so it should have promoters who are so and so some with development experience etc. That is 
done after a thorough analysis of the market, who are the players and a market mapping 
exercise and then we define our own criteria. 
Q: But you don’t so much include impact and social goals but more the financial data? 
A: A lot of the things for us are difficult to evaluate, so a lot of the things are taken as what they 
have stated and we have no reason to doubt that what they have states is going to be true. So we 
look for good management teams, a good board of directors, good corporate governance and if 
they are saying certain things like, ‘we are here to empower poor women in a certain district’ 
we would need to have a great reason to doubt that.’ (Arya, p.c.) 
 
Banks have slowed down their lending significantly following the crisis in AP. It was 
suggested that banks should also show their effort in consumer protection by granting better 
lending terms to MFIs, which follow consumer protection practices at (Access, 2011, p. 12). 
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Besides their role in scrutinising MFIs that they provide wholesale lending to, banks could 
also improve the situation by lending to clients directly. The Economic Times quoted a 
woman asking ‘If Banks lent us enough, why would we borrow from MFIs?’ (The Economic 
Times, 2010c). They also quote a SERP official who argues that banks do not lend SHGs the 
amount they would be entitled to. Banks are not only able to provide loans at lower interest 
rates, but are also institutions that are trusted more and would be preferred by borrowers 
(Practitioner 2, p.c.).  
The involvement of banks in microfinance was triggered by a regulatory obligation to assign 
credit to the so-called PSL. When regulating the sector, similar incentives can be used to 
govern the investment of banks. One option would be to require that a certain percentage of 
the banks’ credit should be delivered directly by banks and not through MFIs. Another option 
would be to require the bank to check the MFIs they lend to more closely.   
 
4.2.3. Investors 
Equity investments in India have risen significantly from 2007 onwards in the last five years 
(Arunachalam R. , CUVMF Blog, 2010). Roughly, they can be divided in two groups: Social, 
often philanthropic investors, who are said to be more patient and to expect less growth, and 
conventional private equity investors like Sequoia, George Soros or Vinod Khosla. 
While social investors are perceived to rather resemble donors in their objectives, mainstream 
equity investors usually treat their investments in MF no different than their other 
investments.  
‘You may have GTZ investing in some MFI that will be really patient capital and that will be 
happy with a nominal rate of return, but when a conventional investor comes in, let’s say a 
hedge fund, they would benchmark this investment with other investments. So if there’s 40% 
he would get in an investment A, he would want that 40% from Microfinance also. We talked 
to MFIs, they had investments from conventional hedge funds, and once you have that, there 
are numbers which have been promised at the time of raising the investment, there are 
benchmarks to be met.’ (Arya, p.c.) 
 
‘See conventional investors are looking for return, so if your business can generate that return, 
they would be interested, and if there is some good which is happening that will be the icing on 
the cake.’ (Arya, p.c.) 
 
‘I did ask this to very senior investors: Do you at least have 5% of your funds, which can give 
you 15, 16 %?’ Then they say: ‘my promoter he has a very charitable mind, but when it comes 
to spreadsheets, there is nothing less than 35, 36%, they don’t invest.’ But that’s what they’ve 
been told, that animal was grown like that. If that animal wants to come into development, this 
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is what will happen’ (Ramana, p.c.) 
 
Even though MFIs claim that investors and their growth expectations have no influence on 
the behaviour of the management, I find it hard to believe that there is really no influence and 
conflict among the board as the Managing Director of Sequoia argued:  
‘There is this outside perception that there is a conflict among the board. But there really isn’t. 
If you were to attend one of our board meetings, I can tell you I am just as concerned about 
service quality as a social investor. There really hasn’t been this big social versus profit debate. 
In practice it has been a non-issue.’ (Chadha in Microfinance Insights, 2009, p. 15) 
 
Some of my interview partners however did see a conflict of interest between investors and 
the management: 
‘It depends on every investors mandate, there are short term and long term investors, there may 
be some investors which came into an MFI going for an IPO they want to enter two months 
before the IPO and exit post the IPO, make their 20% and go. So it really depends on the 
activity the MFI does. The investor is like the part owner, so they would be the driving force, 
how things would happen, so they would absolutely be in the position to influence the 
management, they’re owners, right?’ (Arya, p.c.) 
 
Certainly some boards are stronger than others, and would not allow someone to invest in 
their MFI without clarity about the importance of social versus financial profit. In other cases, 
the discussion might not even take place, as those favouring greater social return over 
financial return have left the institution.  
Alok Prasad, CEO of MFIN stressed the role investors played in the Andhra Pradesh crisis at 
the Responsible Finance Forum 
‘Alok urged investors to do their part now to build a financing “eco-system” that will produce 
more responsible behavior in India and elsewhere. He advocated investor action on six fronts: 
 
- As foreign investors, you must be “engaged owners, not just sleeping partners.” The 
industry needs active governance, especially around the decisions that affect client welfare. 
- Do your due diligence. You can’t just fly into India on Monday, review the CEO’s 
projections, meet some senior staff and fly home on Thursday. You need to ask hard 
questions and counsel the promoters. Seventy percent this year and 150% the next? No 
sector can sustain or manage this kind of growth. 
- Insist on compliance with the industry code of conduct. It’s not enough for the network to 
say “come on, guys, let’s do the responsible thing.” Bank loan covenants should address 
this, and other investors have influence too. 
- Get regular feedback from the networks. Is your MFI partner a member in good standing of 
MFIN? Maybe you should urge the networks to do annual certification. 
- Really integrate social performance indicators into your investment decision making 
processes.’ (McKee et. al., CGAP MF Blog, 2011) 
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While 13% of PRI signatories invested in microfinance funds (PRI, 2011c, p. 17), as of now, 
the importance of the initiative in India is limited. While investors are certainly responsible 
for the way microfinance is conducted, they are hard to monitor and regulate. Investors often 
underlie different jurisdictions. Considering these difficulties, self-regulation is a promising 
approach.   
Just like the lenders’ forum for banks, there have also been efforts to create a voice of 
investors on responsible finance. The ‘Principles for Responsible Investment’ is an ‘investor 
initiative in partnership with UNEP Finance Initiative and the UN Global Compact’ (PRI, 
2011a). By July 2011, 920 asset owners, investment managers and service providers had 
signed up for the PRI (PRI, 2011b, p. 3).  
‘Signatories to the Principles acknowledge that poorer clients are often disadvantaged by 
asymmetries in financial knowledge, power, and influence. By signing the principles, investors 
state their commitment to fair treatment and protection of the interests of the ultimate client in 
inclusive finance – low-income households and small and medium-enterprises. Signatories 
assert their goal of supporting and investing in those financial service institutions that offer 
responsible micro-finance, including a wide range of quality services to clients. They embrace 
transparency and sustainability.’ (India Microfinance Business News, 2011) 
 
While funders are diverse and often not governed by Indian law, there are other methods of 
inducing them to respect consumers’ rights. Donors for instance, are increasingly scrutinised 
by parliaments in their home countries. Banks and investors have started engaging in self-
regulatory efforts. These also address the responsible use of the strong negotiating power of 
funding. It enables funders to enforce consumer protection by demanding it from MFIs.  
Other stakeholders, besides investors, are also engaged in self-regulation, especially industry 
associations. In the next chapter I explain the concept of self-regulation and describe current 
efforts. 
4.3. Self-Regulation by Industry Bodies  
‘In the absence of any other regulation, self regulation is a start’ (Ramana, p.c.) 
 
In the last years - before the Indian State started engaging in a microfinance regulation - 
several industry bodies introduced codes of conduct they aimed to adhere to. Previous to the 
development of a body of ‘hard law’ came various efforts of ‘soft law’ in the form of self-
regulation. Rosenberg defines self-regulation as ‘regulation (and/or supervision) by some 
body that is effectively controlled by the regulated entities’ (Rosenberg, 2003, p. 104). It may 
cover rulemaking, monitoring and sanctioning implementation, and mechanisms of legal 
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redress (ECLG, 2001, p. 2). All or one of them can involve soft law mechanisms. The state 
can also support soft law provisions by legislation, for instance when soft law supplements or 
substitutes for traditional regulation (ibid, p.3). Often the industry develops codes ‘in 
anticipation of legislation if it does not do so’ (ibid, p.5). The same holds true for India: 
In 2006 Sa-Dhan issued their code of conduct, which addressed issues of client protection. 
MFIN followed in 2010. On a global scale, in 2008 CGAP and ACCION started working on 
‘the Smart Campaign’ to endorse client protection. As mentioned above, during the same time 
public bodies started to criticize MFIs and to announce regulation of the sector. At the end of 
2010, the State of Andhra Pradesh released its ordinance. The central government is still 
working on its regulation.  
The benefits of self-regulation are that it is supposedly faster, more flexible and more 
adequate than traditional legislation. Also, the costs of implementation are alleged to be lower 
(ibid, p.4).  
‘The cost of supervision is very high for all the MFIs as their number is very high, so self-
regulation for a segment of MFIs to some extent will help’ (Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
Still, the success of self-regulation for financial institutions is limited, as Rosenberg argues: 
‘Self-regulation of non-bank financial intermediaries in developing countries has been tried 
many times, and has virtually never been effective in protecting the soundness of the regulated 
organizations.’  (Rosenberg, 2003, p. 104).  
 
Also most of the microfinance practitioners I interviewed were critical about the capacity of 
the sector to regulate itself without having an additional regulatory framework by the 
legislator. 
One reason for their reluctance towards self-regulation is the profit orientation of the 
microfinance industry, as engaging in consumer protection will comes at the cost of lower 
profits: 
‘My feeling is, self-regulation is a hoax, especially when you’re talking about for profit. In a for 
profit system, how can you expect self-regulation to take place.’ (C.S. Reddy, p.c.) 
  
Criticism increases due to the weak position microfinance customers are in. It is an area with 
a risk that ‘unfair advantage is taken of people vulnerable for a variety of reasons’. Regulation 
here should safeguard values ‘beyond the collective interests of individual consumers’, which 
‘soft law alone cannot guarantee’ (ECLG, 2001, p. 7).  
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‘Personally, I’m not a believer of self-regulation. I do not believe that self-regulation is to be 
depended on by any regulator, especially when it comes to fields in which the consumer is at a 
particular disadvantage as it is in the case of microfinance; By and large they are women 
borrowers, by and large they are illiterate borrowers, by and large they are people with very 
low bargaining power and in such cases, if the service provider wants to engage in self-
regulation, so be it, but for a regulator to depend on that is not acceptable in my opinion.’ 
(Rajagopalan, p.c.) 
 
What should be noted in this context is the lack of commitment by consumer organisations, 
which rather serve and represent middle class consumers than lobbying for poor ones. They 
could raise concerns publicly in order to establish a balance of interests, which is seen as 
critical for regulation (ECLG, 2001, p. 17). 
I now discuss client protection efforts by a global campaign and by the two biggest Indian 
industry associations. 
4.3.1. The Smart Campaign 
The Smart Campaign, which was initiated by CGAP and ACCION, is a ‘global and diverse 
coalition of microfinance institutions, networks, associations, and other professionals working 
within the microfinance industry […] serving as an umbrella for all industry-wide efforts on 
client protection’ (The Smart Campaign, 2011a). 
It developed seven client protection principles (The Smart Campaign, 2011a), which should 
be followed by its endorsers. These are:  
- Appropriate product design and delivery,  
- Prevention of over-indebtedness,  
- Transparency,  
- Responsible pricing,  
- Fair and respectful treatment of clients,  
- Privacy of client data,  
- Mechanisms for complaint resolution  
Additionally, it developed tools to help MFIs to assess their client protection practices and 
implement the above principles. It also serves as a platform for MFIs to share their client 
protection training kits for field staff. In order to make adherence to the code visible, the 
Smart Campaign introduced a certification programme. It should help MFIs to prove their 
commitment to client protection and is currently getting tested in the field. It will be launched 
in 2012 (The Smart Campaign, 2011b). 
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By September 2011, the Smart Campaign was endorsed by 669 MFIs, 128 investors and 
donors, 109 networks, 147 supporting organizations, and over 1100 individuals (The Smart 
Campaign, 2011b). Due to its global coverage and representation the Smart Campaign 
certainly manages to raise awareness and to facilitate communication between microfinance 
practitioners from different cultural and methodological backgrounds. It reaches investors as 
well as service providers and interested individuals. It facilitates exchange between 
practitioners who share their tools to ensure the provision of microfinance. However, as a 
voluntary code, it cannot replace regulation. Self-regulatory approaches to consumer 
protection established at the industry level should only be a complementary tool to laws and 
regulations.  
‘Self-regulation tools such as codes of conduct are more likely to be effective when they 
function in tandem with government regulation and have mechanisms to ensure adherence by 
participating financial institutions. In the UK for example, the consumer protection system 
fosters industry commitments to responsible finance through a well-defined and 
complementary system of regulation and self-regulation. This system articulates the roles of 
government, banking sector, and an independent verification board.’ (Responsible Finance 
Forum, 2011, p. 8) 
 
While building up pressure to comply with standards and spreading them among investors 
and donors, self-regulation does not provide appropriate protection to the individual 
consumer, as institutions can arbitrarily chose if they wish to comply with standards. The 
introduction of a certificate for institutions that do comply can be a way to help clients in the 
competitive microfinance market to choose responsible institutions. Still, in order to 
strengthen the bargaining power of clients, they need to know about the certificate. 
Additionally, there is a risk of abuse of such a certificate, or the possibility of fraudulent 
acquisition of it.  
 
4.3.2. Indian Industry Associations 
‘The requirement for self-regulation is self-control’ (Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
The report of the Malegam Committee stressed the importance of industry associations and 
acknowledged their work. The Committee saw a role for the associations in ensuring 
compliance with the RBI regulation within their members: 
‘(a) Industry associations must also assume greater responsibility in ensuring compliance. A 
possible scheme which may be considered would be as under:  
[...] 
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ii. The association will have a code of conduct in accordance with the Client Protection Code as 
stipulated by the Regulator.  
iii. The association will have an Enforcement Committee to check violations of the Code 
brought to its attention by its own inspection system or by outsiders including the State 
Government and the Regulator.  
iv. The association will discipline its members by removing them from membership if there is 
persistent violation of the Code and will publicise the fact of removal  
v. The members will publicly acknowledge their membership of the association in their letter 
heads and in all their communications.  
b) If the above steps are effectively implemented, membership of these associations will be 
seen by the trade, borrowers and lenders as a mark of confidence and removal from 
membership can have adverse reputational impact. This can be a major deterrent to non-
compliance.  
c) There are also other organisations in the trade which cover other functions like data 
gathering, assist development NGOs, etc. These can act as “whistle blowers” to highlight 
violations of the regulations or the Code of Conduct.’  (RBI, 2011a, para 22.4) 
 
Already earlier, Indian industry associations had introduced their own codes of conduct. 
There are several industry associations of different sizes in the Indian market like, AKMI for 
MFIs in Karnataka. These are not discussed here as I focus on the two nationwide 
organizations, Sa-Dhan and MFIN.  
_____ 
a. Sa-Dhan 
Sa-Dhan is the largest Indian microfinance association. Its members are commercial and not 
for profit MFIs as well as associations, capacity building organisations and lenders. 
Established in 1999, it currently has 251 members (Sa-Dhan, 2011a). Sa-Dhan works in the 
areas of policy intervention, the setting of standards and capacity building (Sa-Dhan, 2011b). 
Sa-Dhan introduced its code of conduct in the beginning of 2007 on a voluntary basis. It was 
strengthened and refined subsequently. In 2010, in the wake of increasing criticism of rogue 
practices on the ground ‘additional provisions to make implementation of the code 
imperative’ and ‘penal provisions against indifferent members’ were added (Sa-Dhan, 2011c, 
p. 13). A subcommittee on the Code of Conduct was formed. By using international codes, 
like the Smart Campaign Client Protection Principles and with consultation of the RBI and 
SIDBI, with lenders and the Ministries of Finance and Rural Development the code was 
released and adopted in August 2010. In September, Sa-Dhan started to collect data on the 
implementation (Sa-Dhan, 2011c, p. 14). 
Sa-Dhan’s Code of Conduct contains three parts. The first one is on ‘core values in 
microfinance’, the second one contains the actual code of conduct and the third part provides 
  63 
for a compliance mechanism. While the code of conduct is formulated using a lot of 
undefined and vague terms (e.g.: ‘design appropriate policies’, ‘committed to follow fair 
practices built on dignity, respect, fair treatment, persuasion and courtesy to the clients’, 
‘observe high standards on governance’), Sa-Dhan formulated indicators to measure social 
performance and adherence to the code of conduct. In order to ensure enforcement, an ‘Ethics 
and Grievance Redressal Committee’, consisting of two sector experts and three ‘other 
independent persons’ was installed. Reports on compliance and complaints will be brought to 
the committee, which will then ask the institution to comment on the allegations. Sanctions 
then can include suspension and ultimately expulsion. To strengthen the punishment, 
expulsion will be brought to public notice.  
Next to collecting financial data, Sa-Dhan started to collect social performance data of its 
members and analyse the implementation of the code of conduct. The first report on client 
protection and social performance was released in spring 2011 and presented at the yearly 
National Microfinance Conference, which Sa-Dhan organises.  
_____ 
b. MFIN 
MFIN was established in 2009 as the Industry Association for NBFCs. It currently has 46 
members. The rationale behind is to have an additional umbrella organization for those MFIs, 
which are regulated by the RBI. 
‘All of us continue our membership and support of Sa-dhan. Sa-dhan is the wider body of all 
people doing microfinance, including not just microfinance providers but also people who are 
doing capacity building or research. It is like a congregation of everybody interested in 
microfinance. The NGOs, MFIs all are there, whereas MFIN is a very specific and focused 
subset that is only for NBFCs. Sa-dhan has 300 members, of which only 40 are NBFCs. So 
there is no conflict of interest. In fact, 2 of MFIN board members are also members of Sa-
dhan’s board, and I have been involved with Sa-dhan. So as a founder of Sa-dhan I have no 
issues about Sa-dhan as such. MFIN was necessary. One reason for our creation of MFIN is 
that Sa-dhan is not an SRO. It is a conferencing and networking forum. Initially we asked Sa-
dhan to create MFIN as an internal NBFC Division. We wanted some changes, but their general 
body didn’t vote in favour of it. But that’s fine, we continue our membership and continue to 
participate in Sa-dhan’s activities, but for specific RBI-related issues, we have our SRO.’ 
(Mahajan, MFIN was necessary for Indian Microfinance: Vijay Mahajan Interview, 2010) 
 
MFIN aims to be a Self-regulatory-Organisation and also presented their code of conduct. The 
MFIN code is drafted more precise and definite, which makes it easier to enforce. For 
instance, it determines that a maximum of three MFIs can lend to one client, with a maximum 
loan size of Rs. 50,000, - by all three (Para. B.i. MFINCOC). It also provides for sharing of 
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data, for a whistle blowing mechanism and for an ombudsman. The MFIN COC41 includes an 
enforcement mechanism where the matter is brought to the Conduct Enforcement Committee, 
which then gives notice to other members, investors and the RBI (Para. F.iv. MFINCOC). 
Recently it set up a helpline for customers of any of their member MFIs (MFIN, 2011). 
_____ 
Sa-Dhan’s and MFIN’s nature as industry associations implies that they represent their 
members. To also sanction them is a difficult challenge. 
‘It’s a very difficult situation for Sa-Dhan too; they also have to represent their members. So 
their pressure is limited.  It has to be that way, there is no other way than saying: if you want to 
be my member in the industry association, you have to follow my criteria, otherwise you are 
not part of us.’ (Alok, p.c.) 
 
‘The point is, how influential they are, because my interaction with Sa-Dhan says that they 
have good network, but the question is, how much these partner institutions listen to them, 
because the single objective of being partner with these kind of PMOs is getting funding easily, 
I mean that’s the practicality’ (Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
Industry associations argue that they need lenders to strengthen their cause, claiming that 
‘until banks show active interest in assuring compliance through better lending terms, the 
associations will not be able to operate proactively’ (Access, 2011, p. 12).  
‘For self-regulation there has to be some request to compliance by lenders and investors, if 
there is no requirement for this by them, it is not going to work. I guess that is why people are 
members of Sa-Dhan or MFIN anyways, to show their membership to lenders. So, if Sa-Dhan 
says, unless you comply with this code of conduct you will not be a member and if that leads to 
not being given any loans, then they have to comply.’ (Alok, p.c.) 
 
‘The role that industry associations play, and the role that is accorded to industry associations 
by lenders, raters, RBI, bodies like that, if let’s say, I’m an MFI which has only one single goal 
in mind, to make profit, it should be very hard for me to operate, without, let’s say, the seal of 
approval of the industry body, whoever that is. But for me to go and get a loan from a bank, for 
instance, there have to be some preconditions, and so it should become difficult, it’s only when 
that happens, everybody has to work in concession, it cannot be that MFIN has its set of 
standards and then there are people who are not members. […] 
When is such an association successful? When it gives you key benefits, which you will not get 
by being outside, so there comes a trade-off. If I want to continue receiving these benefits I 
have to comply. So the sanctions which are imposed are worth something.’ (Practitioner 3, p.c.) 
 
Alternatively, associations ask for the regulator to confer some powers to associations or to 
assign another official role to them, arguing that if ‘associations are given a mandate by the 
regulator, then maybe there is a chance of legitimizing the process’ (Access, 2011, p. 12). One 
                                                 
41 See Appendix 
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option would be to make membership a requirement for carrying out a microfinance business, 
as it is done with other professions.  
‘Here, the associations are busy pleasing their members. [...] You have chartered accountant 
associations, banking associations, some of them work, but they are recognized by law. 
Existing associations don’t have recognition because there is no law itself. The fact is that India 
has no microfinance law, and it will not have one it looks like. RBI is saying why do you need 
a law if you only want RBI regulated agencies to be involved in Microfinance.’ (C.S. Reddy, 
p.c.) 
 
By September 2011, none of the institutions had used their powers of expulsion and public 
shaming, which adds to the scepticism. On one side, industry associations claim that they 
need other stakeholders to put them in the position to pressure their members to comply. On 
the other side, the other stakeholders do not see why they should confer power to associations 
who seem to struggle to enforce action against their members. 
‘First of all there has to be a proper formulation of the code of conduct, of consumer protection, 
and then the compliance has to be demanded by somebody. So either then the associations, 
MFIN and Sa-Dhan, have to demand it, or the investors, the shareholders from the market. All 
the lenders who finance, they have to demand it. It would need a combination of those. If they 
demand it, then they have to find ways to assess if those codes of conduct have been 
implemented properly. So there has to be an entire mechanism to enforce that code of conduct. 
And there has to be a penalty for violation of the code of conduct. If someone does not comply, 
there has to be a penalty. So, unless there are checks and balances, it will not work. Just having 
a code of conduct will not work.’ (Alok, p.c.) 
 
‘It’s again a credibility issue. If I say: ‘I’m following all the rules’, people will trust you. First 
you have to become trustworthy. Both in the eyes of the public and in your own consumers’ 
eyes. Once you do that, self-regulation makes sense.’ (Ramana, p.c.) 
 
The near future will show how industry associations solve this vicious cycle. I expect that 
they will take action against their members, in order to attain credibility. This would increase 
the value of membership. Currently, as one of my interview partners argued, the value of 
membership in industry associations should not be overrated, as ‚almost every NBFC MFI is 
with MFIN, and almost every MFI worth a name is in Sa-Dhan, so that’s not a criteria’ 
(Practitioner 2, p.c.).  
At the same time, the new regulatory framework strengthens the role of industry associations 
and will add weight to the sanction of expulsion from the industry association. 
 
To include industry bodies in the regulatory regime is certainly adequate. Besides their 
capacity in monitoring, there also is a role for self-regulation ‘in getting institutions to begin a 
reporting process, or in articulating basic standards of good practice’ (Rosenberg, 2003, p. 
  66 
104). Industry associations can act as a forum to discuss client protection and get institutions 
to open up to the idea and get convinced to engage in consumer protection – without being 
forced by a regulator, as ‘you cannot put in willingness [to follow self-regulation, author’s 
note] from the outside, that has to come from the inside’ (Practitioner 2, p.c.). 
Another role that associations can play is to help client empowerment through financial 
literacy trainings and the like. In general, they are closer to both clients and the industry, 
which helps them to monitor regulation more closely and to react more flexible than a formal 
regulator. 
‘Self-regulation is always good to have, but it’s not a must have. In a free market economy, 
self-regulation is difficult to enforce its code of conduct and penalize members and things like 
that, because it’s an association. It’s difficult, but it’s obviously not impossible and it’s always 
good to have, but once you already have a regulation, a lot of these things get sorted out. 
However, a self-regulatory body is always good to share best practices and other things like 
anti-poaching agreements to poach each other’s employees, that’s always good to have.’ (Arya, 
p.c.) 
 
As another microfinance practitioner I interviewed pointed out, the real risk is that regulation  
– be it formal regulation or self-regulation – is not implemented. 
‘A risk is that it will not be implemented. That is a risk: that it will not be implemented, as 
lenders will not insist on it. People will not accept it, because nobody implements it. There is 
no regulation, no control, no external assessment – in that situation it will not get enforced. […] 
The regulator already has its own code of conduct; the investor association also has one. But 
somebody has to demand compliance on this. And there has to be a penalty for non-
compliance.’ (Alok, p.c.)  
 
Industry bodies adopted self-regulation measures in anticipation of regulation, as they 
experienced the effects of improper field practices. While they struggle with self-regulation, 
the state needs to assist associations and those MFIs by adopting a regulatory framework that 
also covers and sanctions institutions that do not even participate in discussions on consumer 
protection. To include industry bodies in the framework will help to ensure that regulation is 
also implemented and monitored. 
4.4. The Level of Individual Institutions 
 
‘Self-regulation has to work; obviously it comes from the mission of the organisation. Why are 
you working? So, make sure your purpose is getting achieved! Now if that purpose is only 
profit, then I’m sorry, but if you have a social mission, then obviously you have to make sure 
that all your actions, operations, policies, how people behave, everything is in alignment.’ 
(Practitioner 3, p.c.) 
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The missions of some of the biggest Indian MFIs read: ‘Our purpose is to eradicate poverty’ 
(SKS, 2011), ‘to be one of the most significant microfinance service provider by offering a 
range of financial and non-financial products and services to low income households and 
individuals to improve the quality of life’ (Spandana, 2011), ‘to reduce economic and social 
poverty significantly’ (Bandhan, 2011) or ‘to provide financial and support services to the 
poor, particularly women, for viable productive income-generating enterprises enabling them 
to reduce their poverty’ (SHARE, 2011). Considering these missions are supposed to be what 
is driving MFIs, the recent microfinance crisis and the apparent lack of awareness of clients’ 
needs seems very surprising.  
‘MFIs need to become increasingly aware of the sensitivity of the type of clients being served 
and the need to synchronize/match their service to the needs and other development factor 
playing on the day to day lives of the poor. The importance of governance and the critical 
nature of the staff incentive system in the overall service delivery and social performance are 
other aspects the MFIs need to internalize.’ (Sa-Dhan, 2011c, p. 50) 
 
The commercialization of microfinance is often claimed to have led to a mission drift, and 
that microfinance institutions need to be reminded of their mission is a strong indicator that a 
mission drift has indeed happened (see Iskenderian, 2011). One argument addressing this lack 
is that these missions and codes of conduct cannot be followed due to pressure from investors 
and regulators, as was already discussed in chapter 4.2.3. 
‘When somebody is a private equity investor they cannot be a social investor, as a private 
equity investor looks for profit. For MFIs, which prefer the IPO route, the shareholders’ motive 
will be to maximise their return. At what cost a MFI maximises its profit is a moot point and 
profiteering in the name of commercialisation of microfinance is not desirable.’   
(Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
While funders certainly influence management decisions, MFIs themselves still have freedom 
of action and a corresponding responsibility. 
‘Operations don’t change because of private equity investors. I don’t buy that. A board is there 
to give you a broad direction. The execution, how you want to do it, what you will do on the 
ground, is totally a management responsibility. The moment you mix up these two, you’re lost.’ 
(Practitioner 3, p.c.) 
 
Regardless of the pressure of investors, ‘organizations have the best visibility on their 
functioning’ and investors ‘have to go by what the MFI says’, as was pointed out in a 
discussion on governance in MFIs last November (Access, 2011, p. 23). 
An argument often heard was that the problem was not to be found at the management level 
but at the level of the field staff. Field staff was allegedly engaging in coercive practices and 
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over-lending because of the incentives that were used on the ground level without the 
managements’ knowledge. 
‘The staff is provided incentives apart from a basic salary. The incentives are linked to 
productivity, efficiency and quality parameters. There is no incentive linkage to ticket size and 
repayment rates, to ensure avoidance of inappropriate lending and unethical recovery 
practices.’ (Srinivasan N. , SSR, 2009, p. 52) 
 
‘The practices like incentives to the staff at the lower level for driving the business without 
adhering to accepted principles of lending and recovery is not appropriate and not in the interest 
of the microfinance sector. The top management of MFIs needs to take a strong note of this, as 
multiple lending to those whose incomes are very low and unethical recovery practices are 
outcomes of such practices.’ (Practitioner 1, p.c.) 
 
As I already noted above, I find it hard to believe that managements did not know of the 
heavy competition, practices of over-lending and aggressive recovery practices on the ground.  
‘Nobody, no MFI can come and say I have lent in area X and I have not known what was there 
already.’ (Practitioner 2, p.c.) 
 
Incentives and practices of field staff have been addressed by some organisations. From the 
tools, which the Smart Campaign is collecting from their endorsers and sharing publicly, a 
considerable share deals with staff training and codes for loan officers. All three ‘call for tools 
winners’ were addressing the institutional level (Smart Campaign, 2011). Two of these were 
designed by Indian MFIs. One was a tool to test the knowledge of the institution’s code by 
staff; the other one was a tool for training loan officers on customer rights and responsibilities 
(ibid).  
Still, practices of the field staff are one aspect of the management responsibility and cannot be 
analysed separately. Designing incentives and also scrutiny of field is a question of 
management. Just as the management chooses investors, they are the ones choosing field staff 
and putting in place incentives to achieve their mission. Already the decision to enter areas 
with a lot of competition is a step towards pushing staff to over-lend. The responsibility for an 
eventual mission drift is one of the whole institution and institutional practices. As Peg Ross 
from the Grameen Foundation’s Human Capital Center put it: 
‘The organization must be very clear about frontline staff roles and their primary 
responsibilities.  For example, providing effective financial services and helping to protect 
client interests are not mutually exclusive objectives, but the organization’s recruitment and 
selection, learning and development, and rewards practices must all be aligned to help staff 
meet them.  There must also be quantitative and qualitative performance objectives that clearly 
define the behaviours expected, such as honesty, respect, transparency, etc.  
Now is a good time to rethink the use of incentives altogether.  Some MFIs have either never 
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used incentives or have eliminated them with no negative consequences.  And more and more 
private sector companies are realizing that employee motivation and commitment depend on 
many dimensions; money often plays just a small part. 
[…] People tend to work toward what is expected — whether these expectations are high or 
low.  In addition, keeping decisions at the top means that they are made far away from the 
people who have the most current information on clients and local conditions. Providing 
targeted learning and development opportunities to frontline staff that focus on what is needed 
to drive both financial and social results will increase capability and ensure that decisions can 
be made at the levels closest to where the challenges lie. 
Organizational culture that stresses financial over social return. Creating and maintaining a 
culture that focuses on social as well as financial returns and embraces client protection 
principles requires intention and appropriate decisions/actions.  Large, rapidly growing 
organizations may be tempted to cut corners on the selection and orientation and training of 
new hires, with the result that the organization’s social mission, core values and long-term 
vision are not effectively communicated to the new hire.  […]  In fact, adherence to these core 
values should be part of each employee’s individual performance expectations.’ (Ross, CGAP 
MF Blog, 2010c, marked as in original) 
 
MFIs increasingly measure social performance. BASIX, for instance, works on building a 
‘system that incentivizes the growth of the customer over time’ to strengthen compliance with 
the institutional mission (Access, 2011, p. 9).  
Several institutions put a focus on responsible finance not only by endorsing campaigns and 
the code of conduct of associations but have also put in place their own codes of conduct. 
These codes are usually quite similar to the codes of industry associations. At a thematic 
retreat on client protection in Indian Microfinance the coexistence of various codes was 
discussed, which was seen as confusing (ibid, p.9). Sa-Dhan and MFIN have started a process 
of harmonising their codes of conduct. 
Working with codes of conduct is one of the widest used forms of ensuring client protection 
for Indian MFIs. Next to adopting codes, these are also translated into regional languages and 
explained to staff in special trainings. Another often-used mechanism is to set up a complaint 
service reachable by telephone (ibid, p.10). Another option is to include client protection into 
regular internal audits, as some institutions do. The mere use of codes of conduct entails a 
high risk of being nothing more than window dressing, if they are not combined with a 
change of field practices42 and incentives. There are different intensities of fulfilling the quest 
for responsible finance: 
‘We started with a suggestion box at our branches, and when we reviewed that we felt that it 
                                                 
42 Besides changing incentives, the use of women as field staff seems to have a positive effect 
on recovery practices. See The Econonomic Times. (8th. December 2011). Microfinance 
industry going all out to regain lost glory with women power. 
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was one of those things that you can tick off on a survey, saying, yes, we have a customer 
complaint mechanism, but it’s not something that is proactive that you know the customer is 
even comfortable using. So, we did a whole campaign and we put in two more measures, one 
is, we do an exit form for a sample of renewal loans and clients leaving. So, for these loans, 
there is a more detailed questionnaire with the client, to understand what they like, what they 
didn’t. The other thing is, now we also have a customer helpline, and that we found is actually 
the most effective. We printed posters and publicised the number. We had flyers, we put it up at 
a lot of the branches, and we do get on average 8 to 10 calls a week on that line. And there is a 
dedicated resource at our back-office, answering those calls.’ (Mehta Mankar, p.c.) 
MFI practitioners feel that regulation only reaches the institutions who are engaging in client 
protection anyways or those, which the general public is aware of, while the ‘true villains’ are 
acting on the ground without being noticed.  
‘You have this whole set of operators who call themselves finance companies, who are 
registered, but also those who are not, who also operate in the villages and all. There’s nothing 
being done about them, because they are nameless, faceless institutions.’ (Practitioner 3, p.c.) 
 
In order to avoid over-borrowing, credit bureaus were created (Hindustan Times, 2011). 
These bureaus collect financial data of microfinance clients. MFIs, who are assessing a loan, 
can check the loan history of a prospective client (See Sane et. al., 2011, 25f). Credit bureaus 
will only help, if the organisational culture behind changes. The microfinance market in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, faced trouble after tremendous growth and competition. 
There, a credit bureau was functional. The competitive surrounding, however, led to weaker 
loan appraisals (Srinivasan, SSR 2010, p. 76f).    
‘The question is not whether there is multiple lending. The question is whether the lender 
knows the absorption and repayment capacity of the borrower. It is impossible to know this if 
we are doing a group meeting in 20 minutes and moving on. It is impossible to address this 
when we have standardised products and offer a higher loan each cycle. Our credit officers are 
trained to be robots following a process mechanically and are prohibited to think. Therefore 
multiple lending is a problem of the MFIs. We clearly do not know our customers enough, and 
do not have the time to know them. 
There have been moves to have a credit bureau to address this problem. Is this not a joke? What 
will a centralised database covering Ganjam and Ernakulam, Chennai and Ludhiana tell me 
better than what my credit officer can tell? Every organisation operating in the area knows the 
other. We have asked our credit officers to chase targets. If only we ask our credit officers to 
treat this money as their own and see if it is worth lending to the client; if only we allow our 
credit officers to think.’ (Sriram, WritersK Blog, 2010a) 
 
While other stakeholders do have a responsibility too, and while pressure on MFIs was high, 
and while it is a very difficult task to monitor field practices, it is ultimately a management 
decision and responsibility how practices on the ground are. Certainly, a regulatory 
framework needs to address unregistered institutions, perhaps by encouraging MFIs to bring 
such actors to the notice of the RBI or State Governments. How MFIs practice microfinance, 
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however, is their matter and responsibility. As in most MFIs, the management is not able or 
willing to fulfil their organisational mission, an external regulator is needed.  
‘I think it is something that is time and cost intensive for an MFI to set in place, so there needs 
to be enough management direction to say, yes it’s a priority for us, let’s put in the resources to 
do this. I don’t know how many people would make that call. I think if it is monitored by an 
external agency, it helps to ensure it is happening.’ (Mehta Mankar, p.c.) 
 
In the same tune, MFIs cannot blame other involved stakeholders, be it investors or 
employees, for their own actions.  
‘At the end of the day, it’s about doing what you really believe in, and if you really believe in 
it, you will find a way of doing it. […] You should be governed by what you want to do, if 
that’s why you don’t want to do it, you’re weak at heart. Be firm with what you want to do, and 
if that necessitates stronger regulation, curbs, or that you have to get yourself audited every 
month, so be it’. (Practitioner 3, p.c.) 
 
The crisis in Indian microfinance has often been described using the term ‘mission drift’, 
meaning that institutional growth can lead to a drift from the institutional mission to alleviate 
poverty. As I showed, most big MFIs include the goal to end or reduce poverty in their 
mission statement. In the institutional pursuit of growth, the focus to meet financial 
benchmarks was certainly stronger than the focus on poverty reduction. While I strongly 
believe that institutions have the most insight in field practices and that it is in their hands to 
provide responsible microfinance, it is obvious that not all MFIs are interested in doing so. 
Efforts of self-regulation and of individual MFIs are certainly important. However, they 
cannot replace a regulatory framework. Consumer protection in microfinance cannot depend 
on an institutional mission; it has to be the legal basis of operations.  
 
4.5. The Level of the Borrower 
 
As I stressed in my introduction, microfinance circles around the challenge to overcome lack 
of information. When discussing consumer protection in microfinance this lack of knowledge 
is also central. There is, one the one side, a lack of knowledge of behaviour and the actual 
needs of rural clients. On the other side, there is a lack of knowledge about financial products 
and terms of contract by customers.  
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Additionally, there is a lack of organisation on the clients’ side, which would be needed to 
lobby for their rights. Consumer organisations rather focus on middle class clients than the 
poor. I think that this lack of representation is one of the reasons for frequent outbursts of 
collective disapproval by default or by harassing field staff, as formal complaint mechanisms 
are not existent or not widely known.  
The imbalance of the bargaining process would require that clients know about their rights 
and understand the terms and consequences of the contracts they are signing. This information 
would strengthen their position in the bargaining process and enable competition of the many 
providers. Mere regulation of transparency lacks any effect when a borrower is illiterate. 
Disclosure of interest rates is useless when a client does not understand the way it is being 
calculated. A recent study pointed out that often, consumers actually do not perceive certain 
practices like seizure of assets as coercive, as they lack awareness of their rights (IFMR 
Centre for Microfinance, 2008, p. 16). 
Consumer protection laws can improve these power imbalances by giving additional rights to 
clients. One is regulating cool-off-phases for clients, where they can step back from the 
contract (Porteous, 2009, p.7). This is a mechanism used in consumer protection for door-to-
door selling in Europe. Again, such a provision is useless if it is not known or not used due to 
high costs of accessing the justice system.  
To overcome the lack of consumer awareness and literacy a regulator can use a mechanism 
that precludes unwanted practices. N.V. Ramana, one of my interview partners, suggested to 
prescribe a specific day for centre meetings in every village as an easily manageable solution 
to avoid over-lending: 
‘Suppose today the meeting of MFI x is over, Friday, yesterday was MFI y, day before 
yesterday was some other company, so each of them will have a meeting and each one of them 
will have 100% attendance and each member will have a loan which is getting repaid to 
whichever it is. [...] So one way if you really ask me how do you prevent certain things in 
consumer protection is: just fix a day. People will ask, how will you monitor? Malegam 
Committee very good, no multiple lending, but how will you monitor, one simple answer: 
people should have fixed days for meetings, all loan meetings should happen on Monday, 
period. Then the women can only attend one meeting. Money will come, but then there is a 
dilution of the company system, I’m saying if you really look at the political construct, if for a 
village there is one financial meeting fixed for a day, multiple lending will phenomenally 
reduce.’ (Ramana, p.c.) 
 
To tackle the problem of financial illiteracy at its root, several stakeholders introduced 
financial literacy measures to enhance it. Better understanding of financial services and 
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products by clients should enable the consumer to make a prudent choice. Financial literacy is 
defined as ‘the ability to process financial information and make informed decisions about 
personal finances’ (IFMR Centre for Microfinance, 2008, p. 5). While better off clients 
usually know how to read and write, a lack of financial literacy is just as well being 
encountered and discussed in Europe43 and the US44.45 
Considering that the main cause for client distress was over-lending without a proper 
assessment of clients’ repayment capacity, increasing financial literacy can shape consumers’ 
behaviour so they understand the risks of over-borrowing. The capacity to deal with the 
oversupply of credit is critical, as it tackles the problem of over-lending at the root.   
‘At the household level, there should be a push to build greater financial literacy, so that 
customers know the consequences of over borrowing and the benefits of savings and insurance 
in adversity.’ (Mahajan in Microfinance Insights, 2009) 
 
‘People have this argument, there’s too much of supply, so people are greedy and take. I don’t 
believe in that ‘people are greedy’ thing at all. It’s more – you’re also in this surrounding world 
in which your aspirations are being pumped up, you look at urban spaces and even in villages, 
TV is such a household thing, and what you have on TV, all these soap operas and stuff like 
that which comes, you have a very high standard of living which is projected over there. So 
people have dreams, which I don’t say is bad, but how do you manage those aspirations, how 
do you plan for those aspirations, that’s where I think there’s a huge gap today in terms of 
financial planning, financial literacy, understanding all these terms, and therefore, for instance, 
if I have a family for two children, one is their education, one is their marriage, making sure for 
day to day expenses and long term needs, so how do you make sure for all of that. Now you 
have this kind of planning, and then you have a multitude of institutions knocking on your 
door, offering a loan. Taking a loan has become very easy, there are lots of institutions going to 
an area, and then they just start disbursing loans, without knowing the people, without doing a 
survey.’ (Practitioner 3, p.c.) 
 
                                                 
43 For OECD Countries see: Smith, B. E., & Stewart, F. (2008). Learning from the Experience 
of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries: Lessons for Policy, 
Programs, and Evaluations. In A. Lusardi, Overcoming the Saving Slump: How to increase 
the effectiveness of financial education and saving programs (S. 345-368). Chicago, US: 
University of Chicago Press  
For the EU see: TNS Opinion & Social on request of Eurostat and the Directorate-General for 
Health and Consumers (DG SANCO). (2011). Eurobarmeter no 342: Consumer 
Empowerment. Eurobarometer, Brussels. 
44 For the US see: U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2011). Resource Center. Retrieved 24th 
September 2011 from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/financial-
education/Pages/default.aspx or Braunstein, S., & Welch, C. (2002). Financial Literacy: An 
Overview of Practical Research, and Policy. Federal Reserve Bulletin (88), 445-458. 
45 In general, Indians have better financial literacy levels than consumers from e.g. the US, the 
Netherlands or Korea, as a recent study found out Indian Express. (2011, January 15th). 
Indians more fin literate than most: Survey. Retrieved September 24th, 2011 from 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indians-more-fin-literate-than-most-survey/737587/0.  
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There are some recent studies on financial capabilities of clients to find out how well 
borrowers understand their loan. Also, there are various efforts to increase financial literacy 
of clients by MFIs, associations and the Indian government.  
‘ “There should not be a double negative. This means even if I don't want a product, I'm 
saddled with it. For instance, I need to tell I don't need an insurance policy or I automatically 
get an insurance policy,” said Deepali Pant Joshi, chief general manager, Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI). “This is what we are uncomfortable with. Because we are dealing with vulnerable and 
poor clientele, we don't want products to be pushed through to them,” she said, while 
addressing a seminar on financial inclusion in Mumbai on Tuesday. […] Over the last two 
years, banks have embarked on the financial inclusion drive to cover under-banked and un-
banked villages in India. No-frills, or zero balance, accounts are opened at doorsteps on the 
submission of basic know-your-customer norms. […] She also said banks needed to insure 
financial literacy while meeting their inclusion targets. “They (customers) must understand the 
products they are getting, and from the demand side, financial literacy becomes all the more 
important,” she said.’ (Business Standard, 2011b) 
 
Also Sa-Dhan stresses the importance of financial literacy as a pre-condition for an effective 
consumer protection:  
‘In India, the Sa-Dhan Code of Conduct, referred to earlier in this paper, exhorts its members to 
disclose their interest rates and funding costs to clients by posting them inside their offices. […] 
While these efforts are laudable, it is also important to appreciate that unless MFI clients in 
these countries understand interest rates and can calculate them, these regulations are 
meaningless and will have no impact.’ (IFMR Centre for Microfinance, 2008, p. 6) 
 
The MFI Ujjivan started a Financial Literacy Training called Diksha. They released a 30-
minute long video46, which is intended to raise awareness. It is screened at centre meetings, 
but also in local cable TV (Ujjivan, 2011) to also reach those who are not Ujjivan clients. It 
focuses on over-lending. Additionally, a voluntary follow up training programme will be 
conducted, which includes training of numerical skills, budgeting and planning for expenses.   
The modalities to conduct financial literacy can become quite complex too. Swadhaar, 
another MFI that conducts financial literacy trainings, realized that these should not be made 
mandatory. 
‘What we do is that most areas where we have our microcredit operations are covered by SFA 
with its Financial Education program. They work with clients and non-clients, and are not 
restricted only to Swadhaar clients. Anybody who takes a loan from Swadhaar in those areas is 
offered these services if they would like to go. We found earlier that making this a mandatory 
part of the loan process meant that then the clients interaction or involvement in the process 
was very different. If they come and attend the session only because they think they will 
otherwise not, their level of interest is very different from when they actually choose to attend 
                                                 
46 A 10 min long trailer can be watched at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VlKflRIcSaY , 
retrieved August 25th, 2011.  
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themselves. We’ve had a lot of cases where a small initial group attends and very good word of 
mouth feedback is generated. The course is designed to be a lot of fun, with the contents being 
delivered through games, pictures and exercises. We have even had clients come and ask our 
loan officers, “you know, I have a friend who attended that, where can I go to attend it?” We 
are now looking at covering our entire area of operations with this.’ (Mehta Mankar, p.c.) 
 
Often, institutions conduct financial literacy trainings when they offer financial products, as 
the time clients apply for a loan is when they show the strongest interest: 
‘Many financial literacy programs rely on providing information or increasing knowledge, but 
this does not necessarily result in a change in behavior. Research suggests the links to desired 
practice are strongest when linked to “a teachable moment”—for example, providing home 
loan education when a consumer is first searching for a house; or retirement financing when 
entering the workforce. Most people continue to learn from family and friends; but if there 
were to be a scale rollout, using popular media such as TV or radio would be important.’  
(Porteous, 2009, p.12, with reference to Hilgert and Hogarth, 2003,47). 
 
Still, like in other contexts, humans sometimes take bad decisions despite knowing better.  
‘Experiments in behavioral economics have demonstrated that human attitudes and actions 
have systematic patterns which deviate from the rational; and that these deviations have 
important effects on credit markets. Even when human beings are well informed about their 
choices, they are inherently subject to behavioral biases.’ (Porteous, 2009, p.9) 
 
The irrationality of human behaviour is the boundary for financial literacy measures as well as 
for consumer protection.  
Besides consumers understanding financial products and knowing about their rights, installing 
a complaint mechanism is important to ensure compliance and monitor ground practices.  
‘Wherever you have structured, widespread consumer activity, and there’s a likelihood of an 
exploiter, the regulator has a role to play, but only so much. The grievance mechanism is what 
really is going to help out.’ (Rajagopalan, p.c.) 
 
While industry associations and many MFIs have installed telephone help-lines and 
ombudsman mechanisms, an independent helpline is still lacking. GIZ is trying to fill this gap 
in India, by including the microfinance sector into their project ‘Sustainable Consumption and 
Consumer Protection’48. The goal is to include microfinance clients in the Indian consumer 
                                                 
47 Hilgert, M & J.M.Hogarth (2003) “Household Financial Management; The Connection 
between Knowledge and Behavior” Federal Reserve Bulletin 89.7:301-322.  
48http://www.asemindia.com/Projects.aspx?Title=Sustainable+Consumption+and+Consumer
+Protection&Sectionid=2&subsectionid=10&rowid=13 , retrieved August 23rd, 2011.  
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advisory network49, which is supported by GIZ. This would be the first project providing 
independent advice to microfinance clients, both before and after clients take a credit. 
Training financial literacy is a major need in order to ensure that clients make informed 
decisions and to strengthen their negotiating power. Again, this is not a developmental 
agenda, but part of providing financial services in a fair manner. Financial literacy is a matter 
equally discussed in the west and aiming at balancing diverging levels of information. It 
should be distinguished from so-called ‘microfinance plus’ services that some MFIs offer, 
often through NGOs. As the realisation that microfinance alone has limited impact on 
development parameters is gaining ground, these services provide livelihood assistance like 
business and agricultural trainings. 
‘You need to bundle the microfinance service with certain additional services in order for it to 
even be viable. That needs to be livelihood development, or a higher component of financial 
literacy, more handholding along the loan-path. And these are all aspects which is not easy for 
an MFI to do it on a cost-to-cost basis, because the clients won’t be able to pay.’  (Mehta 
Mankar. p.c.) 
 
While I argue for a regulatory system for the Indian microfinance market, which should be 
driven by the Indian government, including industry associations, there should at the same 
time be efforts to include microfinance clients in this regime. First of all, by giving them a 
system of legal redress that they can access and use. Additionally, to include clients in the 
process, an organisation presenting the needs of clients is needed. Another issue is the lack of 
financial literacy: every instrument used has to take account of the actual knowledge and 
capabilities of microfinance clients.   
However, these issues are all occurring in other financial markets too and are not unique to 
microfinance. To address microfinance as a financial service, and not a development 
programme, also helps consumers: from their perspective, it is irrelevant who is providing 
financial services to them; they should all have to follow the same regulatory standards.  
 
 
                                                 
49 For further information see http://www.consumeradvice.in , retrieved August 23rd, 2011. 
  77 
5. CONCLUSION 
In microfinance, there is an informational asymmetry to the disadvantage of consumers, 
which has been largely ignored so far.  
As competition and commercialization increased in the Indian microfinance market, this 
asymmetry has led to a severe crisis. Competition did not lead to improved products and a 
stronger negotiating position of consumers, but instead to excessive borrowing and indebted 
clients. Large numbers of clients stopped repaying their loans, threatening the stability of 
several micro-finance institutions. 
The joint liability group (JLG) model, which is widely used at the moment, has severe 
shortcomings and requires reconsideration. At the moment, however, there are almost no 
efforts in this direction. 
Additionally, it is important to reconsider the classification of microfinance as a means of 
development assistance. It is a financial service for poor people - useful and needed - which 
we should not expect to end poverty. Just like with any other financial service, there is a need 
for consumer protection to balance current informational asymmetries.  
Clients in all low-income markets, including the microfinance market, would need even 
stronger protection than middle class consumers. Instead, they do not even enjoy a protection 
equal to them. An institution representing interests of the poor is missing.  
A coherent regulatory regime would be needed to improve this balance. In India there are 
various efforts of regulation, a unified law on microfinance is still lacking. Due to a 
constitutional conflict on the competence to regulate microfinance, it is still unregulated.  
I portrayed the efforts of the regulator, funders, institutions and industry associations to meet 
this need for regulation and came to the conclusion that none of these efforts can substitute for 
a unified legal framework. 
While the draft of the central microfinance bill appoints the RBI as the main regulator, the 
actual bill has not yet been passed. It would be needed in order to regulate the sector 
nationwide, so that banks and investors can readapt their strategies and eventually start 
lending to struggling MFIs again.  
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Membership in industry associations is voluntary The hesitance of the Indian parliament is 
also impeding the self-regulatory efforts of industry associations, as those who refuse to be 
regulated do not have to justify themselves before any (other) body. While industry 
associations have the most knowledge of the actualities of microfinance practices, they 
struggle to sanction their members.  
Individual institutions have experienced a mission drift. I argue that it was wrong to judge 
them by their mission statement in the first place. Instead, they should be judged by the 
services they actually provide, be it credit or any other service. While it is highly valuable if 
microfinance institutions aim to reach developmental goals and offer services accordingly, 
they simply cannot be treated differently as far as consumer protection is concerned.   
Funders, on the other hand, are hard to govern under Indian law. Alternative ways of scrutiny 
are therefore crucial to ensure adequate consumer protection. Donors for instance, are 
increasingly facing scrutiny by their parliaments. Banks and investors have started engaging 
in self-regulatory efforts. Considering that the involvement of Indian banks has been 
advocated by the Indian state in order to achieve financial inclusion, similar mechanisms 
might also help to increase their efforts in consumer protection.  
While addressing all these actors and their role in consumer protection, the actual consumers 
should not be left out.   
Institutions are needed to represent poor consumers and ensure consumer rights.  
There is need for a complaint and redress mechanism that they can access and use.   
Additionally, the issue of the lack of financial literacy needs to be addressed: every 
instrument used has to take the actual knowledge and capabilities of microfinance clients into 
account. 
All these measures are not unique to microfinance. To address microfinance as a financial 
service, and not a development programme, also helps consumers: from their perspective, it is 
irrelevant who is providing financial services to them, so all financial institutions should have 
to follow the same regulatory standards.  
In order to balance the lack of information of clients in financial markets, consumer 
protection is needed. This equally holds true for microfinance services. Microfinance clients 
should be regarded as consumers, not entrepreneurs, and offered adequate protection. This 
lesson is being learnt in India but equally applies to other microfinance markets. 
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APPENDIX – RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (SELECTED PROVISIONS) 
 
 PART XI  
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE STATES  
CHAPTER I.—LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS  
Distribution of Legislative Powers  
245. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.—(1) Subject to 
the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory 
of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State.  
(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have 
extra-territorial operation.  
246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.—(1) 
Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with 
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred 
to as the “Union List”).  
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature 
of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in 
the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).  
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws 
for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the 
Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “State List”').  
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of 
India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.  
247. Power of Parliament to provide for the establishment of certain additional courts.—
Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, Parliament may by law provide for the establishment of any 
additional courts for the better administration of laws made by Parliament or of any existing laws with 
respect to a matter enumerated in the Union List.  
48. Residuary powers of legislation.—(1) Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with 
respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List.  
(2) Such power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in 
either of those Lists.  
249. Power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter in the State List in the 
national interest.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, if the 
Council of States has declared by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members 
present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest that Parliament should make 
laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the State List specified in the resolution, it shall be 
lawful for Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to 
that matter while the resolution remains in force.  
(2) A resolution passed under clause (1) shall remain in force for such period not exceeding one 
year as may be specified therein:  
Provided that, if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in force of any such 
resolution is passed in the manner provided in clause (1), such resolution shall continue in force for a 
further period of one year from the date on which under this clause it would otherwise have ceased to 
be in force.  
(3) A law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the passing of a resolution 
under clause (1) have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have 
effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the resolution has ceased to be in force, except 
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as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period.  
251. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament under articles 249 and 250 and laws 
made by the Legislatures of States.—Nothing in articles 249 and 250 shall restrict the power of the 
Legislature of a State to make any law which under this Constitution it has power to make, but if any 
provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by 
Parliament which Parliament has under either of the said articles power to make, the law made by 
Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State, shall prevail, 
and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall to the extent of the repugnancy, but so long only 
as the law made by Parliament continues to have effect, be inoperative.  
252. Power of Parliament to legislate for two or more States by consent and adoption of 
such legislation by any other State.—(1) If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be 
desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to make laws for the 
States except as provided in articles 249 and 250 should be regulated in such States by Parliament by 
law, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those States, it 
shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so 
passed shall apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution 
passed in that behalf by the House or, where there are two Houses, by each of the Houses of the 
Legislature of that State.  
(2) Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act of Parliament 
passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any State to which it applies, be amended or 
repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that State.  
254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of 
States.—(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision 
of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an 
existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the 
provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by 
the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made 
by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.  
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated 
in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by 
Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of 
such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his 
assent, prevail in that State:  
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law 
with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so 
made by the Legislature of the State.  
CHAPTER II.—ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS  
General  
256. Obligation of States and the Union.—The executive power of every State shall be so 
exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which 
apply in that State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions 
to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.  
257. Control of the Union over States in certain cases.—(1) The executive power of every 
State shall be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the 
Union, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as 
may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.  
(2) The executive power of the Union shall also extend to the giving of directions to a State as to 
the construction and maintenance of means of communication declared in the direction to be of 
national or military importance:  
Provided that nothing in this clause shall be taken as restricting the power of Parliament to 
declare highways or waterways to be national highways or national waterways or the power of the 
Union with respect to the highways or waterways so declared or the power of the Union to construct 
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and maintain means of communication as part of its functions with respect to naval, military and air 
force works.  
(3) The executive power of the Union shall also extend to the giving of directions to a State as to 
the measures to be taken for the protection of the railways within the State.  
(4) Where in carrying out any direction given to a State under clause (2) as to the construction or 
maintenance of any means of communication or under clause (3) as to the measures to be taken for the 
protection of any railway, costs have been incurred in excess of those which would have been incurred 
in the discharge of the normal duties of the State if such direction had not been given, there shall be 
paid by the Government of India to the State such sum as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, 
as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India, in respect of the extra 
costs so incurred by the State.  
258. Power of the Union to confer powers, etc., on States in certain cases.—(1) 
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the President may, with the consent of the Government 
of a State, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers 
functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends.  
(2) A law made by Parliament which applies in any State may, notwithstanding that it relates to a 
matter with respect to which the Legislature of the State has no power to make laws, confer powers 
and impose duties, or authorise the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the State 
or officers and authorities thereof.  
(3) Where by virtue of this article powers and duties have been conferred or imposed upon a 
State or officers or authorities thereof, there shall be paid by the Government of India to the State such 
sum as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by 
the Chief Justice of India, in respect of any extra costs of administration incurred by the State in 
connection with the exercise of those powers and duties.  
258A. Power of the States to entrust functions to the Union.—Notwithstanding anything in 
this Constitution, the Governor of a State may, with the consent of the Government of India, entrust 
either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers functions in relation to any 
matter to which the executive power of the State extends.  
261. Public acts, records and judicial proceedings.—(1) Full faith and credit shall be given 
throughout the territory of India to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and of 
every State.  
(2) The manner in which and the conditions under which the acts, records and proceedings 
referred to in clause (1) shall be proved and the effect thereof determined shall be as provided by law 
made by Parliament.  
(3) Final judgments or orders delivered or passed by civil courts in any part of the territory of 
India shall be capable of execution anywhere within that territory according to law. 
Co-ordination between States  
263. Provisions with respect to an inter-State Council.—If at any time it appears to the 
President that the public interests would be served by the establishment of a Council charged with the 
duty of—  
(a) inquiring into and advising upon disputes which may have arisen between States;  
(b) investigating and discussing subjects in which some or all of the States, or the Union 
and one or more of the States, have a common interest; or  
(c) making recommendations upon any such subject and, in particular, recommendations 
for the better co-ordination of policy and action with respect to that subject,  
it shall be lawful for the President by order to establish such a Council, and to define the nature of the 
duties to be performed by it and its organisation and procedure.  
 
 
 SEVENTH SCHEDULE  
(Article 246)  
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List I—Union List 
43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance 
and financial corporations, but not including co-operative societies.  
44. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects 
not confined to one State, but not including universities.  
     45. Banking.  
47. Insurance.  
48. Stock exchanges and futures markets.  
 
List II—State List 
30. Money-lending and money-lenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness.  
32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, 
and universities; unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and 
associations; co-operative societies.  
 
_____ 
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CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (1986) (SELECTED PROVISIONS) 
An Act to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers and for that purpose to make 
provision for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of 
consumers' disputes and for matters connected therewith. 
  
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Thirty-seventh Year of the Republic of India as follows:— 
  
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY 
1. Short title, extent, commencement and application.— 
(1 ) This Act may be called the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by  notification, appoint and 
different dates may be appointed for different States and for different provisions of this Act. 
(4) Save as otherwise expressly provided by the Central Government by notification, this Act shall 
apply to all goods and services. 
  
2. Definitions.— 
(1 ) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— 
  (b) 'complainant' means— 
(i)  a consumer; or 
(ii) any voluntary consumer association registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1of 1956) 
or under any other law for the time being in force; or 
  (iii) the Central Government or any State Government,  
  (iv) one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers having the same interest; 
  (v)  in case of death of a consumer, his legal heir or representative; 
 who or which makes a complaint; 
  (c) 'complaint' means any allegation in writing made by a complainant that— 
(i) an unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade practice has been adopted by any trader or 
service provider ; 
(ii) the goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him; suffer from one or more defects; 
(iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from 
deficiency in any respect; 
(iv) a trader or service provider, as the case may be,  has charged for the goods or for the 
service mentioned in the complaint a price in excess of the price – 
(a) fixed by or under any law for the time being in force  
(b) displayed on the goods or any package containing such goods ; 
(c) displayed on the price list exhibited by him by or under any law for the time being 
in force; 
(d) agreed between the parties; 
(v) goods which will be hazardous to life and safety when used or being offered for sale to the 
public,-- 
(A)  in contravention of any standards relating to  safety of such goods as required to 
be complied with, by or under any law for the time being in force; 
(B)  if the trader could have known with due diligence that the goods so offered are 
unsafe to the public; 
(vi) services which are hazardous or likely to be hazardous to life and safety of the public 
when used, are being offered by the service provider which such person could have known 
with due diligence to be injurious to life and safety;”; 
..(d) 'consumer' means any person who— 
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and 
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods 
other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid 
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or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the 
approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or 
for any commercial purpose; or 
(ii)  hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or 
partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any 
beneficiary of such services other than the person who 'hires or avails of the services for 
consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of 
deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned 
person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purposes; 
 
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, “commercial purpose” does not include use by 
a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the 
purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment; 
 
..(e) 'consumer dispute' means a dispute where the person against whom a complaint has been made, 
denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint. 
..(f) 'defect' means any fault, imperfection or shortcoming in the quality, quantity, potency, purity or 
standard which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force under any 
contract, express or implied or as is claimed by the trader in any manner whatsoever in relation to any 
goods; 
..(g) 'deficiency' means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and 
manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in 
force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in 
relation to any service; 
..(h)  'District Forum'  means  a  Consumer  Disputes  Redressal Forum established under clause (a) of 
section 9; 
  (i.) 'goods' means goods as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930;  
  (k) 'National Commission' means the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 
established under clause (c) of section 9; 
  ( l ) 'notification' means a notification published in the Official Gazette; 
  (m) 'person' includes,— 
(i) a firm whether registered or not;  
(ii) a Hindu undivided family; 
(iii) a co-operative society; 
(iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the Societies R(21 of 1860) or 
not; 
  (n) 'prescribed' means prescribed by rules made by the State Government, or as the case may be, by 
the Central Government under this Act; 
  (nn) “regulation” means the regulations made by the National Commission under this Act; 
  (nnn) “restrictive trade practice” means a trade practice which tends to bring about manipulation of 
price or conditions of delivery or to affect flow of supplies in the market relating to goods or services 
in such a manner as to impose on the consumers unjustified costs or restrictions and shall include— 
(a) delay beyond the period agreed to by a trader in supply of such goods or in providing the 
services which has led or is likely to lead to rise in the price; 
(b) any trade practice which requires a consumer to buy, hire or avail of any goods or, as the 
case may be, services as condition precedent to buying, hiring or availing of other goods or 
services; 
  (o) 'service' means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, 
but not limited to, the provision of  facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, 
transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing 
construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not 
include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service; 
  
  (oo) “spurious goods and services” mean such goods and services which are claimed to be genuine 
but they are actually not so; 
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  (p) 'State Commission' means a Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission established in a State 
under clause (b) of section 9; 
  (q) 'trader' in relation to any goods means a person who sells or distributes any goods for sale and 
includes the manufacturer thereof, and where such goods are sold or distributed in package form, 
includes the packer thereof; 
  (r) 'unfair trade practice' means a trade practice which, for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or 
supply of any goods or for the provision of any service, adopts any unfair method or unfair or 
deceptive practice including any of the following practices, namely;— 
(1) the practice of making any statement, whether orally or in writing or by visible 
representation which,— 
(i)  falsely represents that the goods are of a particular standard, quality, quantity, 
grade, composition, style or model; 
(ii)  falsely represents that the services are of a particular standard, quality or grade; 
(iii) falsely represents any re-built, second-hand, renovated, reconditioned or old 
goods as new goods; 
(iv)  represents that the goods or services have sponsorship, approval, performance, 
characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits which such goods or services do not have; 
(v)  represents that the seller or the supplier has a sponsorship or approval or 
affiliation which such seller or supplier does not have; 
(vi) makes a false or misleading representation concerning the need for, or the 
usefulness of, any goods or services; 
(vii) gives to the public any warranty or guarantee of the performance, efficacy or 
length of life of a product or of any goods that is not based on an adequate or proper 
test thereof; 
Provided that where a defence is raised to the effect that such warranty or guarantee is 
based on adequate or proper test, the burden of proof of such defence shall lie on the 
person raising such defence; 
(viii) makes to the public a representation in a form that purports to be— 
(i)  a warranty or guarantee of a product or of any goods or services; or 
(ii)  a promise to replace, maintain or repair an article or any part thereof or to 
repeat or continue a service until it has achieved a specified result, if such 
purported warranty or guarantee or promise is materially misleading or if there 
is no reasonable prospect that such warranty, guarantee or promise will be 
carried out; 
(ix) materially misleads the public concerning the price at which a product or like 
products or goods or services, have been or are, ordinarily sold or provided, and, for 
this purpose, a representation as to price shall be deemed to refer to the price at which 
the product or goods or services has or have been sold by sellers or provided by 
suppliers generally in the relevant market unless it is clearly specified to be the price 
at which the product has been sold or services have been provided by the person by 
whom or on whose behalf the representation is made; 
(x) gives false or misleading facts disparaging the goods, services or trade of another 
person. 
  
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (1), a statement that is— 
(a) expressed on an article offered or displayed for sale, or on its wrapper or container; 
or 
(b) expressed on anything attached to, inserted in, or accompanying, an article offered 
or displayed for sale, or on anything on which the article is mounted for display or 
sale; or 
(c) contained in or on anything that is sold, sent, delivered, transmitted or in any other 
manner whatsoever made available to a member of the public,  
shall be deemed to be a statement made to the public by, and only by, the person who had 
caused the statement to be so expressed, made or contained; 
  
  102
(4) permits the sale or supply of goods intended to be used, or are of a kind likely to be used, 
by consumers, knowing or having reason to believe that the goods do not comply with the 
standards prescribed by competent authority relating to performance, composition, contents, 
design, constructions, finishing or packaging as are necessary to prevent or reduce the risk of 
injury to the person using the goods; 
 
(6) manufacture of spurious goods or offering such goods for sale or adopts  deceptive 
practices in the provision of services. 
 
 
(2) Any reference in this Act to any other Act or provision thereof which is not in force in any area to 
which this Act applies shall be construed to have a reference to the corresponding Act or provision 
thereof in force in such area.  
 
3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not 
in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. 
 
CHAPTER II 
CONSUMER PROTECTION COUNCILS 
  
4. The Central Consumer Protection Council.—(1) The Central Government shall, by notification, 
establish with effect from such date as it may specify in such notification, a Council to be known as 
the Central Consumer Protection Council (hereinafter referred to as the Central Council). 
(2) The Central Council shall consist of the following members, namely:— 
(a) the Minister in charge of the consumer affairs in the Central Government, who shall be its 
Chairman, and 
(b) such number of other official or non-official members representing such interests as may 
be prescribed. 
  
5. Procedure for meetings of the Central Council.—(1) The Central Council shall meet as and when 
necessary, but at least one meeting of the Council shall be held every year. 
(2) The Central Council shall meet at such time and place as the Chairman may think fit and shall 
observe such procedure in regard to the transaction of its business as may be prescribed. 
 
6. Objects of the Central Council.—The objects of the Central Council shall be to promote and 
protect the rights of the consumers such as,—  
(a) the right to be protected against the marketing of goods and services which are hazardous 
to life and property; 
(b) the right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of 
goods or services, as the case may be so as to protect the consumer against unfair trade 
practices;  
(c) the right to be assured, wherever possible, access to a variety of goods and services at 
competitive prices;  
(d) the right to be heard and to be assured that consumer's interests will receive due 
consideration at appropriate forums;  
(e) the right to seek redressal against unfair trade practices or restrictive trade practices or 
unscrupulous exploitation of consumers; and 
(f) the right to consumer education. 
  
7. The State Consumer Protection Councils.--( l ) The State Government shall, by notification, 
establish with effect from such date as it may specify in such notification, a Council to be known as 
the Consumer Protection Council for..................... (hereinafter referred to as the State Council). 
(2) The State Council shall consist of the following members, namely:— 
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(a) the Minister incharge of consumer affairs in the State Government who shall be its 
Chairman; 
(b) such number of other official or non-official members representing such interests as may 
be prescribed by the State Government. 
(c) such number of other official or non-official members, not exceeding ten, as may be 
nominated by the Central Government. 
(3) The State Council shall meet as and when necessary but not less than two meetings shall be held 
every year. 
(4) The State Council shall meet at such time and place as the Chairman may think fit and shall 
observe such procedure in regard to the transaction of its business as may be prescribed by the State 
Government. 
  
8. Objects of the State Council.—The objects of every State Council shall be to promote and protect 
within the State the rights of the consumers laid down in clauses (a) to (f) of section 6. 
  
8A. (1) The State Government shall establish for every district, by notification, a council to be known 
as the District Consumer Protection Council with effect from such date as it may specify in such 
notification. 
(2) The District Consumer Protection Council (hereinafter referred to as the District Council) shall 
consist of the following members, namely:— 
(a) the Collector of the district (by whatever name called), who shall be its Chairman; and 
(b) such number of other official and non-official members representing such interests as may 
be prescribed by the State Government. 
(3) The District Council shall meet as and when necessary but not less than two meetings shall be held 
every year. 
(4) The District Council shall meet at such time and place within the district as the Chairman may 
think fit and shall observe such procedure in regard to the transaction of its business as may be 
prescribed by the State Government. 
  
8B. The objects of every District Council shall be to promote and protect within the district the rights 
of the consumers laid down in clauses (a) to (f) of section 6. 
 
CHAPTER III 
CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL AGENCIES 
  
9. Establishment of Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies. There shall be established for the 
purposes of this Act, the following agencies, namely:— 
(a) a Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum to be known as the 'District Forum' established by 
the State Government in each district of the State by notification: 
      Provided that the State Government may, if it deems fit, establish more than one District 
Forum in a district. 
(b) a Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to be known as the 'State Commission' 
established by the State Government in the State by notification; and 
(c) a National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission established by the Central 
Government by notification. 
10. Composition of the District Forum.—(1) Each District Forum shall consist of,— 
(a)    a person who is, or  has been, or is qualified to be a District Judge, who shall be its 
President; 
(b) two other members, one of whom shall be a woman, who shall have the following 
qualifications, namely:— 
(i)  be not less than thirty-five years of age, 
(ii)  possess a bachelor's degree from a recognised university, 
(iii)  be persons of ability, integrity and standing, and have adequate knowledge and 
experience of at least ten years in dealing with problems relating to economics, law, 
commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration: 
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    (1A) Every appointment under sub-section (I) shall be made by the State Government on the 
recommendation of a selection committee consisting of the following, namely:— 
 
Provided that where the President of the State Commission is, by reason of absence or otherwise, 
unable to act as Chairman of the Selection Committee, the State Government may refer the matter to 
the Chief Justice of the High Court for nominating a sitting Judge of that High Court to act as 
Chairman. 
  
      11. Jurisdiction of the District Forum.—(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the 
District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services 
and the compensation, if any, claimed ''does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs. 
   
      12. Manner in which complaint shall be made.—(1) A complaint in relation to any goods sold 
or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or any service provided or agreed to be provided may be 
filed with a District Forum by – 
(a)   the consumer to whom such goods are sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or such 
service provided or agreed to be provided; 
(b)    any recognised consumer association whether the consumer to whom the goods sold or 
delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or service provided or agreed to be provided is a member of 
such association or not; 
(c)    one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers having the same interest, with the 
permission of the District Forum, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all consumers so interested; or 
(d)  the Central Government or the State  Government, as the case may be,  either in its individual 
capacity or as a representative of interests of the consumers in general. 
(2) Every complaint filed under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied with such amount of fee and 
payable in such manner as may be prescribed. 
(3)        On receipt of a complaint made under sub-section (1),  the District Forum may, by order, 
allow the complaint to be proceeded with or rejected: 
            Provided that a complaint shall not be rejected under this section unless an opportunity of 
being heard has been given to the complainant: 
            Provided further that the admissibility of the complaint shall ordinarily be decided within 
twenty-one days from the date on which the complaint was received. 
(4)        Where a complaint is allowed to be proceeded  with under sub-section (3), the District Forum 
may proceed with the complaint in the manner provided under this Act: 
            Provided that where a complaint has been admitted by the District Forum, it shall not be 
transferred to any other court or tribunal or any authority set up by or under any other law for the time 
being in force. 
  
Explanation.-  For the purpose of this section “recognised consumer association” means any 
voluntary consumer  association registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the 
time being in force”. 
  
       13. Procedure on admission of complaint.—  
    (2) the District Forum shall, if the complaint admitted  by it under section 12 relates to goods in 
respect of which the procedure specified in sub-section (1) cannot be followed, or if the complaint 
relates to any services,— 
(a) refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the 
case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may 
be granted by the District Forum; 
(b) where the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of the complaint, referred to him under 
clause (a) denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to 
take any action to represent his case within the time given by the District Forum, the District 
Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute,— 
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(i) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant and the opposite 
party, where the opposite party denies or disputes the allegations contained in the 
complaint, or 
(ii) ex parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant where 
the opposite party omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time 
given by the Forum. 
(c) where the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing before the District 
Forum, the District Forum may either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on 
merits. 
    (3) No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in subsections (1 ) and (2) shall be 
called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been 
complied with. 
  
  (3A) Every complaint shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to 
decide the complaint within a period of three months from the date of receipt of notice by opposite 
party where the complaint does not require analysis or testing of commodities and within five months 
if it requires analysis or testing of commodities: 
Provided that no adjournment shall be ordinarily granted by the District Forum unless sufficient cause 
is shown and the reasons for grant of adjournment have been recorded in writing by the Forum: 
Provided further that the District Forum shall make such orders as to the costs occasioned by the 
adjournment as may be provided in the regulations made under this Act.       
    (4) For the purposes of this section, the District Forum shall have the same powers as are vested in a 
civil court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, 
namely:— 
(i) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any defendant or witness and examining 
the witness on oath; 
(ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as 
evidence; 
(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits; 
(iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test from the appropriate 
laboratory or from any other relevant source; 
(v) issuing  of any commission for the examination of any witness, an 
(vi) any other matter which may be prescribed. 
  
  
14. Finding of the District Forum.—(1) If, after the proceeding conducted under section 13, the 
District Forum is satisfied that the goods complained against suffer from any of the defects specified 
in the complaint or that any of the allegations contained in the complaint about the services are 
proved, it shall issue an order to the opposite party directing him to do one or more of the following 
things, namely:— 
(a) to remove the defect pointed out by the appropriate laboratory from the goods in question;  
(b) to replace the goods with new goods of similar description which shall be free from any 
defect; 
(c) to return to the complainant the price, or, as the case may be, the charges paid by the 
complainant; 
(d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer for any loss 
or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party. 
Provided that the District Forum shall have the power to grant punitive damages in such 
circumstances as it deems fit; 
(e) to remove the defects in goods or deficiencies in the services in question; 
(f) to discontinue the unfair trade practice or the restrictive trade practice or not to repeat it; 
(g) not to offer the hazardous goods for sale; 
(h) to withdraw the hazardous goods from being offered for sale; 
(ha) to cease manufacture of hazardous goods and to desist from offering services which are 
hazardous in nature; 
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(hb) to pay such sum as may be determined by it if it is of the opinion that loss or injury has 
been suffered by a large number of consumers who are not identifiable conveniently: 
Provided that the minimum amount of sum so payable shall not be less than five per cent. of 
the value of such defective goods sold or service provided, as the case may be, to such 
consumers: 
Provided further that the amount so obtained shall be credited in favour of such person and 
utilized in such manner as may be prescribed; 
(hc) to issue corrective advertisement to neutralize the effect of misleading advertisement at 
the cost of the opposite party responsible for issuing such misleading advertisement; 
(i) to provide for adequate costs to parties. 
   
(2A) Every order made by the District Forum under sub-section (1) shall be signed by its President 
and the member or members who conducted the proceeding: 
            Provided that where the proceeding is conducted by the President and one member and they 
differ on any point or points, they shall state the point or points on which they differ and refer the 
same to the other member for hearing on such point or points and the opinion of the majority shall be 
the order of the District Forum. 
   
   16. Composition of the State Commission.—(1) Each State Commission shall consist of— 
  
(a) a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court, appointed by the State Government, who 
shall be its President:  
     Provided that no appointment under this clause shall be made except after consultation with the 
Chief Justice of the High Court; […] 
  
    17. Jurisdiction of the State Commission.—(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the 
State Commission shall have jurisdiction— 
(a) to entertain— 
(i)   complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, 
claimed exceeds rupees twenty lakhs but does not exceed rupees one crore; and 
(ii)  appeals against the orders of any District Forum within the State; and 
(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is 
pending before or has been decided by any District Forum within the State, where it appears to 
the State Commission that such District Forum has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by 
law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction 
illegally or with material irregularity. 
  
20. Composition of the National Commission.—(1) The National Commission shall consist of— 
(a) a person who is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court, to be appointed by the Central 
Government, who shall be its President; 
  
Provided that no appointment under this clause shall be made except after consultation with the Chief 
Justice of India; […] 
  
    21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission.—Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the 
National Commission shall have jurisdiction— 
         (a) to entertain— 
(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, 
claimed exceeds rupees one crore; and 
(ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission; and  
(b)  to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is 
pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National 
Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, 
or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
illegally or with material irregularity. 
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   27. Penalties.—(1) Where a trader or a person against whom a complaint is made or the 
complainant fails or omits to comply with any order made by the District Forum, the State 
Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, such trader or person or complainant 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which 
may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than two thousands rupees but which 
may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both: 
     (3) All offences under this Act may be tried summarily by the District Forum or the State 
Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be. 
  
CHAPTER IV 
 MISCELLANEOUS 
 
30A. (1) The National Commission may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, by 
notification, make regulations not inconsistent with this Act to provide for all matters for which 
provision is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. 
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may 
make provisions for the cost of adjournment of any proceeding before the District Forum, the State 
Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, which a party may be ordered to pay. 
   
31. Laying of rules.-- (1) Every rule and every regulation made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as 
may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of 
thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, 
before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions 
aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or regulation or both Houses 
agree that the rule or regulation should not be made, the rule or regulation shall thereafter have effect 
only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such 
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under 
that rule or regulation. 
(2) Every rule made by a State Government under this Act shall be laid as soon as may be after it is 
made, before the State Legislature 
 
 
 
 
_____ 
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THE MF BILL, 2011 (SELECTED PROVISIONS) 
 
A BILL to provide access to financial services for the rural and urban poor and certain 
disadvantaged sections of the people by promoting the growth and development of micro finance 
institutions as extended arms of the banks and financial institutions and for the regulation of micro 
finance institutions and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.  
WHEREAS the banking system has achieved significant growth in terms of average population 
per bank office and has been able to reduce the levels of credit gaps in the economy;  
AND WHEREAS inspite of such growth many of the poor households still do not have access to 
basic financial services such as savings, credit and money transfer and the financial exclusion faced by 
such people results in discrimination and denial of equal opportunities to them;  
AND WHEREAS micro finance sector is engaged in providing credit and other financial services 
to the poor households and their micro enterprises as an extended arm of the banking system;  
AND WHEREAS micro finance sector lacks a formal statutory framework for its financial 
activities;  
NOW THEREFORE it is expedient to provide a formal statutory framework for the promotion, 
development, regulation and orderly growth of the micro finance sector and thereby to facilitate 
universal access to integrated financial services for the unbanked population.  
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Sixty Second Year of the Republic of India as follows: - 
 
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY 
1.(1) This Act may be called the Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011  
(2) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official 
gazette, appoint:  
Provided that different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act and any reference in 
such provision to the commencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into 
force of that provision.  
 
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -  
(a) “annual percentage rate” means aggregate rate consisting of interest, processing fees, 
service charges and any other charges or fees charged by the micro finance institution on any 
financial assistance granted to any client;  
(b) “co-operative society” means a society or cooperative registered or deemed to be 
registered, under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912 or any other Central or State law 
relating to cooperative societies or cooperatives for the time being in force;  
(c) “Council” means the Micro Finance Development Council constituted under section 3;  
(d) “financial assistance” means any loan, advance, grant or any guarantee given or any other 
credit facility extended in cash or kind with or without security or guarantee;  
(e)”margin” means the difference between the annual percentage rate collected by the micro 
finance institution for any financial assistance granted to clients and the cost of funds raised 
and other operational costs incurred by the micro finance institution for grant of and servicing 
such financial assistance.  
(f) “micro finance institution” means an entity (irrespective of its organisational form), which 
provides micro finance services in the form and manner as may be prescribed but does not 
include: -  
(i) a banking company, State Bank of India, a Subsidiary Bank, a corresponding new 
bank, a cooperative bank, EXIM Bank, Reconstruction Bank, National Housing Bank, 
National Bank, a Regional Rural Bank and Small Industries Bank;  
(ii) a co-operative society engaged primarily in agricultural operations or industrial 
activity or purchase or sale of any goods and such other activities;  
(iii) a cooperative society not accepting deposits from anybody except from its 
members having voting rights or from those members who will acquire voting rights 
after a stipulated period of their making deposits as per the law applicable to such 
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cooperative society.  
(g) “Micro finance services” means one or more of the following financial services involving 
small amounts to :  
individuals or groups:  
(i) providing micro credit;  
(ii) collection of thrift;  
(iii) remittance of funds;  
(iv) providing pension or insurance services;  
(v) any other services as may be specified.  
in such form and manner as may be prescribed.  
(h) “National Bank” means the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
established under section 3 of the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act, 
1981;  
(l)“regulations” means regulations made by the Reserve Bank;  
(o) “Systemically important micro finance institution” means a micro finance deploying such 
amount of funds for providing micro credit to such minimum number of clients as may be 
specified by the Reserve Bank by regulations framed under this Act.  
(p) “thrift” means any money collected other than in the form of current account or demand 
deposits, by a micro finance institution from members of self-help groups or any other group 
of individuals by whatever name called, who are availing financial services provided by such 
micro finance institution;  
CHAPTER II 
MICRO FINANCE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL 
3. The Central Government may, by notification, constitute a Council to be known as the Micro 
Finance Development Council, to advise the Central Government, on formulation of policies, schemes 
and other measures required in the interest of orderly growth and development of the micro finance 
sector and micro finance institutions, to promote financial inclusion.  
4. The Council shall consist of the following members, nominated by the Central Government namely: 
(a) a person of eminence, with experience in banking, rural credit and micro finance, - 
Chairperson;  
(b) two officers, not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India, one each 
from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Rural Development – Members;  
(c) an officer, not below the rank of an Executive Director of the Reserve Bank - Member;  
(d) an officer, not below the rank of an Executive Director of the Small Industries 
Development Bank of India established under the Small Industries Development Bank of 
India Act, 1989 - Member;  
(e) an officer, not below the rank of an Executive Director of the National Bank dealing with 
micro finance, - Member;  
(f) an officer, not below the rank of an Executive Director of the National Housing Bank 
established under the National Housing Bank Act, 1987– Member;  
(g) not more than six persons, of whom at least two shall be women, to be nominated in 
consultation with the Reserve Bank from amongst persons with experience in banking, rural 
credit and micro finance or the representatives of micro finance institutions or scheduled 
banks or any other institution providing micro finance services - Members.  
5. The Council shall advise the Central Government on formulation of policies and measures 
including;  
(i) adoption of any innovations and use of technology in providing micro finance services;  
(ii) establishing credit information bureaus for creation of data-base of clients availing micro 
finance services from various agencies;  
(iii) the working of grievance redressal mechanisms and suggest modifications of the systems 
to protect the interest of clients of micro finance services; or  
(iv) any other matter which may be referred to the Council by the Central Government in the 
interest of promotion of financial inclusion and protecting the interest of clients availing micro 
finance services  
6. A member of the Council shall hold office for such term not exceeding three years as the Central 
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Government may fix, and, receive such fees and allowances as may be prescribed.  
 
CHAPTER III 
STATE ADVISORY COUNCILS 
8. (1) The Central Government may by issue of a notification establish State Advisory Councils for 
Micro Finance at the State level and considering the extent of micro finance activities in the States, 
such Advisory Councils may be set up with jurisdiction over more than one State.  
(2) The constitution of such State Advisory Councils shall be as under:  
(a) two Nominees of the concerned State or States including a Chairperson of the Advisory 
Council;  
(b) Convener Bank of the State Level Bankers’ Committee for any State or States;  
(c) one member representing the micro finance sector operating in the State nominated by the 
Central Government; and  
(d) one member nominated by the Reserve Bank.  
(3) The State Advisory Councils shall advise the Central Government the progress achieved in 
implementation of the Policy initiatives undertaken for promotion and development of the micro 
finance sector in the State including the following matters:  
(a)whether lending activities undertaken by micro finance institutions is resulting in over-
indebtedness and consequent large scale defaults;  
(b) whether recovery practices adopted by micro finance institutions are fair and reasonable;  
(c) whether the grievance re-dressal mechanism is working satisfactorily;  
(d) overall assessment of the impact of measures for financial literacy and inclusion on an 
annual basis;  
(e) any other matter which the State Advisory Council deems necessary to bring to the notice 
of Central Government.  
(4) The Central Government may entrust such other functions of the Micro Finance Development 
Council to any State Advisory Council by issue of notification subject to such terms and conditions as 
deemed fit.  
9. A member of the Council shall hold office for such term not exceeding three years and receive such 
fees and allowances may be prescribed.  
CHAPTER IV 
REGISTRATION OF MICRO FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
10. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and the Banking 
Regulation Act, 1949 and save as otherwise provided in this Act, no micro finance institution shall 
commence or carry on the activity of providing micro finance services without obtaining a certificate 
of registration from the Reserve Bank under this Act.  
11. (1) A micro finance institution which intends to commence the business of providing micro 
finance services shall make an application for registration to the Reserve Bank in such form and 
manner along with such fee as may be specified by regulations.  
(2) Any micro finance institution, in existence at the commencement of this Act engaged in providing 
micro finance services shall, before the expiry of three months from such commencement, apply in 
writing to the Reserve Bank for a certificate of registration under this Act.  
(3) Any company registered as a non-banking finance company with the Reserve Bank of India under 
the provisions of chapter III-B of the Reserve Bank of India, 1934, and engaged in the activity of 
extending micro finance services shall also apply for registration as a micro finance institution under 
this Act.  
(4) Any such non-banking finance company registered as micro finance institution under this Act, 
shall continue to comply with the terms and conditions of its registration and any rules, regulations, 
directives and guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank to the non-banking finance companies, from 
time to time and such other rules, regulations, directives and guidelines of the Reserve Bank as may be 
issued by the Reserve Bank for the micro finance institutions, under this Act.  
12. (1) The Reserve Bank may, for the purpose of grant of certificate of registration, satisfy itself that 
the following conditions are fulfilled by the applicant micro finance institution, namely:—  
(a) the general character and management of the applicant shall not be prejudicial to the 
interest of the clients availing micro finance services.;  
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(b) the applicant is engaged in the promotion and development of financial inclusion by 
providing micro finance services;  
(c) the applicant has a net owned fund, created out of contributions to capital, reserves or 
grants or donations received by it, of at least five lakh rupees or such other amounts specified 
by regulations;  
(d) any other condition as may be specified by regulations .  
(2) The Reserve Bank may, on being satisfied that the conditions referred to in sub-section (1) are 
fulfilled, grant a certificate of registration to the applicant micro finance institution to commence or 
carry on the business of providing micro finance services subject to such conditions as it may consider 
necessary to impose:  
Provided that no application for registration shall be rejected unless the applicant has been given an 
opportunity of being heard.  
13. Cease and desist order  
(1) If on inspection or perusal of annual accounts or any returns submitted by any micro finance 
institution, the Reserve Bank is satisfied that activities of any micro finance institution are being 
conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of its clients or depositors or the micro finance 
institution itself the Reserve Bank may pass an order directing such micro finance institution to cease 
and desist from continuing the micro finance activities subject to such terms and conditions as may be 
specified in such order.  
(2) The Reserve Bank may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, grant time to such Micro 
Finance Institution for taking necessary steps to comply with such directives or conditions within the 
time granted by the Reserve Bank.  
(3) The Reserve Bank may withdraw the Cease and Desist Order issued under sub-section (1) if the 
Reserve Bank is satisfied that Micro Finance Institution has complied with the directives and other 
terms of the Order.  
(4) The Reserve Bank may initiate proceedings for cancellation of the registration granted to the micro 
finance institution if it fails to comply with, and implement the directives or conditions stipulated by 
Reserve Bank in the Cease and desist Order.  
14.(1) The Reserve Bank may cancel the certificate of registration granted to a micro finance 
institution under section 12, if such micro finance institution,—  
(i) fails to comply with directives or condition stipulated with Cease and desist Order passed 
under section 13 by the Reserve Bank;  
(ii) ceases to carry on the business of providing micro finance services or  
(iii) has failed to comply with any of the conditions including conditions relating to 
maintenance of the levels of assets deployed and observance of other norms subject to which 
the certificate of registration has been granted to it; or  
(iv) fails to comply with any direction issued by the Reserve Bank under the provisions of this 
Act; or  
(iv) fails to submit or offer for inspection its books of accounts and other relevant documents 
under sub-section (2) of section 26.  
(2) Before cancelling the certificate of registration under this section, the Reserve Bank shall provide 
an opportunity to such a micro finance institution to show cause why the certificate or registration 
granted to it should not be cancelled.  
(3) Any such representation made by the Micro Finance Institution shall be considered by the Reserve 
Bank and an order recording the reasons either for withdrawal of the cancellation or confirming the 
cancellation shall be passed by the Reserve Bank within 60 days of the representation.  
15 (1) Any micro finance institution which is not a company registered under the Companies Act, 
1956 and which becomes systemically important micro finance institution shall convert its institution 
into a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 with or without a licence under section 25 
of the Companies Act, 1956, within six months from the date of the Balance Sheet which shows that it 
has become systematically important micro finance institution in terms of the rules prescribed by the 
Central Government.  
(2) A micro finance institution which becomes systemically important shall submit to the Reserve 
Bank a certificate from the Statutory Auditor indicating the Assets pattern and total number of clients 
availing micro finance services making it eligible to be classified as systemically important micro 
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finance institution, within one month from the date of finalisation of the balance sheet.  
(3) On becoming systemically important micro finance institution it shall comply with any directives 
issued by the Reserve Bank, from time to time to systemically important micro finance institutions.  
16 (1) A micro finance institution aggrieved by an order of rejection of an application for grant of 
certificate of registration under section 12, or cancellation of certificate of registration under section 
14, or any action taken by the Reserve Bank under sub-section (4) of section 26, may prefer an appeal 
to the Central Government or such other authority as the Central Government may, by notification 
specify, within a period of sixty days from the date on which such order is communicated to the micro 
finance institution.  
CHAPTER IV 
RESERVE, ACCOUNTS, AUDIT AND RETURNS 
17. (1) Every micro finance institution registered with the Reserve Bank under this Act shall create a 
reserve fund and transfer therein a sum, representing such percentage, as may be specified by the 
Reserve Bank, of its net profit or surplus realized by providing micro finance services every year as 
disclosed in the profit and loss account or income and expenditure account before any dividend is 
declared or surplus is utilized for any other purpose.  
(2) No appropriation of any sum from the reserve fund shall be made by the micro finance institution 
except for the purpose, as may be specified by the Reserve Bank from time to time, and every such 
appropriation shall be reported to the Reserve Bank within twenty-one days from the date of such 
appropriation.  
(3) The Reserve Bank may, in the public interest or in the interest of clients of any micro finance 
institution direct any micro finance institution or any class of micro finance institutions to invest the 
whole or part of such reserve fund in such unencumbered securities, as it may, by regulations specify.  
18. At the close of each financial year, every micro finance institution shall prepare with reference to 
that year, in respect of all services transacted by it, a balance sheet, profit and loss account or an 
income and expenditure account as on the last working day of the financial year, in such forms as may 
be specified by regulations.  
19. The balance sheet, profit and loss account or an income and expenditure account prepared in 
accordance with section 18 shall be audited by a person duly qualified under any law for the time 
being in force to be an auditor of companies formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or 
an auditor from the list of Chartered Accountants or other qualified persons approved by the Reserve 
Bank  
20. Without prejudice to anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the time 
being in force, where the Reserve Bank is of the opinion that it is necessary in the public interest or in 
the interest of its clients or for the purpose of proper assessment of the records and books of account of 
the micro finance institution, so to do, it may by order direct –  
(a) the auditor of micro finance institution to audit the accounts of the micro finance institution 
in relation to any transaction or class of transactions, or for such period or periods as may be 
specified in the order, and the auditor shall comply with such directions and make a report of 
the audit with such information as it may be asked to report by the Reserve Bank to it and 
forward a copy thereof to the micro finance institution;  
(b) such micro finance institution to appoint auditors, with the prior approval of the Reserve 
Bank, for such period and subject to such conditions as the Reserve Bank may specify from 
time to time.  
CHAPTER V 
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF RESERVE BANK 
23. (1) It shall be the duty of the Reserve Bank to promote and ensure orderly growth of the micro 
finance Sector in accordance with such measures as it deems fit, for the purpose of promoting 
financial inclusion.  
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions contained in sub-section (1), the 
measures may provide for-  
(a) formulating and facilitating appropriate policy for the orderly growth of the micro finance 
services provided by micro finance institutions so as to ensure greater transparency, effective 
management, good governance and to facilitate the flow of micro finance services in an 
efficient manner;  
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(b) setting or facilitating the sector related benchmarks and performance standards pertaining 
to methods of operation, methods of recovery, management and governance including model 
codes for conduct of business of micro finance institutions;  
(c) facilitating the development of credit rating norms or rating norms for other purposes for 
micro finance institutions;  
(d) specifying the form and manner of books of account to be maintained by micro finance 
institutions;  
(e) specifying the form and manner of accounting of business operations of micro finance 
institutions and auditing standards relating thereto;  
(f) calling for information and data from micro finance institutions for maintaining an 
appropriate data base in the public domain relating to micro finance services and 
disseminating the same through a national dissemination network;  
(g) facilitating institutional development of all entities, including groups, engaged in micro 
finance services through training and capacity building measures;  
(h) promoting customer education of all entities engaged in thrift services and micro finance 
for greater awareness and for economic empowerment of micro finance clients;  
(i) supporting sector related research, field research, documentation and dissemination thereof;  
(j) co-ordinating with other agencies for orderly growth and development of entities engaged 
in the micro finance services;  
(k) documenting and disseminating information relating to fair practices with a view to 
ensuring provision of thrift services and micro finance services at an affordable cost to eligible 
clients;  
(l) perform such other functions as may be prescribed.  
24. (1) If the Reserve Bank is satisfied that, in the public interest or to prevent the affairs of any micro 
finance institution being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the clients availing micro 
finance services or in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the micro finance institution, it is 
necessary or expedient so to do, it may give directions to a class or classes or all micro finance 
institutions relating to income recognition, accounting standards, making of proper provision for bad 
and doubtful debts, capital adequacy based on risk weights for assets and credit conversion factors for 
off-balance-sheet items and also relating to deployment of funds by a micro finance institution or a 
class of micro finance institutions or micro finance institutions generally, as the case may be, and such 
micro finance institutions shall be bound to follow the policy so determined and the directions so 
issued.  
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such directions may 
provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: -  
(a) extent of deployment of assets for providing micro finance services and proportion of 
clients availing such services , necessary to classify any institution as Micro finance 
institution;  
(b) ceiling on amount of financial assistance and the number of individual clients to whom 
such financial assistance may be provided by any micro finance institution;  
(c) tenure of financial assistance given to clients and other terms such as purpose for which 
financial assistance can be given, margin caps and peridiocity of repayment schedules;  
(d) levy of processing fees, interest, life insurance premium and other terms relating to 
financial assistance and the percentage of margin to be maintained by a micro finance 
institution.  
(e) specify the maximum Annual Percentage Rate that can be charged by a micro finance 
institution on the financial assistance granted to any client.  
(f) specify the locations where financial assistance may be sanctioned and disbursed by micro 
finance institutions;  
(g) require micro finance institutions to become members of Credit Information Bureaus that 
may be set up for the Micro Finance Sector;  
(h) observe Code of Conduct formulated by any Self-Regulatory Organisation of micro 
finance institutions recognized by the Reserve Bank and set up grievance redressal mechanism 
for their clients as required by the self-regulatory organisation;  
(i) provide a Client Protection Code and direct its acceptance and observance by micro finance 
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institutions ;  
(j) advise micro finance institutions to achieve better control , simplification of procedures and 
reduction of costs by use of information technology;  
(k) specify the minimum net-worth of micro finance institutions considering their size of 
operations and other relevant parameters;  
(l) specify norms for corporate governance to be observed by micro finance institutions;  
(m) specify prudential norms relating to income recognition, accounting standards, 
provisioning for bad and doubtful debts, capital adequacy based on risk weights for assets and 
deployment of funds;  
(n) require disclosure of assignments or securitisation of assets as also assets assigned with 
recourse or with arrangement as agent for collection of loan installments;  
(o) raising of preference share capital or other capital by micro finance institution;  
(p) grant recognition to any self Regulatory Organisation of micro finance institutions;  
(q) generally for efficient conduct of the business of micro finance institution.  
25. (1) A micro finance institution engaged in the activity of granting financial assistance to eligible 
clients shall maintain the percentage of margin as may be specified by the Reserve Bank by 
regulations from time to time.  
Explanation: The Reserve Bank may specify margin under sub-section (1) for micro finance 
institutions generally or for a class of micro finance institutions or for any micro finance institution in 
particular, considering the size of their operations and other relevant parameters.  
(2) A micro finance institution engaged in the activity referred in sub-section (1) shall convey to every 
borrower the annual percentage rate comprising of the annual interest rate, processing fees or any 
other charges or fees levied by the micro finance institution and incorporate the same distinctly and 
prominently in the loan document obtained from the borrower as also in the sanction letter given to the 
borrower.  
(3) A micro finance institution shall also obtain from the Statutory Auditors a certificate that the 
margin available to and realised by the micro finance institution does not exceed the percentage of 
margin specified by the Reserve Bank computed on the basis of the annual percentage rate fixed by 
the micro finance institution and that the micro finance institution has complied with the requirements 
of sub-sections (1) and (2)  
26. (1) The Reserve Bank may, at any time, cause inspection to be made of books of account or any 
other record of any micro finance institution, by an inspecting authority approved by it in such manner 
and on such terms and conditions as may be specified by it and such inspecting authority shall submit 
a report to the Reserve Bank in respect of inspection made by it.  
(2) It shall be duty of every person who is a director, trustee or a member of Managing Committee, 
manager, secretary or other officer or employee of the micro finance institution to produce before the 
inspecting authority, all such books of account, records and other documents in custody or power of 
the person to furnish any statement or information relating to affairs of the micro finance institution, as 
the inspecting authority may require within such time, as may be specified.  
(3) A copy of the report under sub-section (1) shall be furnished to the micro finance institution, if:  
(a) the micro finance institution makes a request for the same; or  
(b) any action is contemplated against the micro finance organization on the basis of such 
report.  
(4) If the Reserve Bank, after considering the report, is of the view that the affairs of any micro 
finance institution are being conducted to the detriment of its clients, it may after giving such 
opportunity to the micro finance institution to make representation in connection with the report, take 
such action as it deems appropriate including removal of any officer, office bearer or managing 
committee of the micro finance institution or prohibiting the micro finance institution from providing 
micro finance services for such period as the Reserve Bank may deems fit, in accordance with the 
procedure specified in the regulations.  
27. No micro finance institution providing micro finance services or other services, shall close or wind 
up its business, or amalgamate with other institutions, or take over any other business or its 
shareholding or de-merge or divide, or restructure, or otherwise transfer the ownership or control of its 
business without prior approval of the Reserve Bank. ering the report, is of the view that the affairs of 
any micro finance institution are being conducted to the detriment of its clients, it may after giving 
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such opportunity to the micro finance institution to make representation in connection with the report, 
take such action as it deems appropriate including removal of any officer, office bearer or managing 
committee of the micro finance institution or prohibiting the micro finance institution from providing 
micro finance services for such period as the Reserve Bank may deems fit, in accordance with the 
procedure specified in the regulations.  
28. Power of Reserve Bank to file winding up petition  
(1) The Reserve Bank, on being satisfied that a micro finance institution  
 
(a) is unable to pay its debt; or  
(b) by virtue of provisions of this Act become disqualified to carry on the activity of micro 
finance institution; or  
(c) has failed to comply with any directives or orders issued by the Reserve Bank along with 
the Cease and Desist Order or otherwise; or  
(d) the continuance of the micro finance institution is detrimental to public interest or to the 
interest of the clients of the institution;  
may file an application for winding up or any other application by whatever name called, before the 
appropriate authority or Court empowered to wind up the business or activity of the micro finance 
institution under the law applicable to such micro finance institution.  
Explanation: If the micro finance institution against whom application for winding up is to be filed is 
also engaged in any other activity, the concerned micro finance institution may be permitted to 
continue such activity and restrict the winding up or closure of the business only to the activity of 
providing micro finance services with the approval of the concerned authority or Court.  
(2) A micro finance institution shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if it has refused or has 
failed to meet within five working days any lawful demand made at any of its officers or branches and 
the Reserve Bank certifies in writing that such company is unable to pay its debt.  
CHAPTER VI 
CONSTITUTION OF MICRO FINANCE DEVELOPMENT FUND 
29. The Central Government may, after due appropriation made by Parliament by law in this behalf, 
make to the Reserve Bank, National Bank or any other authority s may be prescribed, grant such sums 
of money as that Government may think fit for being utilised for the purposes of this Act.  
30. (1) The Reserve Bank shall constitute a fund to be called the Micro Finance Development Fund 
(hereafter called ‘the Fund’) and there shall be credited thereto -  
(a) all Government grants received and fees payable under this Act;  
(b) all sums that may be raised by the Reserve Bank from donors, Governments, institutions, 
other entities and public for the purpose of this Act;  
(c) any interest or other income received out of investments made from the Fund under clause 
(c) of sub-section (3);  
(d) the balance outstanding in the Micro Finance Development and Equity Fund maintained by 
the Reserve Bank, before the commencement of this Act.  
(2) The Fund shall be managed by the Reserve Bank in the in accordance with regulations duly 
approved by the Central Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank.  
(3) The Fund shall be applied-  
(a) to provide loans, refinance, grant, seed capital or any other financial assistance to any 
micro finance institution or any other agency which the Reserve Bank may by regulations 
specify;  
(b) to give grants or loans for training and capacity building of institutions engaged in micro 
finance services and personnel engaged in promoting and providing micro finance services 
and meeting other expenditure related to such training and capacity building on such terms 
and conditions as may be specified by regulations;  
(c) to invest in equity or any other form of capital or quasi-equity of a micro finance institution 
or any other agency on such terms and conditions as may be specified by regulations;  
(d) to meet the expenses in relation to collection, analysis, dissemination of information 
relating to micro finance, conduct of such research, experiments or studies as may be 
necessary, and to design, promote, and propagate such practices as may be considered 
conducive to the growth of micro finance services;  
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(e) to meet any other expenses as may be required for the promotion of micro finance services 
as the Reserve Bank by regulations specify;  
(f) to meet any other expenses (except salaries, allowances and other remuneration of officers 
and other employees) of the Reserve Bank in connection with discharge of its functions as 
may be specified by the regulations.  
CHAPTER VII 
REDRESSAL MECHANISM 
31. (1) The Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Micro Finance Development Council and the 
State Advisory Councils , if deemed necessary, appoint as many Micro Finance Ombudsmen as it may 
deem fit in accordance with a scheme framed under this section, for the purpose of redressal of 
grievances between clients of micro finance institutions and micro finance institutions with powers to 
issue directions to micro finance institutions.  
(2) Any such scheme of Micro Finance Ombudsman may provide for the following:-  
(a) appointment, terms of office, conditions of service and location of office of the 
Ombudsman;  
(b) nature of grievances and complaints that may be entertained by the Ombudsman and the 
procedures for redressal of grievances and complaints;  
(c) any other matter that may be necessary for effective functioning of Micro Finance 
Ombudsman.  
CHAPTER VIII 
OFFENCES AND PENALTIES 
32. (1) If any provision of this Act is contravened or if any default is made in complying with any 
other requirement of this Act or of any rules, regulations or orders or directions given or notification 
issued or condition imposed thereunder, any person guilty of such contravention or default shall be 
punishable with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees and where, a contravention or default is a 
continuing one, with further fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees for everyday after the first, 
during which the contravention or default continues or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years or with both.  
(2) Whoever knowingly fails to comply with the provisions of section 12 or any orders made by the 
Central Government or other specified authority under section 13 or the directions issued by the Micro 
Finance Ombudsman shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees and where, a 
contravention or default is a continuing one, with a further fine, which may extend to ten thousand 
rupees for every day after the first, during which the contravention or default continues, or with 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or with both.  
(3) Every offence connected with or arising out of acceptance of thrift or repayment thereof, shall be a 
cognizable offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.  
33. Whoever, in any application, declaration, return, statement, information or particulars made, 
required or furnished by or under or for the purposes of any provision of this Act, or any rule, 
regulation or order or direction made or given there under, willfully makes a statement which is false 
in any material particulars knowing it to be false or willfully omits to make a material statement, shall 
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to 
fine which may extend to five lakh rupees and where, a contravention or default is a continuing one, 
with further fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees for everyday after the first, during which 
the contravention or default continues or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or 
with both.  
34. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 27 and 28, the Reserve Bank 
may impose penalty,—  
(a) which may extend upto five lakhs rupees where the contravention is of the nature referred 
to in sections 26 and 27;  
(b) which may not be less than ten thousand rupees for every day during which non 
compliance of the orders and directions, referred to in sections 28 and 29 continues.  
(2) For the purpose of imposing penalty under sections 29 and 30, the Reserve Bank shall serve notice 
on the micro finance institution requiring it to show cause why the amount specified in the notice 
should not be imposed as a penalty and a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall also be given to 
such micro finance institution.  
  117 
(3) Any penalty imposed by the Reserve Bank under this section shall be payable within a period of 
thirty days from the date on which the notice by the Reserve Bank demanding payment of the amount 
is served on the micro finance institution to pay the amount and the orders of the Reserve Bank shall 
be enforceable in the same manner as if it were a decree made by the civil court in a civil suit.  
36. (1) Where an offence under this Act is committed, the person who was in charge of, and was 
responsible to, the micro finance institution for the conduct of business of the micro finance 
institution, as well as the micro finance institution itself, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence 
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:  
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to punishment 
if he proves that the contravention or default was committed without his knowledge or that he had 
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.  
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been 
committed by a micro finance institution and it is proved that the same was committed with the 
consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any person who is or was a 
director, trustee, member of the managing committee, manager, secretary or other officer or employee 
of the micro finance institution when the offence is or was committed, such person shall also be 
deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished 
accordingly.  
Explanation— For the purposes of this section, any offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed 
to have been committed at the place where the registered office or principal office of the micro finance 
institution, is situated.  
CHAPTER IX 
DELEGATION OF POWERS 
38. (1)The Reserve Bank may with the previous approval of the Central Government delegate any of 
its powers conferred under this Act to the National Bank in respect of any micro finance institution or 
a class of micro finance institutions generally, by issue of a notification in the Official Gazette.  
(2) Any notification issued under sub-section (1) shall specify the following particulars:  
(a) specific micro finance institution or class of micro finance institutions such as companies 
providing micro finance services for profit or companies licensed under section 25 of the 
Companies Act, 1956; or other non-corporate organizations engaged in the activity of 
providing micro finance services or any other category of organizations, to which the 
delegation of powers shall apply;  
(b) the specific powers under various provisions of this Act which are delegated to the 
National Bank;  
(c) the powers which are retained by the Reserve Bank  
(3) The National Bank shall exercise the powers delegated by the Reserve Bank subject to such 
conditions as may be specified in the Notification under sub-section (1) and such directives and 
guidelines that may be issued by the Reserve Bank from time to time.  
(4) Any action taken by the National Bank pursuant to the delegation by the Reserve Bank shall be 
deemed to be the action of the Reserve Bank and provisions contained in section 17 for appeal against 
the orders referred in the said section shall lie to the Central Government.  
CHAPTER X 
MISCELLANEOUS 
40. The Central Government may, in consultation with the Reserve Bank from time to time, require 
the furnishing of such returns, statements and such other particulars in regard to micro finance 
institutions in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and the micro finance institution 
shall furnish to the Central Government such returns, statements and particulars.  
41. The Central Government may, on being satisfied that in the public interest, or in the interest of the 
micro finance institution, it is necessary so to do, by an order published in the Official Gazette, declare 
that any or all of the provisions of this Act shall not apply to a micro finance institution or a class of 
micro finance institutions, either generally or for such period as may be specified in the order, subject 
to such conditions, limitations or restrictions as it may deem fit to impose.  
42. The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith 
contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any 
such law.  
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Explanation : For removal of doubts it is declared that micro finance services extended by any micro 
finance institution registered with the Reserve Bank shall not be treated as money-lender for the 
purpose of any State enactments relating to money-lenders and usurious loans  
44. (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying 
out the provisions of this Act.  
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may 
provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: -  
(a) the form and manner of providing micro finance services under clause (g) of section 2 
including the following:  
(i) the purposes for which financial assistance can be granted  
(ii) fix the quantum of financial assistance or other services which will be treated as micro 
financial services for thepurposes of this Act  
(iii) declare various categories of clients, households and self-help or joint liability groups 
who can be provided micro finance services;  
(iv) the nature and extent of pension or insurance services that can be provided and the 
regulatory directives that need to be complied with and observed while providing such 
services, as may be stipulated by the Pension Regulatory Authority or the Insurance regulatory 
and Development Authority from time to time;  
(v) the maximum amount of thrift that can be collected from each individual client, creation of 
free reserves in unencumbered securities and any other measures for protecting the interest of 
the clients keeping thrift with the micro finance institutions;  
(vi) various categories of institutions that can provide micro finance services and minimum 
amount of capital, free reserves or net owned funds any or all or any class or classes of micro 
finance institutions is required to hold;  
(d) the form and manner of collection of thrift by micro finance institutions under clause (p) of 
section 2;  
(i) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed.  
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 45-S of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 the 
Rules prescribed under clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 44 may permit acceptance of thrift by 
micro finance institutions subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.  
45. (1) The Reserve Bank, with the previous approval of the Central Government may, by notification 
in the Official Gazette, make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder 
to carry out the purposes of this Act.  
(a) the form and manner in which a micro finance institution shall make an application for 
registration and the fee payable to the Reserve Bank under sub-section (1) of section 11;  
(b) amounts of net owned funds under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12;  
(c) any other condition for grant of a certificate of registration under clause (d) of sub-section 
(1) of section 12;  
(d) the unencumbered securities for the purpose of investment under sub-section (3) of section 
17;  
(e) the form in which the balance sheet, profit and loss account or an income and expenditure 
account shall be prepared under section 18;  
46. Every rule or order made by the Central Government and every regulation made by the Reserve 
Bank and any order of exemption made under section 41 shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is 
made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which 
may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the 
session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in 
making any modification in the rule, regulation, scheme or order or both Houses agree that the rule, 
regulation, scheme or order should not be made, the rule, regulation or order shall thereafter have 
effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such 
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under 
that rule, regulation, scheme or order.  
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AP MICRO FINANCE INSTITUTIONS (REGULATION OF MONEY LENDING) 
ORDINANCE 
 
An Ordinance to protect the women Self Help Groups from exploitation by the Micro Finance 
Institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh and for the matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto Whereas, Government of Andhra Pradesh has facilitated organization of the below poverty line 
households into self help groups (SHGs) for the purpose of their economic advancement by achieving 
financial inclusion through linking with the 
banking network; 
Whereas these SHGs are being exploited by private Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) through 
usurious interest rates and coercive means of recovery resulting in their impoverishment & in some 
cases leading to suicides, it is expedient to make provisions for protecting the interests of the SHGs, 
by regulating the money leading transactions by the money lending MFIs and to achieve greater 
transparency in such transactions in the State of Andhra Pradesh; 
And whereas, the Legislature of the State is not now in session and the Governor of Andhra Pradesh is 
satisfied that circumstances exists which render it necessary for him to take immediate action; 
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 213 of the 
Constitution of India, the Governor hereby promulgates the following Ordinance:- 
Short title, extent and commencement 
1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (regulation of 
money lending) Ordinance, 2010. 
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh. 
(3) It shall come into force at once. 
(4) It shall apply to Micro Finance Institutions whether they had come into existence before or after 
the commencement of this Ordinance. 
Definitions 
2. In this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires - 
(a) ‘Self Help Group (SHG)’ means a group of women formed on principles of self help and 
registered as such with the Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP) in the rural areas or 
Mission for Elimination of Urban Poverty in Municipal areas (MEPMA) in urban areas. 
(b) ‘Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP)’ is a Society formed by Government for 
the purpose of implementing pro-poor initiatives and thereby eliminating poverty in rural areas. 
(c) Society under ‘Mission for eliminating poverty in municipal areas (MEPMA)’ is a Society 
formed by Government for the purpose of implementing pro-poor initiatives and thereby eliminating 
poverty in urban areas. 
(d) ‘Micro finance institution (MFI)’ means any person, partnership Firm, group of persons, 
including a Company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act 1956, a Non-Banking 
Finance Company as defined under section 58-A of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934, a Society 
registered under the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act 1964, or the A.P. Societies Registration Act 2001 
and the like, in whichever manner formed and by whatever name called, whose principal or incidental 
activity is to lend money or offer financial support of whatsoever nature to the low income population. 
(e) ‘Government’ means the State Government of Andhra Pradesh. 
(f) 'SHG bank linkage' means provision of credit for the SHGs by the commercial banks based 
on a micro credit plan prepared by the SHGs for carrying out economic activities. 
(g) 'Interest' for the purposes of the terms defined under the provisions of this Ordinance 
would mean a return on the amount lent by the MFI to a SHG. 
(g) 'Loan' means an advance whether of money or in kind given to the borrowing SHG at 
interest, whether given before the commencement of this Act or after such commencement and 
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includes advance, discount, money paid for or on account of or paid on behalf of or at the request of 
any person, or any account whatsoever, and every agreement (whatever its terms or form may be) 
which is in substance or effect a loan of money or in kind given to an SHG and further includes, an 
agreement relating to the repayment of any such loan. 
(i) ‘Notification’ means a notification published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette and the word 
‘notified’ shall be construed accordingly. 
(j) ‘Prescribed’ means prescribed by Rules made under this Ordinance. 
(k) 'Registering Authority' means the Project Director District Rural Development Agency for 
the rural areas and Project Director MEPMA for urban areas; or any other person appointed by the 
District Collector to perform the functions of a registering authority under this Ordinance for such 
District. 
(l) 'Registration' means registration granted to a MFI under this Ordinance. 
(m) “SHG Member” means a registered member of a SHG who intends to avail a loan through 
such SHG. 
(n) Words used but not defined in this Ordinance, shall have the same meaning assigned under 
the relevant Acts. 
Registration of MFIs 
3.  (1) All MFIs operating in the State of Andhra Pradesh as on the date of the commencement of 
this Ordinance, shall within thirty days from the date of commencement of this Ordinance, apply for 
Registration before the Registering Authority of the district specifying therein the villages or towns in 
which they have been operating or propose to operate, the rate of interest being charged or proposed to 
be charged, system of conducting due diligence and system of effecting recovery and list of persons 
authorized for conducting the activity of lending or recovery of money which has been lent. 
(2) No MFIs, operating at the commencement of this Ordinance or intending to start the 
business of lending money to SHGs, after the commencement of this Ordinance, shall grant any loans 
or recover any loans without obtaining registration under this Ordinance from the Registering 
Authority. 
(3) The Registering Authority shall conduct verification of the details furnished by the MFI 
and accord registration in such manner as may be prescribed for operation of MFIs for a period of one 
year, after obtaining a written undertaking from the MFI that it shall always act in conformity with the 
provisions of this Ordinance. 
(4) Where the MFI applies for renewal of registration, an application for that purpose shall be 
filed by the MFI 60 days before the expiry of the period of one year referred to in sub-section (3) and 
the Registering Authority shall decide either to grant renewal or refuse renewal of registration within 
15 days before the date of expiry of registration, after due verification of the performance of the MFIs 
in the field level and after hearing objections, if any, from the general public regarding extension of 
Registration. 
Register of MFIs 
4.  (1) Every registering authority shall maintain for the area under its jurisdiction registers of all 
MFIs having valid registration in such form as may be prescribed. 
(2) The registers maintained under sub-section (1) shall be published in such manner and at 
such intervals as may be prescribed. 
MFIs to obtain registration 
5.  (1) The Registering Authority may, at any time, either suomoto or upon receipt of complaints 
by SHGs or its members or by members of the public cancel the registration of an MFI after assigning 
sufficient reasons for such cancellation. 
Provided that no order of cancellation of the Registration shall be passed without issuing notice to the 
MFI intimating the facts upon which the prima-facie decision to cancel the registration has been taken 
and the MFI shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such notice. 
Explanation: For the purposes of sub-section (1), conviction of a MFI for an offence of violation of 
any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be sufficient cause for suspension or cancellation of its 
registration. 
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(2) Pending enquiry under sub-section (1), the Registering Authority may, for sufficient reasons to be 
recorded, suspend the Registration of an MFI. 
Member of SHG not to be member of more than one SHG 
6.  No member of an SHG shall be a member of more than one SHG, provided that where a 
member has, at the commencement of this Ordinance, become a member of more than one SHG, she 
shall have the option to retain the membership of one SHG and to terminate her membership in other 
SHGs and for that purpose, she shall issue a notice to such SHGs about her option to terminate her 
membership, settle and pay the amount payable to the MFIs which had lent monies to such SHGs, 
within a period of 3 months from the date of commencement of this Ordinance. 
MFIs not to seek security for loan 
7.  No MFI shall seek any security from a borrower by way of pawn, pledge or other security for 
the loan. 
Provided that any such security obtained from a borrower before the commencement of this Ordinance 
shall forthwith stand released in favour of the borrower. 
Display of rates of interest charged by MFIs 
8.  (1) All MFIs shall display the rates of interest charged by them in a conspicuous place in their 
premises in bold letters visible to the members of the public. 
(2) No MFI shall charge any other amount from the borrower except any charge prescribed in 
the Rules for submission of an application for grant of a loan. 
Maximum amount of interest recoverable on loans and discharge of loans in certain cases 
9.  (1) No MFI shall recover from the borrower towards interest in respect of any loans advanced 
by it, whether before or after commencement of this Ordinance, an amount in excess of the principal 
amount. 
(2) All loans in respect of which an MFI has realized from the borrower, whether before or 
after commencement of this Ordinance, an amount equal to twice the amount of the principal, shall 
stand discharged and the borrower shall be entitled to obtain refund and the MFI shall be bound to 
refund the excess amount paid by the borrower. 
Prior approval for grant of further loans to SHGs or their members 
10.  (1) No MFI shall extend a further loan to a SHG or its members, where the SHG has an 
outstanding loan from a Bank unless the MFI obtains the prior approval in writing in such manner as 
may be prescribed from the Registering Authority after making an application seeking such approval. 
(2) The Registering Authority while considering such application from an MFI seeking 
approval as aforesaid, shall secure the following information in writing from the MFI in regard to 
every member of SHG namely, 
i) Name of the Borrower 
ii) name of the SHG 
iii) bank from which loan has been obtained by the SHG 
iv) date of the loan granted by the bank 
v) amount paid to the SHG by the bank 
vi) amount due from the SHG 
vii) fresh amount of loan sought by the SHG from the MFI 
viii) terms of repayment proposed by the MFI 
ix) details of due diligence including the capacity of the SHG for repayment and 
x) such other details as may be prescribed by Rules made under this Ordinance. 
(3) The Registering Authority shall, not later than fifteen days from the date of filing of such 
application for approval under subsection (2), cause an enquiry into the contents of the application and 
shall grant approval for further loan unless the Registering Authority is satisfied that the SHG and its 
members have passed a resolution that they have understood the conditions of the loan and terms of 
repayment and unless the Registering Authority is also satisfied that such further loan would generate 
additional income to the SHG and its members, needed for servicing the debt. 
(4) No MFI shall grant loan to a member of SHG during the subsistence of two previous loans 
irrespective of the source of the previous two loans. 
Duty of MFIs to maintain accounts and furnish copies 
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11.  (1) All borrowings by a member of an SHG from an MFI shall be contracted in the manner, 
form and format prescribed under the Ordinance. 
(2) Every MFI shall keep and maintain a cash book, a ledger and such other books of account 
in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. 
(3) Every MFI shall - 
(a) Deliver or cause to be delivered, to the borrower within seven days from the date 
on which a loan is made, a statement in the prescribed form showing in clear and distinct 
terms the amount and date of the loan and of its maturity, the name and address of the 
functionary of the MFI and the effective rate of interest charged. 
(b) Upon repayment of a loan in full, the MFI shall obtain an indelible mark on every 
paper signed by the borrower with words indicating such repayment and provide copies 
thereof to the borrower. 
(4) No MFI shall receive any payment from a borrower on account of any loan without giving 
him a duly signed receipt for the payment. 
(5) An MFI shall, on a demand in writing by the borrower, supply a copy of any document 
relating to a loan obtained by him, or if the borrower so requires, to any person specified in that behalf 
in the demand. 
Provided that in respect of loans given prior to the commencement of this Ordinance, it shall be 
obligatory for the lender to specify if any security was accepted from the borrower. 
(6) All tranches of repayment shall be made by the group at the office of the Gram Panchayat 
only. 
(7) MFI shall not deploy any agents for recovery nor shall use any other coercive action either 
by itself or by its agents for recovery of money from the borrower; and any form of coercive recovery 
including but not limited to visiting the house of the borrower shall, apart being punishable under the 
provisions of the Ordinance, empower the Registering Authority to suspend or cancel the license of 
such an MFI as provided in Section 5. 
Submissions of monthly statemens tby MFIs 
12. Every MFI shall submit a Monthly Statement to the Registering Authority before 10th day of 
every month giving therein the list of borrowers, the loan given to each and the interest rate charged 
on the repayment made. 
Power to require production of records or documents and power of entry, inspection and seizure 
13.  (1) The Registering Authority or any officer authorised by him in this behalf may, to verify 
whether the business of the MFI is being carried on in accordance with the provisions of this 
Ordinance, enter the premises of the MFI office or of any person who in his opinion is carrying on the 
business of lending and call upon him to produce any record or document relating to such business and 
every such MFI shall allow such inspection and produce such record or document. 
(2) The Registering Authority may, for the purposes of sub-section (1), search the premises 
and seize any record and document as may be necessary and the record or document seized shall be 
retained only for such period as may be necessary for the purposes of examination, prosecution or 
other legal action. 
Provided that the provisions of Sections 100 and 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall, 
so far as may be, apply to such search and seizure. 
(3) The registering authority or the other officer referred to in subsection (1) shall also have 
power to summon and examine the MFI or any person who in his opinion is in a position to furnish 
relevant information. 
Complaints 
14.  Any SHG or its members or any member of the public can file a complaint regarding violation 
of the provision of this Ordinance by a MFI before the Registering Authority and the said Authority 
shall enquire into the same after giving a reasonable opportunity to the MFI to show cause and pass 
such orders as it may deem fit including an order under section 5 of the Ordinance. 
Settlement of Disputes 
15.  (1) For the protection of debtors and for the settlement of disputes of civil nature between the 
SHG or its members on the one hand and the MFI on the other hand or between the members of the 
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SHG and the SHG, in relation to the loans granted under this Ordinance to the SHG or its members, 
the State Government after consultation with the High Court, and by notification, - 
(a) Shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Ordinance, establish for 
every district in the State a Fast-Track Court; 
(b) May establish Fast-Track Court for such other areas in the State, as it may deem 
necessary. 
(2) The Government shall, after consultation with the High Court of Andhra Pradesh specify, 
by notification, the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a Fast-Track Court shall extend 
and may, at any time, increase, reduce or alter such limits. 
3) The cases that may be filed before the fast-Track Court shall be disposed of within a period 
of three months. 
(4) The decree of the Fast Track Courts shall be liable to be executed in accordance with the 
procedure under the Code of the Civil Procedure 1908. 
Penalty for coercive actions MFIs 
16.  (1) All persons who are connected with and responsible for the day-to-day control, business 
and management of a MFI including the Partners, Directors and the employees who resort to any type 
of coercive measures against the SHGs or its members of their family members shall be liable for 
punishment of imprisonment which may extend up to a period of three years or with fine which may 
extend to one lakh rupees or with both. 
Explanation:- For the purposes of this section, “coercive action” by an MFI against the SHGs or its 
members of their family members include the following - 
(a) obstructing or using violence to, insulting or intimidating the borrower or his 
family members, or 
(b) persistently following the borrower or his family member from place to place or 
interfering with any property owned or used by him or depriving him of, or hindering him in, 
the use of any such property 
(c) frequenting the house or other place where such other person resides or works, or 
carries on business, or happens to be, or 
(d) doing any act calculated to annoy or intimidate such person or the members of his 
family, or 
(e) moving or acting in a manner which causes or is calculated to cause alarm or 
danger to the person or property of such other person 
(f) seeking to remove forcibly any document from the borrower which entitles the 
borrower to a benefit under any Government programme. 
Provided that a person who frequents the house or place referred to in clause (c) in order merely to 
obtain or communicate information shall not be deemed to be using coercive action. 
(2) The MFI or the persons who use coercive actions as stated in sub section (1) shall be 
prosecuted in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance. 
(3) The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall, so far as may be, apply to 
the proceedings before a Fast Track Court, and for the purpose of the said provisions, a Fast Track 
Court shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. 
Penalty for carrying on Business without registration 
17. All persons who are connected with and responsible for the day-to-day control, business and 
management of a MFI including the Partners and Directors of such MFI which carries on the business 
of providing loans either without obtaining registration of the MFI from the Registering Authority 
under Section 3 of the Ordinance, shall be liable for punishment with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to rupees one lakh. 
Penalty for contraventio n of the provisions of the Ordinance 
18. If any person contravenes any provision other than Section 3 of this Ordinance, he shall be 
punishable with imprisonment for a period of six months or with fine which may extend to ten 
thousand rupees or with both. 
Every officer to be public servant 
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19. Every officer of the Government and every person acting under the provisions of this Ordinance 
shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. 
Bar of certain proceedings. 
20.  (1) No suit, prosecution or other proceedings shall lie against any officer or employee of the 
Government for any act done or purporting to be done under this Ordinance, without the previous 
sanction of the Government. 
(2) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall be instituted against any person for 
anything which is, in good faith, done or intended to be done under this Ordinance or the rules made 
thereunder. 
Power to remove difficulties. 
21. If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Ordinance, the Government may, 
by notification, remove difficulties by orders not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, 
but which appear to them to be necessary or expedient to remove such difficulty. 
Power to give directions 
22. The Government may, from time to time, issue such orders, instructions and directions not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance and the rules made thereunder to the officers for the 
proper administration of the Ordinance, and such officers and all other persons employed in the 
enforcement of the Ordinance, shall comply with such orders, instructions and directions. 
Power to make rules 
23.  (1) The State Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the purposes of 
this Ordinance. 
(2) Every rule made under this Ordinance shall, immediately after it is made, be laid before 
the Legislature of the State, if it is in session and if it is not in session, in the session immediately 
following for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two 
successive sessions and if, before the expiration of the session in which it is so laid or the session 
immediately following the Legislature agrees in making any modification in the rule or in the 
annulment of the rule, the rule shall, from the date on which the modification or annulment is notified, 
have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled as the case may be so, however, that 
any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously 
done under that rule. 
Annual Report on The administration of the Ordinance 
24. The Government shall prepare an annual report on the administration of this Ordinance and the 
same shall be placed before the State Legislature. 
 
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS 
 
The Government of Andhra Pradesh has made rapid strides in the field of financial inclusion 
of the rural & urban poor by organising women self help groups (SHGs); and linking them with the 
banks for meeting their credit needs. 
Of late, many individuals and entities have come up styling themselves as Micro Finance 
Institutions and are giving loans to SHGs at very high or usurious rates of interest and are using 
inhuman coercive methods for recovery of the loans. 
This has even resulted in suicides by many rural poor who have obtained loans from such 
individuals or entities. 
In the larger public interest and to protect the poor from exploitation, and to regulate the 
lending of monies to the SHGs by the MFIs, the Government intends to bring into force a law 
containing the various provisions stated in this Bill in order to check the illegal acts of these MFIs. 
This Bill seeks to give effect to the above decision. 
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ACTS OF THE RBI 
___ 
REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS OFO RESERVE BANK 
OF INDIA TO STUDY ISSUES AND CONCERNS IN THE MFI SECTOR (MALEGAM 
RECOMMENDATIONS) – RBI, JANUARY 2011 
___ 
 
 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS (ANNEXURE TO THE REPORT) 
Para 3.8. - The need for regulation  
A separate category be created for NBFCs operating in the Microfinance sector, such NBFCs 
being designated as NBFC-MFI  
Para 4.2. Definition  
A NBFC-MFI may be defined as  
“A company (other than a company licensed under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956) 
which provides financial services pre-dominantly to low-income borrowers with loans of small 
amounts, for short-terms, on unsecured basis, mainly for income-generating activities, with repayment 
schedules which are more frequent than those normally stipulated by commercial banks and which 
further conforms to the regulations specified in that behalf”.  
Provision should be made in the regulations to further define each component of this definition.  
Para 5.9. Regulations to be specified 
A NBFC classified as a NBFC-MFI should satisfy the following conditions:  
a) Not less than 90% of its total assets (other than cash and bank balances and money market 
instruments) are in the nature of “qualifying assets.”  
b) For the purpose of (a) above, a “qualifying asset” shall mean a loan which satisfies the 
following criteria:-  
i. the loan is given to a borrower who is a member of a household whose annual income does 
not exceed Rs. 50,000;  
ii. the amount of the loan does not exceed Rs. 25,000 and the total outstanding indebtedness of 
the borrower including this loan also does not exceed Rs. 25,000;  
iii. the tenure of the loan is not less than 12 months where the loan amount does not exceed 
Rs. 15,000 and 24 months in other cases with a right to the borrower of prepayment without 
penalty in all cases;  
iv. the loan is without collateral;  
v. the aggregate amount of loans given for income generation purposes is not less than 75% of 
the total loans given by the MFIs;  
vi. the loan is repayable by weekly, fortnightly or monthly installments at the choice of the 
borrower.  
c) The income it derives from other services is in accordance with the regulation specified in that 
behalf.  
Para 5.10. - Regulations to be specified 
A NBFC which does not qualify as a NBFC-MFI should not be permitted to give loans to the 
microfinance sector, which in the aggregate exceed 10% of its total assets.  
Para 7.11. - Pricing of Interest 
There should be a “margin cap” of 10% in respect of MFIs which have an outstanding loan 
portfolio at the beginning of the year of Rs. 100 crores and a “margin cap” of 12% in respect of MFIs 
which have an outstanding loan portfolio at the beginning of the year of an amount not exceeding Rs. 
100 crores. There should also be a cap of 24% on individual loans. 
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Para 8.7. - Transparency in Interest Charges 
a) There should be only three components in the pricing of the loan, namely (i) a processing 
fee, not exceeding 1% of the gross loan amount (ii) the interest charge and (iii) the insurance premium.  
b) Only the actual cost of insurance should be recovered and no administrative charges should 
be levied.  
c) Every MFI should provide to the borrower a loan card which (i) shows the effective rate of 
interest (ii) the other terms and conditions attached to the loan (iii) information which adequately 
identifies the borrower and (iv) acknowledgements by the MFI of payments of installments received 
and the final discharge. The Card should show this information in the local language understood by 
the borrower.  
d) The effective rate of interest charged by the MFI should be prominently displayed in all its 
offices and in the literature issued by it and on its website.  
e) There should be adequate regulations regarding the manner in which insurance premium is 
computed and collected and policy proceeds disposed off.  
f) There should not be any recovery of security deposit. Security deposits already collected 
should be returned.  
g) There should be a standard form of loan agreement.  
Para 9.7. - Multiple-lending, Over-borrowing and Ghost-borrowers 
a) MFIs should lend to an individual borrower only as a member of a JLG and should have the 
responsibility of ensuring that the borrower is not a member of another JLG.  
b) a borrower cannot be a member of more than one SHG/JLG.  
c) not more than two MFIs should lend to the same borrower.  
d) there must be a minimum period of moratorium between the grant of the loan and the 
commencement of its repayment.  
e) recovery of loan given in violation of the regulations should be deferred till all prior 
existing loans are fully repaid.  
Para 9.12. - Multiple-lending, Over-borrowing and Ghost-borrowers 
All sanctioning and disbursement of loans should be done only at a central location and more 
than one individual should be involved in this function. In addition, there should be close supervision 
of the disbursement function.  
Para 10.5. - Credit Information Bureau  
a) One or more Credit Information Bureaus should be established and be operational as soon 
as possible and all MFIs be required to become members of such bureau.  
b) In the meantime, the responsibility to obtain information from potential borrowers 
regarding existing borrowings should be on the MFI.  
Para 11.12. - Coercive Methods of Recovery  
a) The responsibility to ensure that coercive methods of recovery are not used should rest with 
the MFIs and they and their managements should be subject to severe penalties if such methods are 
used.  
b) The regulator should monitor whether MFIs have a proper Code of Conduct and proper 
systems for recruitment, training and supervision of field staff to ensure the prevention of coercive 
methods of recovery.  
c) Field staff should not be allowed to make recovery at the place of residence or work of the 
borrower and all individual loans. 
Para 15.3 - Corporate Size  
All NBFC-MFIs should have a minimum Net Worth of Rs.15 crores 
Para 16.3. - Corporate Governance  
Every MFI should be required to have a system of Corporate Governance in accordance with 
rules to be specified by the Regulator 
Para 17.3. - Maintenance of Solvency 
Provisioning for loans should not be maintained for individual loans but an MFI should be 
required to maintain at all times an aggregate provision for loan losses which shall be the higher of:  
1% of the outstanding loan portfolio or (ii) 50% of the aggregate loan installments which are overdue 
for more than 90 days and less than 180 days and 100% of the aggregate loan installments which are 
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overdue for 180 days or more.   
 
 
Para 17.5. - Maintenance of Solvency 
NBFC-MFIs should be required to maintain Capital Adequacy Ratio of 15% and subject to 
recommendation 21 below, all of the Net Owned Funds should be in the form of Tier I Capital.  
Para 18.10.- Need for Competition 
Bank lending to the Microfinance sector both through the SHG-Bank Linkage programme and 
directly should be significantly increased and this should result in a reduction in the lending interest 
rates.  
Para 19.5. – Priority Sector Status 
Bank advances to MFIs shall continue to enjoy “priority sector lending” status. However, 
advances to MFIs which do not comply with the regulation should be denied “priority sector lending” 
status. It may also be necessary for the Reserve Bank to revisit its existing guidelines for lending to the 
priority sector in the context of the Committee’s recommendations.  
Para 20.5. - Assignment and Securitisation 
a) Disclosure is made in the financial statements of MFIs of the outstanding loan portfolio 
which has been assigned or securitised and the MFI continues as an agent for collection. The amounts 
assigned and securitised must be shown separately.  
b) Where the assignment or securitisation is with recourse, the full value of the outstanding 
loan portfolio assigned or securitised should be considered as risk-based assets for calculation of 
Capital Adequacy.  
c) Where the assignment or securitisation is without recourse but credit enhancement has been 
given, the value of the credit enhancement should be deducted from the Net Owned Funds for the 
purpose of calculation of Capital Adequacy.  
d) Before acquiring assigned or securitised loans, banks should ensure that the loans have been 
made in accordance with the terms of the specified regulations.  
Para 21.4. - Assignment and Securitisation 
a) Disclosure is made in the financial statements of MFIs of the outstanding loan portfolio 
which has been assigned or securitised and the MFI continues as an agent for collection. The amounts 
assigned and securitised must be shown separately.  
b) Where the assignment or securitisation is with recourse, the full value of the outstanding 
loan portfolio assigned or securitised should be considered as risk-based assets for calculation of 
Capital Adequacy.  
c) Where the assignment or securitisation is without recourse but credit enhancement has been 
given, the value of the credit enhancement should be deducted from the Net Owned Funds for the 
purpose of calculation of Capital Adequacy.  
d) Before acquiring assigned or securitised loans, banks should ensure that the loans have been 
made in accordance with the terms of the specified regulations.  
Para 22.7.  - Monitoring of Compliance 
a) The primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with the regulations should rest with the 
MFI itself and it and its management must be penalized in the event of non-compliance  
b) Industry associations must ensure compliance through the implementation of the Code of 
Conduct with penalties for non-compliance.  
c) Banks also must play a part in compliance by surveillance of MFIs through their branches.  
d) The Reserve Bank should have the responsibility for off-site and on-site supervision of 
MFIs but the on-site supervision may be confined to the larger MFIs and be restricted to the 
functioning of the organizational arrangements and systems with some supervision of branches. It 
should also include supervision of the industry associations in so far as their compliance mechanism is 
concerned. Reserve Bank should also explore the use of outside agencies for inspection.  
e) The Reserve Bank should have the power to remove from office the CEO and / or a director 
in the event of persistent violation of the regulations quite apart from the power to deregister an MFI 
and prevent it from operating in the microfinance sector.  
f) The Reserve Bank should considerably enhance its existing supervisory organisation 
dealing with NBFC-MFIs.  
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Para 23.4. - Moneylenders Acts 
NBFC-MFIs should be exempted from the provisions of the Money-Lending Acts, especially 
as we are recommending interest margin caps and increased regulation.  
 
Para 24.7. - The Micro Finance (Development and Regulation) Bill 2010  
Subject to Smt.Rajagopalan's reservations as expressed in para. 24.6 above, we would, 
therefore, recommend the following:  
a) The proposed Act should provide for all entities covered by the Act to be registered with the 
Regulator. However, entities where aggregate loan portfolio (including the portfolio of associated 
entities) does not exceed Rs. 10 crores may be exempted from registration.  
b) If NABARD is designated as the regulator under the proposed Act, there must be close co-
ordination between NABARD and Reserve Bank in the formulation of the regulations applicable to 
the regulated entities.  
c) The micro finance entities governed by the proposed Act should not be allowed to do the 
business of providing thrift services.  
Para 25.7. - The Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act  
If the Committee’s recommendations are accepted, the need for a separate Andhra Pradesh 
Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act will not survive.  
Para 26.2. - Transitory Provisions 
(a) 1st April 2011 may be considered as a cut- off date by which time our recommendations, if 
accepted, must be implemented. In particular, the recommendations as to the rate of interest must, in 
any case, be made effective to all loans given by an MFI after 31st March 2011.  
(b) As regards other arrangements, Reserve Bank may grant such extension of time as it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances. In particular, this extension may become necessary for 
entities which currently have activities other than microfinance lending and which may need to form 
separate entities confined to microfinance activities.  
 
___ 
 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE REPORT 
1 Introduction  
1.1 The Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of India, at its meeting held on October 15, 2010 
formed a Sub-Committee of the Board to study issues and concerns in the microfinance 
sector in so far as they related to the entities regulated by the Bank.  
1.2 The composition of the Sub-Committee was as under:-  
Shri Y.H. Malegam – Chairman  
Shri Kumar Mangalam Birla  
Dr. K. C. Chakrabarty  
Smt. Shashi Rajagopalan  
Prof. U.R. Rao  
Shri V. K. Sharma (Executive Director) – Member Secretary  
1.3 The terms of reference of the Sub-Committee were as under:-  
1. To review the definition of ‘microfinance’ and ‘Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs)’ for the 
purpose of regulation of non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) undertaking 
microfinance by the Reserve Bank of India and make appropriate 
recommendations.  
2. To examine the prevalent practices of MFIs in regard to interest rates, lending and 
recovery practices to identify trends that impinge on borrowers’ interests.  
3. To delineate the objectives and scope of regulation of NBFCs undertaking microfinance 
by the Reserve Bank and the regulatory framework needed to achieve those 
objectives.  
4. To examine and make appropriate recommendations in regard to applicability of money 
lending legislation of the States and other relevant laws to NBFCs/MFIs.  
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5. To examine the role that associations and bodies of MFIs could play in enhancing 
transparency disclosure and best practices  
6. To recommend a grievance redressal machinery that could be put in place for ensuring 
adherence to the regulations recommended at 3 above.  
7. To examine the conditions under which loans to MFIs can be classified as priority sector 
lending and make appropriate recommendations. 2  
8. To consider any other item that is relevant to the terms of reference.  
2 The Microfinance sector 
2.1 Microfinance is an economic development tool whose objective is to assist the poor to work their 
way out of poverty. It covers a range of services which include, in addition to the provision 
of credit, many other services such as savings, insurance, money transfers, counseling, etc.  
2.2 For the purposes of this report, the Sub-Committee has confined itself to only one aspect of 
Microfinance, namely, the provision of credit to low-income groups.  
2.3 The provision of credit to the Microfinance sector is based on the following postulates:  
a) It addresses the concerns of poverty alleviation by enabling the poor to work their way out 
of poverty.  
b) It provides credit to that section of society that is unable to obtain credit at reasonable 
rates from traditional sources.  
c) It enables women’s empowerment by routing credit directly to women, thereby enhancing 
their status within their families, the community and society at large.  
d) Easy access to credit is more important for the poor than cheaper credit which might 
involve lengthy bureaucratic procedures and delays.  
e) The poor are often not in a position to offer collateral to secure the credit.  
f) Given the imperfect market in which the sector operates and the small size of individual 
loans, high transaction costs are unavoidable. However, when communities set up 
their own institutions, such as SHG federations and co-operatives the transaction 
costs are lower.  
g) Transaction costs, can be reduced through economies of scale. However, increases in scale 
cannot be achieved, both for individual operations and for the sector as a whole in 
the absence of cost recovery and profit incentive. 3  
2.4 Given the above considerations, the essential features of credit for Microfinance which have 
evolved are as under:-  
a) The borrowers are low-income groups.  
b) The loans are for small amounts.  
c) The loans are without collateral.  
d) The loans are generally taken for income-generating activities, although loans are also 
provided for consumption, housing and other purposes.  
e) The tenure of the loans is short.  
f) The frequency of repayments is greater than for traditional commercial loans.  
2.5 The players in the Microfinance sector can be classified as falling into three main groups  
a) The SHG-Bank linkage Model accounting for about 58% of the outstanding loan portfolio  
b) Non-Banking Finance Companies accounting for about 34% of the outstanding loan 
portfolio  
c) Others including trusts, societies, etc, accounting for the balance 8% of the outstanding 
loan portfolio. Primary Agricultural Co-operative Societies numbering 95,663, 
covering every village in the country, with a combined membership of over 13 
crores and loans outstanding of over Rs.64, 044 crores as on 31.03.09 have a much 
longer history and are under a different regulatory framework. Thrift and credit co-
operatives are scattered across the country and there is no centralized information 
available about them.  
2.6 The SHG-Bank Linkage Model was pioneered by NABARD in 1992. Under this model, women in 
a village are encouraged to form a Self help Group (SHG) and members of the Group 
regularly contribute small savings to the Group. These savings which form an ever growing 
nucleus are lent by the group to members, and are later supplemented by loans provided by 
banks for income-generating activities and other purposes for sustainable livelihood 
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promotion. The Group has weekly/monthly meetings at which new savings come in, and 
recoveries are made from members towards their loans from the SHGs, their federations, and 
banks. NABARD provides grants, training and capacity building assistance to Self Help 
Promoting Institutions (SHPI), which in turn act as facilitators/ intermediaries for the 
formation and credit linkage of the SHGs.  
2.7 Under the NBFC model, NBFCs encourage villagers to form Joint Liability Groups (JLG) and 
give loans to the individual members of the JLG. The individual loans are jointly and 
severally guaranteed by the other members of the Group. Many of the NBFCs operating this 
model started off as non-profit entities providing micro-credit and other services to the poor. 
However, as they found themselves unable to raise adequate resources for a rapid growth of 
the activity, they converted themselves into for-profit NBFCs. Others entered the field 
directly as for-profit NBFCs seeing this as a viable business proposition. Significant amounts 
of private equity funds have consequently been attracted to this sector.  
3 The need for regulation  
3.1 All NBFCs are currently regulated by Reserve Bank under Chapters III-B, III-C and V of the 
Reserve Bank of India Act. There is, however, no separate category created for NBFCs 
operating in the Microfinance sector.  
3.2 The need for a separate category of NBFCs operating in the Microfinance sector arises for a 
number of reasons.  
3.3 First, the borrowers in the Microfinance sector represent a particularly vulnerable section of 
society. They lack individual bargaining power, have inadequate financial literacy and live in 
an environment which is fragile and exposed to external shocks which they are ill-equipped 
to absorb. They can, therefore, be easily exploited.  
3.4 Second, NBFCs operating in the Microfinance sector not only compete amongst themselves but 
also directly compete with the SHG-Bank Linkage Programme. The practices they adopt 
could have an adverse impact on the programme. In a representation made to the Sub-
Committee by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, it has been argued, that the MFIs are 
riding “piggy-back” on the SHG infrastructure created by the programme and that JLGs are 
being formed by poaching members from existing SHGs. About 30% of MFI loans are 
purportedly in Andhra Pradesh. The Microfinance in India- A State of Sector Report 2010 
also says that there are many reports of SHGs splitting and becoming JLGs to avail of loans 
from MFIs. The A.P. Government has also stated that as the loans given by MFIs are of 
shorter duration than the loans given under the programme, recoveries by SHGs are 
adversely affected and loans given by the SHGs are being used to repay loans given by 
MFIs. While we did not, as committee, examine each of these issues in depth, the fact that 
these complaints have been made reinforces the need for a separate and focused regulation.  
3.5 Thirdly, credit to the Microfinance sector is an important plank in the scheme for financial 
inclusion. A fair and adequate regulation of NBFCs will encourage the growth of this sector 
while adequately protecting the interests of the borrowers.  
3.6 Fourth, over 75% of the finance obtained by NBFCs operating in this sector is provided by banks 
and financial institutions including SIDBI. As at 31
st 
March 2010, the aggregate amount 
outstanding in respect of loans granted by banks and SIDBI to NBFCs operating in the 
Microfinance sector amounted to Rs.13,800 crores. In addition, banks were holding 
securitized paper issued by NBFCs for an amount of Rs.4200 crores. Banks and Financial 
Institutions including SBIDBI also had made investments in the equity of such NBFCs. 
Though this exposure may not be significant in the context of the total assets of the banking 
system, it is increasing rapidly.  
3.7 Finally, given the need to encourage the growth of the Microfinance sector and the vulnerable 
nature of the borrowers in the sector, there may be a need to give special facilities or 
dispensation to NBFCs operating in this sector, alongside an appropriate regulatory 
framework. This will be facilitated if a separate category of NBFCs is created for this 
purpose.  
3.8 We would therefore recommend that a separate category be created for NBFCs operating in the 
Microfinance sector, such NBFCs being designated as NBFC-MFI.  
  132
4 Definition 
4.1 Once a separate category of NBFC-MFI is created, it becomes necessary to provide in the 
regulations a definition for such NBFCs. This definition must incorporate the distinctive 
features of a NBFC-MFI.  
4.2 The Sub-Committee therefore recommends that a NBFC-MFI may be defined as  
“A company (other than a company licensed under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956) 
which provides financial services pre-dominantly to low-income borrowers with loans of 
small amounts, for short-terms, on unsecured basis, mainly for income-generating activities, 
with repayment schedules which are more frequent than those normally stipulated by 
commercial banks and which further conforms to the regulations specified in that behalf”.  
5. Regulations to be specified 
5.9. We would, therefore, recommend that a NBFC classified as a NBFC-MFI should satisfy the 
following conditions:  
a) Not less than 90% of its total assets (other than cash and bank balances and money market 
instruments) are in the nature of “qualifying assets.”  
b) For the purpose of (a) above, a “qualifying asset” shall mean a loan which satisfies the 
following criteria:-  
i. the loan is given to a borrower who is a member of a household whose annual 
income does not exceed Rs. 50,000;  
ii. the amount of the loan does not exceed Rs. 25,000 and the total outstanding 
indebtedness of the borrower including this loan also does not exceed Rs. 
25,000;  
iii. the tenure of the loan is not less than 12 months where the loan amount does not 
exceed Rs. 15,000 and 24 months in  
other cases with a right to the borrower of prepayment without penalty in all cases;  
iv. the loan is without collateral;  
v. the aggregate amount of loans given for income generation purposes is not less 
than 75% of the total loans given by the MFIs;  
vi. the loan is repayable by weekly, fortnightly or monthly installments at the 
choice of the borrower.  
c) The income it derives from other services is in accordance with the regulation 
specified in that behalf.  
5.10 We would also recommend that a NBFC which does not qualify as a NBFC-MFI should not be 
permitted to give loans to the microfinance sector, which in the aggregate exceed 10% of its 
total assets.  
8. Transparency in Interest Charges 
8.7 We would, therefore, recommend that:-  
a) There should be only three components in the pricing of the loan, namely (i) a 
processing fee, not exceeding 1% of the gross loan amount (ii) the interest 
charge and (iii) the insurance premium.  
b) Only the actual cost of insurance should be recovered and no administrative charges 
should be levied.  
c) Every MFI should provide to the borrower a loan card which (i) shows the effective 
rate of interest (ii) the other terms and conditions attached to the loan (iii) 
information which adequately identifies the borrower and (iv) 
acknowledgements by the MFI of payments of installments received and the 
final discharge. The Card should show this information in the local language 
understood by the borrower.  
d) The effective rate of interest charged by the MFI should be prominently displayed in 
all its offices and in the literature issued by it and on its website.  
e) There should be adequate regulations regarding the manner in which insurance 
premium is computed and collected and policy proceeds disposed off.  
f) There should not be any recovery of security deposit. Security deposits already 
collected should be returned.  
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g) There should be a standard form of loan agreement.  
9. Multiple-lending, Over-Borrowing and Ghost-Borrowing 
9.7 We would, therefore, recommend that:-  
a) MFIs should lend to an individual borrower only as a member of a JLG and should have 
the responsibility of ensuring that the borrower is not a member of another JLG.  
b) a borrower cannot be a member of more than one SHG/JLG.  
c) not more than two MFIs should lend to the same borrower.  
d) there must be a minimum period of moratorium between the grant of the loan and the 
commencement of its repayment.  
  e) recovery of loan given in violation of the regulations should be deferred till all prior 
existing loans are fully repaid.  
10. Credit Information Bureau 
10.5 We would therefore recommend that  
a) One or more Credit Information Bureaus be established and be operational as soon as 
possible and all MFIs be required to become members of such bureau.  
b) In the meantime, the responsibility to obtain information from potential borrowers 
regarding existing borrowings should be on the MFI.  
11. Coercive Methods of Recovery 
11.9  A key component in the prevention of coercive recovery is an adequate grievance 
redressal procedure. It is necessary that there should be a grievance redressal system 
established by each MFI and for this to be made known to the borrower in the literature 
issued, by display in its offices, by posting on the website and by prominent inclusion in 
the Loan Card given to the borrower. In addition, it is necessary that there should be 
independent authorities established to whom the borrower can make reference.  
21. Funding of MFIs 
21.4 We would, therefore, recommend that:  
a) The creation of one or more "Domestic Social Capital Funds" may be examined in 
consultation with SEBI.  
b) MFIs should be encouraged to issue preference capital with a ceiling on the coupon rate and this 
can be treated as part of Tier II capital subject to capital adequacy norms.  
 
___ 
 
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA - MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT 2011-12 
(SELECTED PROVISIONS) 
 
IV Credit Delivery and Financial Inclusion 
Credit Flow to the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Sector 
High Level Task Force on MSMEs 
88. As indicated in the Second Quarter Review of November 2010, the Reserve Bank, based 
on the recommendations of the High Level Task Force on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSMEs), issued guidelines in June 2010, advising scheduled commercial banks that the allocation of 
60 per cent of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) advances to the micro enterprises was to be 
achieved in stages, viz., 50 per cent in the year 2010-11, 55 per cent in the year 2011-12 and 60 per 
cent in the year 2012-13. Further, banks were mandated to achieve a 10 per cent annual growth in the 
number of micro enterprise accounts and a 20 per cent year-on-year growth in credit to the MSE 
sector. The Reserve Bank is closely monitoring the achievement of targets by banks on a half-yearly 
basis, i.e., March and September each year. A suitable format has been devised by the Reserve Bank 
to capture and monitor the achievement of the targets by banks and the same are regularly reviewed at 
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the highest level. Banks, which lag behind in achieving the targets, have been mandated to submit an 
action plan to achieve the prescribed targets. 
Rural Credit Institutions 
Licensing of Co-operatives 
89. In terms of the recommendations of the Committee on Financial Sector Assessment 
(Chairman: Dr. Rakesh Mohan and Co-Chairman: Shri Ashok Chawla) and as proposed in the Annual 
Policy Statement of April 2009, the work relating to licensing of unlicensed state and central co-
operative banks in a non-disruptive manner, in consultation with National Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (NABARD), was initiated. Subsequent to the issuance of revised guidelines on 
licensing of state co-operative banks (StCBs)/district central co-operative banks (DCCBs), 10 StCBs 
and 144 DCCBs were licensed, bringing down the number of unlicensed StCBs from 17 to 7 and 
unlicensed DCCBs from 296 to 152 as on March 31, 2011. 
 
Revival of the Rural Co-operative Credit Structure 
90. The Government of India, based on the recommendations of the Task Force on Revival of 
Rural Co-operative Credit Institutions (Chairman: Prof. A. Vaidyanathan) and in consultation with the 
State Governments, had approved a package for revival of the short-term rural co-operative credit 
structure. As envisaged in the package, 25 States have entered into memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) with the Government of India and NABARD and 20 States have amended their respective 
State Co-operative Societies Acts. As on February 28, 2011, an aggregate amount of `8,460 crore was 
released by NABARD for recapitalisation of primary agricultural credit societies (PACS) in 16 States 
as the Government of India’s share under the revival package.  
 
Financial Inclusion through Grass-root Co-operatives 
91. It was proposed in the Monetary Policy Statement of April 2010 to constitute a committee 
comprising representatives from the Reserve Bank, NABARD and a few State Governments to study 
the functioning of well-run PACS, large adivasi multi-purpose co-operative societies (LAMPS), 
farmers service societies (FSS) and thrift and credit co-operative societies set up under the parallel 
Self-Reliant Co-operative Societies Acts to gather information on their working and assess their 
potential to contribute to financial inclusion. The regional offices of the Reserve Bank have since 
given their inputs. Analysis, consolidation of data and preparation of State-wise reports are in progress 
and are expected to be completed by end-July 2011.  
 
Malegam Committee Recommendations 
 
92. In the wake of the Andhra Pradesh micro finance crisis in 2010, concerns were expressed by 
various stakeholders and the need was felt for more rigorous regulation of non-banking financial 
companies (NBFCs) functioning as micro finance institutions (MFIs). As indicated in the Second 
Quarter Review of November 2010, a Sub-Committee of the Central Board of the Reserve Bank 
(Chairman: Shri Y. H. Malegam) was constituted to study issues and concerns in the MFI sector. The 
Committee submitted its report in January 2011, which was placed in public domain. The Committee, 
inter alia, recommended (i) creation of a separate category of NBFC-MFIs; (ii) a margin cap and an 
interest rate cap on individual loans; (iii) transparency in interest charges; (iv) lending by not more 
than two MFIs to individual borrowers; (v) creation of one or more credit information bureaus; (vi) 
establishment of a proper system of grievance redressal procedure by MFIs; (vii) creation of one or 
more “social capital funds”; and (viii) continuation of categorisation of bank loans to MFIs, complying 
with the regulation laid down for NBFC-MFIs, under the priority sector. The recommendations of the 
Committee were discussed with all stakeholders, including the Government of India, select State 
Governments, major NBFCs working as MFIs, industry associations of MFIs working in the country, 
other smaller MFIs, and major banks. In the light of the feedback received, it has been decided: 
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• to accept the broad framework of regulations recommended by the Committee;  
• that bank loans to all MFIs, including NBFCs working as MFIs on or after April 1, 2011, will be 
eligible for classification as priority sector loans under respective category of indirect finance only 
if the prescribed percentage of their total assets are in the nature of "qualifying assets" and they 
adhere to the "pricing of interest" guidelines to be issued in this regard;  
• that a “qualifying asset’’ is required to satisfy the criteria of (i) loan disbursed by an MFI to a 
borrower with a rural household annual income not exceeding `60,000 or urban and semi-urban 
household income not exceeding `1,20,000; (ii) loan amount not to exceed `35,000 in the first 
cycle and `50,000 in subsequent cycles; (iii) total indebtedness of the borrower not to exceed `50,000; (iv) tenure of loan not to be less than 24 months for loan amount in excess of `15,000 
without prepayment penalty; (iv) loan to be extended without collateral; (v) aggregate amount of 
loan, given for income generation, not to be less than 75 per cent of the total loans given by the 
MFIs; and (vi) loan to be repayable by weekly, fortnightly or monthly instalments at the choice of 
the borrower;  
• that banks should ensure a margin cap of 12 per cent and an interest rate cap of 26 per cent for 
their lending to be eligible to be classified as priority sector loans;  
• that loans by MFIs can also be extended to individuals outside the self-help group (SHG)/joint 
liability group (JLG) mechanism; and 
• that bank loans to other NBFCs would not be reckoned as priority sector loans with effect from 
April 1, 2011. 
93. Detailed guidelines in this regard will be issued separately. 
Redefining the Priority Sector 
94. The Malegam Committee recommended that the existing guidelines on bank lending to the 
priority sector be revisited. Requests were also received from various quarters in the recent past to 
relook at the definition of the priority sector, especially when bank finance was being routed through 
other agencies. It is, therefore, proposed: 
• to appoint a committee to re-examine the existing classification and suggest revised 
guidelines with regard to priority sector lending classification. 
 
_____ 
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SA-DHAN CORE VALUE AND VOLUNTARY MUTUAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance institutions seek to create social benefits and promote financial inclusion by providing 
financial services to low income households, including those who were previously excluded. As these 
institutions build partnerships with their clients and the microfinance sector grows more complex, it is 
getting increasingly important to define core values and fair practices, so as to ensure that 
microfinance services are provided in a manner that benefits and respects clients. This document states 
core values for microfinance (Part-I), a voluntary mutual code of conduct for microfinance institutions 
to abide by these values (Part-II) and a process of compliance (Part-III). All microfinance institutions, 
which are members of Sa-Dhan, unanimously and whole-heartedly agree to abide by the core values 
and the code of conduct as set out hereunder: 
Part- I 
CORE VALUES IN MICROFINANCE 
INTEGRITY 
Our mission is to service low-income clients—women and men—and their families, providing them 
short term and/or long-term access to financial services, that are client focused, designed to enhance 
their well-being, and delivered in a manner that is ethical, dignified, transparent, equitable and cost 
effective. 
QUALITY OF SERVICE 
We believe that our clients deserve fair and efficient microfinance services. We will provide these 
services to them in as convenient, participatory and timely manner as possible. 
TRANSPARENCY 
We shall give our clients complete and accurate information and educate them about the terms of 
financial services offered by us in a manner that is understandable by them. 
FAIR PRACTICES 
We are committed to ensure that our services to our clients are not unethical and deceptive. In 
providing microfinance services including lending and collection of dues, we are committed to fair 
practices, which balance respect for client’s dignity and an understanding of a client’s vulnerable 
situation, with reasonable pursuit of recovery of loans. 
PRIVACY OF CLIENT INFORMATION 
We will safeguard personal information of clients, only allowing disclosures and exchange of such 
information to others who are authorized to see it, with the knowledge and consent of clients. 
INTEGRATING SOCIAL VALUES INTO OPERATIONS 
We believe that high standards of governance, participation, management and reporting are critical to 
our mission to serve our clients and to uphold core social values. 
FEEDBACK MECHANISM 
We shall provide our clients formal and informal channels for their feedback and suggestions for 
building our competencies to serve our clients better. 
 
Part-II 
VOLUNTARY MUTUAL CODE OF CONDUCT 
To ensure that all our activities and dealings with clients are in compliance with the above core values, 
we all agree to adopt the code of conduct as elaborated hereunder: 
2.0 APPLICATION OF THE CODE: 
i) This code applies to all categories of member microfinance institutions - irrespective of their 
constitution (a society or a trust or company or cooperative society under any state enactment or 
Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act) - whose principal activity is microfinance. 
ii) This code applies to following activities undertaken by member microfinance institutions: 
a) Formation of any type of community collectives including self-help groups, Joint liability groups 
and their federations. 
b) Providing financial literacy to the clients. 
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c) Collection of thrift from clients. 
d) Making arrangement for remittance of funds collected from clients through banking channels or by 
any other means. 
e) Providing credit services to clients individually or in groups; 
f) Recovery of credit provided to clients for economic activities or for any other purpose for the 
welfare and benefit of clients. 
g) Business development services including marketing products or services made or extended by the 
eligible clients or for any other purpose for the welfare and benefit of clients. 
h) Providing insurance or pension benefit products as partners or agents of insurance companies, or 
pension or mutual fund schemes duly licensed to undertake microfinance or insurance or pensioners’ 
benefit schemes by a competent authority. 
iii) Certain key words used in this code are defined in the Annexure at the end of this code. 
iv) This code comes into effect from 18 January 2007 unless otherwise indicated. 
2.1 We all agree to— 
i) Promote and strengthen the microfinance movement in the country by bringing the low-income 
clients to the mainstream financial sector. 
ii) Build progressive, sustainable and client-centric microfinance institutions in the country to provide 
integrated financial services to our clients. 
iii) Promote cooperation and coordination among microfinance institutions and other agencies to 
achieve higher operating standards and avoid unethical competition in order to serve our clients better. 
2.2 In order to achieve the aforesaid, we all agree to follow the following practices mentioned below: 
2.2.1 INTEGRITY 
We agree to— 
i) Act honestly, fairly and reasonably in conducting microfinance activities. 
ii) Conduct our microfinance activities by means of fair competition, not seeking competitive 
advantages through illegal or unethical microfinance practices. No officer, employee, agent or other 
person acting on our behalf shall take unfair advantage of anyone by manipulation, concealment, 
abuse of privileged information, misrepresentation of material facts or any other unfair 
practice. 
iii) Prominently display the core values and code of conduct on the notice board of head office and all 
branches, and put systems in place to ensure compliance. 
iv) Ensure that our staff and any person acting for us or on our behalf, are trained or oriented to put 
these values into practice. 
2.2.2 TRANSPARENCY 
We agree to— 
i) Disclose to clients all the terms and conditions of our financial services offered in the language 
understood by the client. 
ii) Disclose the source of funds, costs of funds and use of surpluses to provide truthful information to 
clients. 
iii) Provide information to clients on the rate of interest levied on the loan, calculation of interest 
(monthly/quarterly/half-yearly), terms of repayment, and any other information related to interest rates 
and other charges 
iv) Provide information to clients on the rate of interest offered on the thrift services provided by us. 
v) Provide information to clients related to the premium and other fees being charged on insurance and 
pension services offered by us as intermediaries. 
vi) Provide periodical statements of our accounts to the clients. 
2.2.3 FAIR PRACTICES 
We are committed to follow fair practices built on dignity, respect, fair treatment, persuasion and 
courtesy to clients. We agree to 
i) Provide micro finance services to low income clients irrespective of gender, race, caste, religion or 
language. 
ii) Ensure that the services are provided using the most efficient methods possible to enable access to 
financial services by low income households at reasonable cost. 
iii) Recognize our responsibility to provide financial services to clients based upon their needs and 
repayment capacity. 
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iv) Promise that, in case of loans to individual clients below Rs 25,000, the clients shall not be asked 
to hand over original land titles, house pattas, ration cards, etc as collateral security for loans except 
when obtaining copies of these for fulfilling “know your customers” norms of the RBI. Only in case of 
loan to individual clients of Rs 25,000/- and above can land titles, house pattas, vehicle RC books, etc. 
be taken as collateral security. 
v) Interact with the clients in an acceptable language and dignified manner and spare no efforts in 
fostering clients’ confidence and long-term relationship.  
vi) Maintain decency and decorum during the visit to the clients’ place for collection of dues. 
vii) Avoid inappropriate occasions such as bereavement in the family or such other calamitous 
occasions for making calls/visits to collect dues. 
viii) Scrupulously avoid any demeanour that would suggest any kind of threator violence. 
ix) Emphasize using social collateral which includes various forms of peer assurance such as lending 
through groups and group guarantees at the village, hamlet or neighbourhood level, or guarantees by 
relatives, friends, neighbours or business associates; and explain clearly to clients what are the 
obligations of social collateral. 
2.2.4 GOVERNANCE 
We agree to— 
i) Observe high standards of governance, ensuring fairness, integrity and transparency by inducting 
persons with good and sound reputation, as members of Board of Directors. We shall ensure that the 
majority of the directors are independent directors and/or duly elected representatives of the 
community we serve, and that we will involve the Board in all policy formulation and other 
important decisions. 
ii) Ensure transparency in the maintenance of books of accounts and reporting/ presentation and 
disclosure of financial statements by qualified auditor/s. 
iii) Put in our best efforts to follow the Audit and Assurance Standards issued by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).  
iv) Place before the Board of Directors, a compliance report indicating the extent of compliance with 
this Voluntary Mutual Code of Conduct, specifically indicating any deviations and reasons therefore, 
at the end of every half financial year. 
2.2.5 FEEDBACK/ GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS 
We agree to— 
i) Establish effective and efficient feedback mechanism 
ii) Take steps to correct any errors and handle complaints speedily and efficiently. 
iii) Provide; where a complainant is not satisfied with the outcome of the investigation into her 
complaint, she shall be notified of her right to refer the matter to the Ethics and Grievance Redressal 
Committee constituted by Sa-Dhan. 
 
Part-III 
COMPLIANCE MECHANISM 
 
3.1 The Board of Directors of Sa-Dhan shall form an independent Ethics and Grievance Redressal 
Committee to facilitate compliance with this code. The committee shall be constituted of respected 
and trusted persons from the microfinance sector and other social development sectors, providing 
guidance and help in resolving any disputes. 
3.2 The board of the member microfinance institutions should adopt the core values and the code of 
conduct on an annual basis. 
3.3 In case of a written complaint received by the Ethics and Grievance Redressal Committee 
regarding non-compliance with the code by any member microfinance institution, the committee shall 
take the following steps: 
i) Assist in compliance. 
ii) Failing which— 
a) Formally write to the chief executive of that member microfinance institution to respond to the 
complaint within 15 days. 
b) If the chief executive of that member microfinance institution fails to respond within 15 days of the 
receipt of the communiqué, the matter will be formally communicated to the board of that 
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microfinance institution in writing to seek a response. 
c) If the board does not respond within the 15 days of the receipt of the communiqué, the membership 
of that microfinance institution shall be suspended till further decision of the committee. 
d) If the committee decides it is necessary to expel the microfinance institution from the membership 
of Sa-Dhan, it shall recommend the expulsion to the Board of Directors of Sa-Dhan. 
e) The Board of Directors of Sa-Dhan shall then take the appropriate decision and if they decide to 
expel the member, the name of the expelled member will be published on the website of Sa-Dhan. 
 
ANNEXURE 
“Clients” refers to those served by the microfinance institutions - women and men from socially, 
economically and politically disadvantaged sections of society, including small and marginal farmers, 
oral lessees, tenants, sharecroppers, disadvantaged social groups, artisans, and persons engaged in 
small and tiny economic activities. 
“Microfinance Services” means the following activities undertaken by Sa-Dhan’s member 
microfinance institutions: 
i) Formation of any type of community collectives including self-help groups, 
Joint liability groups and their federations; 
ii) Collection of thrift from clients; 
iii) Making arrangement for remittance of funds collected from clients, through banking channels or 
by any other means; 
iv) Providing credit services to clients, individually or in groups.; 
v) Recovery of credit provided to clients for economic activities or for any 
other purpose for the welfare and benefit of clients; 
vi) Business development services including marketing products or services made or extended by the 
eligible clients or for any other purpose for the welfare and benefit of clients. 
vii) Providing insurance or pension benefit products as partners or agents of insurance companies or 
pension or mutual fund schemes duly licensed to undertake micro finance or insurance or pensioners’ 
benefit schemes by a competent authority 
“Thrift” means savings of clients, who have become members of self-help groups, other than public 
deposits. 
 
_____ 
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MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS NETWORK (MFIN) CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
MFIN MEMBERS 
As all MFIN Member MFIs are regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), they are already 
required to follow all prudential norms as well as consumer protection practices laid down by the 
RBI. This Code of Conduct is designed to ensure that the RBI Guidelines are followed in both letter 
and spirit, and in some matters, lays down additional requirements. 
A. FAIR PRACTICES WITH BORROWERS 
i. Communication of charges 
All members should clearly convey to the borrowers the following terms of the loan (at the minimum): 
a. All the important terms and conditions of the loan agreement 
b. Declining rate of interest 
c. Processing fee 
d. Any other charges 
e. Security or any other deposit. 
f. Systematic advance collections 
g. Total charges recovered for insurance coverage risks covered 
h. Any other services rendered and charges for the same 
The communication should be in writing through any/various of the following ways: 
· Individual sanction letter 
· Loan card 
· Loan schedule 
· Passbook 
· Through Group/Centre meetings (Details can be printed on a paper and all borrowers can 
sign on the same as acknowledgement of their acceptance) 
The communication should be in a medium understood by the borrower 
 
ii. Nature and amount of charges 
 
The code of conduct will not specify the nature and quantum of charges to be charged by individual 
MFIs. However, the transparency of the same should be ensured as covered in clause ( I.i. ) 
 
iii. Recovery mechanism 
a. Though each MFI tries to ensure on-time recovery of dues, it is imperative that they shall 
not use any abusive, violent, or unethical methods of collection and recovery efforts should be in line 
with guidelines issued from RBI from time to time. 
b. A valid receipt (in whatever form as decided by each member) should be provided for each 
collection from the borrower. 
 
B. MULIPLE LENDING & LENDING LIMITS 
a. The maximum number of MFIs who can lend to one client is three, and the maximum loan 
outstanding that all the three MFIs together can have to a single client is restricted to Rs. 50,000/- at 
any point in time. 
b. This cap will cover only unsecured loans given within the joint liability group mechanism 
or mutual guarantee of all types. 
c. Any secured loans or individual business loans will not be covered under this cap. 
d. The code will not cover the credit norms to be fixed by individual member MFIs. 
 
C. DATA SHARING/ INCIDENT SHARING 
a. In addition to the formatted data supplied to the Credit Bureaus CIBIL and High Mark, and 
hence available to all the members through the bureaus, it should be agreed to participate in a forum to 
share qualitative credit information. 
b. Whenever any member comes across Incidents of High Default (IHD), the member should 
inform the Association of the same so that the other members are made aware of it. 
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c. However whether any other member would further lend to clients in such an area would be 
the choice of each individual MFI based on their credit policies 
d. In connection with ‘c’ above, it is agreed that each member will make his decision 
transparent to the remaining members. 
e. In case of any Incidents of High Default is faced by one MFI, all members shall cooperate 
in a recovery drive and restrain lending in that area till things are streamlined. 
 
D. RECRUITMENT 
a. The code covers all MFI staff, in particular field staff. Field staff is defined as all branch 
staff including the branch manager. 
b. Any member MFI should have at least 50 percent of its net new recruitment in any 
particular year as people whose immediate previous job has not been with another member MFI. 
c. As a matter of free and fair recruitment practice, there will be no restriction on hiring of 
staff from other MFIs by legitimate means in the public domain like general recruitment 
advertisements in local newspapers, web advertisements on site, walk-in interviews, etc. 
d. Whenever a member MFI recruits from any other member MFI, it will be mandatory to 
seek a reference check from the previous employer. 
e. All member MFIs should agree to provide within two weeks the reply to the reference check 
correspondence from another member MFI. 
f. All member MFIs also agree not to recruit anybody from the other members without the 
relieving letter / no due certificate from the previous MFI employer. 
g. All member MFIs agree to provide such relieving letter / no due certificate to the outgoing 
employee in case he has given proper notice, handed over the charge and settled all the dues towards 
the MFI. 
h. The relieving MFI is within its rights to insist on an actual serving of notice for 30 days, but 
the rest of the notice period pay may be reimbursed by the recruiting MFI. It is the prerogative of the 
relieving MFI to waive part/full of the notice period or accept cash consideration in lieu. 
i. It is also agreed that any staff member who is discovered to have lied about his background 
of working with any other MFI, will be asked to leave immediately by the recruiting MFI. 
 
E. WHISTLE BLOWING 
a. Any person or MFIN member is entitled to report an incident of improper conduct an MFIN 
member to the Code of Conduct Enforcement Committee (CCEC) of MFIN. 
b. The CCEC shall investigate such instances within 30 calendar days of receiving such report. 
For this purpose the CCEC may depute its own staff or use the services of outsourced agencies as the 
CCEC thinks fit. 
 
F. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM 
a. If the CCEC finds the charge prima facie correct, it shall give notice to both the parties for a 
written representation for the charge within 15 days 
b. If the CCEC finds that the contravening Member admits to the contravention and 
undertakes not to repeat the same then the CCEC may drop further proceedings 
c. However if the Member does not admit to contravention or does not undertake to stop 
further contraventions, the CCEC shall hold a hearing with both the parties present within a further 
period of 15 days. 
d. If the action of the member is found to be in contravention to the Code of Conduct, the 
following escalation will come into effect, with a gap of 15 days at each stage, in case no corrective 
action has been taken. 
· Communication to the errant member’s MFIN representative. 
· Communication to the Chief Executive of the respective MFI. 
· Communication to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the errant MFI. 
· Communication to each member of the Board of Directors of the errant MFI. 
· Communication to the institutional investors of the errant MFI 
· Communication to the institutional lenders of the errant MFI 
· Communication to the RBI about the errant MFI 
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e. The errant MFI as well as the complainant can appeal to the Board of MFIN against the 
decision of the CCEC within 15 days. The appeal will be adjudicated by the Board of the MFIN in its 
next meeting. 
f. The escalation mechanism will be kept on hold till such time an appeal is adjudicated upon. 
g. In case no corrective action is taken by the errant member, within 1 month of the final 
escalation, the Board of MFIN is entitled to suspend the errant MFI from the membership of MFIN for 
a period or expel the member from MFIN. While suspension can be approved by the Board with a 
two-thirds majority, the decision for expulsion would require a two-thirds majority in the Board 
favouring it and a further approval by the General Body with two-thirds majority either present and 
voting in person or voting through any written form including e-mail and fax. 
h. This action under ‘g’ would then be communicated to all important stakeholders, along with 
the reasons. 
 
G. OMBUDSPERSON MECHANISM 
a. MFIN Board will appoint one or two individuals of high professional reputation and 
integrity, as Ombduspersons, in each of the six RBI regions – East, West, Central, South, North and 
Northeast, to provide an independent mechanism to individual consumers or staff members to 
complain against an MFI and seek redressal. They will be given adequate secretarial support by 
MFIN. 
b. Any person desiring to complain against an MFIN Member shall write a letter to the 
Ombudsperson 
c. The Ombudsperson, on receipt of the complaint will send copies to the Chairman of the 
CCEC and the Chairman of MFIN Board. The Ombudsperson can cause an initial enquiry to be 
conducted to determine prima facie if there exists a case for investigation 
d. If the Ombudsperson does not feel that there exists a case for further investigation, he may 
accordingly write back to the complaining person with copies marked to the Chairman of MFIN and 
the Chairman of the CCEC (unless the matter pertains to the Chairman himself in which case it shall 
be marked to the Vice Chairman) 
e. If the Ombudsperson feels that there exists a prima facie case for investigation, then he shall 
cause an investigation to be made using the services of the Secretariat of the MFIN. 
f. The Ombudsperson may also require the presence of parties to the dispute in which case, 
such meetings shall normally be held at the office of the Ombudsmen unless the disputing parties 
mutually agree to any other place for such meetings 
g. If after reasonable notice, any party to the dispute fails to be present for such meetings or 
fails to provide written responses to the queries of the Ombudsperson, then the Ombudsperson 
shall proceed to give his decision with the materials available with him 
h. The Ombudsmen will have the power to ask the errant MFI to make good any damages incurred by 
the consumer, and in addition impose a fine on the MFI, commensurate with the seriousness of the 
complaint. After investigation and such inter-party meetings as the Ombudsperson determines, the 
Ombudsperson shall deliver his decision on the dispute in front of him and such decision shall be 
communicated in writing to all the parties to the dispute as well as to the Chairman of the CCEC and 
the Chairman of MFIN. Such decisions of the Ombudsperson shall be final and binding on all the 
parties involved. 
i. However if any of the parties to the dispute desire to contest the decision of the 
Ombudsperson, then they may give the same in writing to the Chairman of MFIN who shall place it 
before the next General Body of the members and two-thirds of the Members may take the final 
decision on the dispute either by voting in person or through other written forms including e-mails and 
fax. 
j. In extreme case, the Ombusdperson may also recommend suspension or expulsion from 
membership of the errant MFI to the MFIN Board. This will then follow the same process as specified 
in clause (F.g.) above. 
 
H. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CODE OF CONDUCT 
Any amendments to this Code of Conduct will be adopted through the due process of first, a 
Board majority approval and thereafter a ratification by a majority of the General Body. 
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_____ 
THE SMART CAMPAIGN CLIENT PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
(REVISED AS OF JULY 2011) 
 
 Appropriate product design and delivery  
 
Providers will take adequate care to design products and delivery channels in such a way that they do 
not cause clients harm. Products and delivery channels will be designed with client characteristics 
taken into account.  
 Prevention of over-indebtedness  
 
Providers will take adequate care in all phases of their credit process to determine that clients have the 
capacity to repay without becoming over-indebted. In addition, providers will implement and monitor 
internal systems that support prevention of over-indebtedness and will foster efforts to improve market 
level credit risk management (such as credit information sharing).  
 Transparency  
 
Providers will communicate clear, sufficient and timely information in a manner and language clients 
can understand so that clients can make informed decisions. The need for transparent information on 
pricing, terms and conditions of products is highlighted.  
 Responsible pricing  
 
Pricing, terms and conditions will be set in a way that is affordable to clients while allowing for 
financial institutions to be sustainable. Providers will strive to provide positive real returns on 
deposits.  
 Fair and respectful treatment of clients  
 
Financial service providers and their agents will treat their clients fairly and respectfully. They will not 
discriminate. Providers will ensure adequate safeguards to detect and correct corruption as well as 
aggressive or abusive treatment by their staff and agents, particularly during the loan sales and debt 
collection processes.  
 Privacy of client data  
 
The privacy of individual client data will be respected in accordance with the laws and regulations of 
individual jurisdictions. Such data will only be used for the purposes specified at the time the 
information is collected or as permitted by law, unless otherwise agreed with the client.  
 Mechanisms for complaint resolution  
 
Providers will have in place timely and responsive mechanisms for complaints and problem resolution 
for their clients and will use these mechanisms both to resolve individual problems and to improve 
their products and services.  
 
_____ 
  144
 
  145 
ANNEX I – ABSTRACTS 
 
ENGLISH 
Increasing commercialisation of the competitive Indian microfinance market has exposed the 
shortcomings of the commonly used microfinance model, the joint-liability-group model. 
While it was designed to address the lack of information of lenders, it failed to address the 
informational asymmetry to the disadvantage of consumers, which is equally important. 
Consumer protection is essential to overcome this asymmetry. This need is not unique to the 
microfinance market, but applies equally to financial products for middle-class clients. 
Unfortunately, a unified regulation of the Indian microfinance sector has not yet been passed. 
While the draft of the central microfinance bill appoints the RBI as the main regulator, it has 
not been adopted yet. It would be needed in order to regulate the sector nationwide, so that 
banks and investors can readapt their strategies and eventually start lending to struggling 
MFIs again. I portrayed the efforts of the regulator, funders, institutions and industry 
associations to meet this need for regulation and came to the conclusion that none of these 
efforts can replace a unified legal framework 
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GERMAN 
Die Kommerzialisierung und der Wettbewerb am indischen Mikrofinanzmarkt haben gezeigt, 
dass das hauptsächlich genutzte Mikrofinanzmodell mangelhaft ist. Dieses wurde entwickelt, 
um die Informationsmängel der Mikrofinanzinstitutionen auszugleichen. Dabei wurde aber 
übersehen, dass auch die Kunden nur über mangelhafte Informationen verfügen. Um dieses 
Informationsdefizit auszugleichen, ist Konsumentenschutz erforderlich, wie er auch bei 
Finanzprodukten für die Mittelklasse üblich ist. 
Eine einheitliche Regulierung des Mikrofinanzmarktes in Indien fehlt. Der Entwurf eines 
einheitlichen Mikrofinanzgesetzes sieht die indische Nationalbank als Regulierungsbehörde 
vor, wurde aber noch nicht vom Parlament verabschiedet. In dieser Arbeit werden der Stand 
der Regulierung und die Konsumentenschutzmaßnahmen verschiedener Akteure wie 
Geberinstitutionen, Investoren, Banken, Industrieverbänden und Mikrofinanzinstitutionen 
dargestellt. Deren Bemühungen können eine gesetzliche Regulierung des Sektors allerdings 
nicht ersetzen. 
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